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ABSTRACT 
This thesis criticizes Marx's labour theory of value in terms of Habermas's critique 
of subject-centred thinking, before going on to criticize Habermas's subject-centred 
approach to the economic system in terms of an intersubjectively re-formulated 
conception of labour, for while Habermas restores normative content to the principle 
of self-constitution he restricts it to communicative action. This places the economic 
system (and its bureaucratic state apparatus) beyond the normative content of 
modernity. Drawing upon Honneth's writings on struggles for recognition, the thesis 
seeks to re-normatize labour on the basis of worker's own struggles to re-normatize 
the economic system. 
The first half of the thesis explores the tensions that arise from Marx's attempt to 
locate his critique of capitalism in a subject-centred conception of self-constitution. 
Although Marx seeks to historicize the categories of political economy (in line with 
capitalist exchange relations), he also seeks to preserve a transhistorical conception 
of labour as the subject of self-objectification (as the standpoint from which to 
criticize capitalism). However, this leaves Marx vulnerable to his own historical 
critique of political economy. It is then argued that it is only possible to redeem the 
latter by re-grounding critical theory in the labour movement's social and historical 
struggles to oppose capital. 
This requires a re-formulation of Marx's labour theory of value. In place of Marx's 
notion that 'value' is an expression of self-objectifying labour we substitute 
Simmel's intersubjective approach to money-value. Marx's account of value is then 
understood as arising from the diremption of intersubjectivity into an 'objective' 
economic system and its 'subjective' agents. This generates a bifurcation of self-
constitution with the intersubjective form of normative social-constitution, on the 
one side, and the dirempted objective and subjective forms of economic-constitution 
on the other. 
The second half of the thesis critically analyzes Habermas' s contention that modem 
sociality is divided into a normative lifeworld and a non-normative system. This 
takes the form of an empirical critique of Habermas' s restriction of normativity to 
communicative action, and a theoretical critique of his restriction of the charge of 
reification to the economic system's encroachment upon the latter. In keeping with 
the theory of discourse ethics, it is argued that Habermas cannot legitimately 
withdraw normative content from labour and claim universal scope for the former. 
Consequently, not only is the economic system's capacity to suppress the 
normativity of labour invalid from the standpoint of 'practical reason', but so is 
Habermas's attempt to legitimate the system on the basis of 'functional reason'. The 
thesis draws on Honneth's work to extend the realm of intersubjectivity into the 
economy on the basis of the struggles of the labour movement to sublate its 
diremption of self-regulating system and self-interested actors. We conclude by 
arguing that trade unions and the welfare state may be understood to comprise 
normative vehicles for subjecting 'market-value' to an intersubjectively accountable 
form of 'social-value'. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Marxism is no longer a fashionable theory - although Marxists will argue this is 
less a function of Marxism than the unpropitious times in which we live. 
However, the tum away from Marxism has not meant the end of critical theory. 
On the contrary, under the influence of poststructuralism critical theory migrated 
during the 1980s from the economic to the cultural realm. Laclau and Mouffe's 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (1985) remains a seminal text marking this 
shift in Britain, in which the authors seek to replace the economic detenninism 
underlying Marx's class-based approach, with a post-Marxist 'openness of the 
social' designed to give equal weight to the struggles of other 'social 
movements' .1 
According to Laclau and Mouffe, Marx's economic detenninism comprises a 
form of' essentialism' that pre-structures society in a closed and systemic fashion. 
In order to overcome this essentialist standpoint they set about re-defining 
modem sociality as an indeterminate entity whose very 'openness' comprises its 
'negative essence' (ibid., p.95). 'There is no sutured space peculiar to "society" 
since the social has no essence' (ibid., p.96). To this extent the space of the social 
is made up of a set of contingent, indeterminate and fluid properties, which social 
movements then seek to impose a necessary, determinant and fixed identity upon. 
The act of imposing social order on the inchoate actuality of social difference is 
called an 'hegemonic practice'. Thus, according to Laclau and Mouffe ' ... the 
openness and indeterminacy of the social ... gives a primary and founding 
character to negativity and antagonism, and assures the existence of articulatory 
and hegemonic practices' (ibid., pp.144-5). 
Laclau and Mouffe list: ' ... the new feminism, the protest movements of ethnic, national and 
sexual minorities, the anti-institutional ecology struggles waged by marginalized layers of the 
population, the anti-nuclear movement, the atypical forms of social struggle in countries on the 
capitalist periphery ... ' (Laclau & Mouffe 1985, p.1) 
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Laclau and Mouffe argue that as Marxism developed, the field governed by 
economic determinism was replaced by a more inessential and contingent 
conception of the social, culminating in their own assertion that ' ... the space of 
the economy is itself structured as a political space ... ' (ibid., pp.76-77). In order 
to justify this claim they draw on the 'politics of production' school to argue that 
labour-power is merely a 'fictional' commodity whose social form is detennined 
through struggle (ibid., p.78). 'Thus, it is not a pure logic of capital which 
determines the evolution of the labour process; the latter is not merely the place 
where capital exerts its domination, but the ground of a struggle' (ibid., p.79). 
However, as a means to criticize Marxism, Laclau and Mouffe's choice of a 
'politics of production' approach suffers from the fact that not only are many of 
its advocates committed Marxists,2 but they also accept the existence of the 'logic 
of capital'.3 Indeed it is precisely because economic structures operate on the 
basis of a 'law of value' that is not reducible to political controls, that Bowles and 
Gintis argue capitalism stands opposed to democratic fonns of 'popular 
sovereignty' (Bowles and Gintis 1986). Thus, while Laclau and Mouffe's 
celebration of' ... the ultimate precariousness of all difference ... ' (op. cit., p.128) 
is designed to make space for a 'radical democratic' strategy, the effect is to 
undermine the economy's detenninistic social structure and with it the role 
played by 'radical democracy' in subverting it. To this extent Laclau and Mouffe 
merely substitute Marx's overly deterministic conception of sociality with an 
overly indeterminate one. 
However, the main problem with Laclau and Mouffe's approach is not that its 
social ontology is as prescriptive as Marx's, but that its alternative fails to do 
2 Michael Burawoy, whose book The Politics of Production is central to this school, writes 
specifically in defence of a Marxist approach (Burawoy 1985). 
3 Bowles and Gintis, who are quoted in connection with the fictional commodity status of labour-
power, continue to refer to the 'logic of capitalist production' (Bowles and Gintis 1986, p.35). 
justice to the historical hegemony of economic imperatives. By arguing that the 
economy comprises' ... the last redoubt of essentialism' (op. cit., p.75), Lac1au 
and Mouffe suggest that it is possible to deconstruct 'economism' by 
deconstructing 'essentialism', without regard to the possibility that the latter is an 
historical expression of the former's capacity to hegemonize society. It is, 
therefore, necessary to distinguish between; (a) the problem of essentialism, and 
(b) the problem of economic determinism. 
If, on the one hand, the problem of essentialism is traced to the determinate 
nature of the capitalist system, then it cannot be resolved by merely re-describing 
sociality in an indeterminate fashion. However, if, on the other hand, the 
determinate nature of the capitalist system is ascribed to sociality in general, then 
it is possible to resolve the problem of essentialism by re-describing the 
economic realm in historically contingent terms. In other words, if we view the 
problem of essentialism as predicated on the hegemonic structures of the 
economy, then it can only be resolved by reforming the economy. Whereas, if the 
deterministic characteristics of the capitalist economy are erroneously transferred 
to society in general, the problem of essentialism can be resolved by 
reformulating how we theorize sociality. Consequently, while Lac1au and Mouffe 
are guilty of defining out of existence the actual deterministic nature of 
capitalism, Marxists are often guilty of defining out of existence the potentially 
indeterminate nature of sociality. To avoid these errors we need to differentiate 
the potential social agents possess to determine their own social structures, from 
the actual form these social structures take in specific historical circumstances. In 
other words, we need to employ a theory of 'reification' . 
To this end Berger and Pullberg ask' ... how is it possible that human activity 
(Handeln) should produce a world of things (chose)?' (Berger and Pullberg 1966, 
p.57). To answer this question the authors return to the tradition of German 
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idealism and in particular Hegel's philosophy of history. 'In the Hegelian 
philosophy Spirit objectivates itself, alienates itself and recovers itself without 
respite' (ibid., p.58). Although Hegel does not use the term reification 
(Verdinglichung, literally thingification), Berger and Pullberg argue that for 
Hegel human history is a history in which 'Man exteriorizes himself and looses 
himself in the things - in the loss the things are posited as "in-itself-others" - only 
to be returned to himself in thought' (ibid., p.58). Thus the starting point for 
Berger and Pullberg is the assertion that humanity is a self-constituting species, 
'man the world-builder', for whom ' ... social structure is nothing but the result of 
human enterprise ... ' (ibid., p.62). However, as a consequence of a 'rupture' 
occurring between producer and produced the latter acquire an external, inhuman 
and reificatory guise. 'Institutions are reified by mystifying their true character as 
human objectivations and by defining them, again, as supra-human facticities 
analogous to the facticities of nature' (ibid., p.67). 
This approach can be fruitfully applied to the economy insofar as it too comprises 
a set of social structures which have acquired a supra-social nature. Thus, what 
for Lac1au and Mouffe arises from an economistic conception of labour, is 
viewed by Berger and Pullberg as arising from labour's de facto but contingently 
'reified' character. 'Labour ... becomes not the world-producing realization of the 
human faculties of man, but a thing, a power to be bought and sold on a 
quantitatively evaluating market' (ibid., p.59). Moreover, because Berger and 
Pullberg view economic determinism as grounded in the 'facticity' of labour's 
reification, rather than the 'fiction' of its commodity status, the process of de-
reification can only be achieved on the basis of actual social 'shocks' such as 
war, trade or migration (ibid., p.70). 
Nevertheless, Berger and Pullberg continue to inhabit an epistemological terrain 
grounded in the sociology of knowledge, in which reification comprises a 
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'mystification' of the 'true character' of humanity's inherent world-forming 
capacities (op. cit.). To this extent Berger and Pullberg share with Laclau and 
Mouffe and the Marxist tradition, a tendency to ground self-constitution in an 
'ontological' rather than a 'normative' conception of sociality. As such, the 
capacity for social constitution is attributed to the world-forming practices of 
humanity, rather than the normative principles of specific social beings in 
particular historical contexts. 
Herein lies the importance of Habermas' s attempt to provide the process of self-
constitution with a specifically modem normative content. Central to Habermas' s 
re-formulation of critical theory is the notion that normativity is an 
intersubjective phenomenon in which subjects participate in the redemption of 
claims to cognitive, moral and expressive validity. To this extent, participant's 
capacity to argumentatively redeem the moral rules that regulate their lives rests 
on a set of emergent historical conditions, that makes the free and fair 
involvement of participants in rational argumentation possible. 
If this is the case then the attribution of alienation (or reification) to a social state 
of affairs must be based on a normative account of human agency - i.e. one that 
affirms human beings should constitute their own sociality. As such, social 
theorists are not only engaged in describing a specific social ontology, but also of 
prescribing a form of life lived according to morally valid criteria. Moreover, 
what is morally valid for one time and place will not be valid at another. Thus the 
fact that modem sociality is legitimated on the basis of a specific conception of 
social validity - one that valorizes the autonomy of the subject - generates its own 
problems of determinism. In order to do justice to this conception of social 
validity it is therefore necessary to provide alienation (reification) with a 
normative content in conformity with the modem principle of self-constitution. 
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To this extent it is no longer a question of grounding the charge ofreification in a 
pre-given ontology of human agency, but of viewing the latter's eschewal of 
normative content as the starting point for an historical analysis of the fonner. To 
this end we propose to view purely ontologically defined fonns of self-
constitution as expressions of reified nonnativity. The question then arises as to 
how normative relations (between subjects) assume the fonn of epistemological 
relations (between subjects and objects). Marx seeks to explain this situation in 
terms of his theory of 'commodity fetishism' in which relationships between 
people in production are ascribed to things in exchange (Marx 1976). However, 
this rests on an 'ontological' notion of labour as the originary source of self-
objectifying subjectivity. With the aid of Habermas's intersubjective critique of 
subject-centred thinking it is possible to widen the charge of reification to include 
Marx's own conception of self-objectification. 
Unfortunately, Habermas is reluctant to extend his intersubjective conception of 
social validity into the economic realm of monetary relationships. On the 
contrary, he limits the normative content of social-constitution to the 'symbolic' 
lifeworld and views the economic realm as a 'non-normative' fonn of system-
constitution. Thus, rather than attempting to re-formulate Marx's labour theory of 
value along normative lines, Habermas merely confirms its instrumental status 
for capitalism. However, Habermas's decision not to view the economic system 
as a reified form of intersubjectivity cannot be justified on the basis of his own 
discourse ethics, which maintains that only a universalistic conception of 
normative self-constitution is capable of rendering modernity legitimate. It is then 
possible to re-formulate Marx's labour theory of value along normative lines, in 
order to argue that 'value relations' comprise a reified form of inter subjectivity. 
However, it is not only necessary to account for the social conditions responsible 
for reifying intersubjective forms of social validity, but also the social conditions 
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which make a normatively redeemable conception of reification possible. Thus if 
the former can be said to arise from the capacity of the economic system to 
regulate itself on the basis of a 'law of value', then the latter can be said to arise 
from the struggles by participants to subject this 'objective' law to ethical criteria. 
In other words, while it can be argued that the economy generates a 'factitious' 
form of social validity, that renders it susceptible to epistemological evaluation, 
workers' struggles to make the economy responsive to their welfare renders it 
susceptible to moral evaluation. Hence the importance of trade unions and the 
welfare state in institutionalizing an intersubjective form of self-constitution 
capable of subjecting the objective 'values' of the system to normative validity 
claims. 
We shall now give a chapter by chapter account of our argument. Chapter one 
seeks to locate the philosophical origins of Marx's labour theory of value in his 
idealist predecessors' notion of self-constituting subjectivity. German idealism 
attempts to reconcile the 'autonomy' of subjectivity with the 'heteronomy' of 
objectivity by viewing the latter as an expression of the former. Thus, for Hegel, 
the subject first 'externalizes' itself in the world, before coming to 're-internalize' 
its alien otherness at a higher level of (self-)consciousness. Marx then 
appropriates this trope and seeks to further 'materialize' it by making a 
distinction between; (a) the natural process of self-objectification that arises from 
the purposive transformation of nature and; (b) the historical process of self-
alienation that arises from the social organization of labour by capital. This, 
however, generates a form of objective sociality that is forever alien to its self-
externalizing subjects. 
In chapter two we explore the tensions which arise from Marx's attempt to 
ground his critique of capitalism in the process of self-objectifying labour. 
Although Marx argues that the naturalistic categories of political economy mirror 
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the fetishistic character of capitalism he, nevertheless, retains a naturalistic 
conception of 'production in general' from which to launch his own critique of 
capitalism. This, however, renders him vulnerable to his own historicist critique 
of political economy. These problems arise because Marx attempts to ground his 
socialist critique of capitalism in a transhistorical rather than an historical 
conception of social labour. In other words, by making self-objectifying labour 
rather than the labour movement the condition for the possibility of socialism 
means Marx is unable to redeem his historicist critique of political economy. 
Chapter three is divided into two sections. Section one examines the tension that 
arises between Marx's historically informed account of the formation of labour 
by capital and the transhistorical basis of his labour theory of value. However, if 
as Marx's historical account of the 'real subordination of labour' indicates 
'labour' is the social product of capital, rather than capital being the social 
product of labour, then an alternative basis for value is required. Section two 
draws on Simmel's 'intersubjective' account of value in order to examine the role 
of exchange in socially 'validating' things. We shall then develop Simmel's 
contention that money-value comprises a form of reified intersubjectivity. 
Chapter four concludes our examination of Marx with an analysis of his theory 
of exploitation. Here the tension between the historical critique of political 
economy and the transhistorical critique of capitalism manifests itself as a dispute 
with regard to the fairness of the wage workers receive for the sale of their 
labour-power. Thus while the wage appears fair from the historical standpoint of 
exchange, it appears unfair from the transhistorical standpoint of production in 
general. However, it is only insofar as Marx adopts the latter position that he can 
claim workers are exploited. To this extent the notion that capitalism is unjust 
rests on the ontological properties of (self-objectifying) labour, rather than the 
normative claims of workers. This then serves to undermine the role played by 
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workers in generating an alternative conception of justice, while underwriting the 
objective forms of normativity derived from capitalism's reification of 
intersubj ectivity. 
This brings us to the end of the first part of our thesis in which we have sought to 
question the role Marx's attributes to (self-objectifying) labour in the production 
of value. In the absence of such a relationship, then both value as the basis for 
capitalism and labour as the basis for critical theory need to be re-thought. In Part 
two we turn our attention to the writings of Habermas and his attempts to put 
critical theory on a normative footing. 
In chapter five we examine Habermas's attempt to separate self-objectification 
and self-constitution from the question of reification. Under the influence of 
Weber, Habermas argues that the capitalist system comprises a realm of self-
objectification. Although 'the system' continues to comprise an act of self-
constitution, the self is a species-subject whose evolutionary progress is no longer 
amenable to the intentions of participants. It then follows that the economic 
system's capacity to institutionalize the instrumentalization of labour cannot be 
deemed reificatory. In contrast to the system the lifeworld comprises a complex 
assembly of intersubjective relationships embracing the private sphere of the 
family and the public sphere of communicative action. Because participants 
engage in acts of self-constitution in the lifeworld it comprises the normative 
realm. Consequently, the charge of reification only arises when the self-
regulating system encroaches upon the self-constituting activities of the lifeworld. 
Having outlined Habermas' s general approach, chapter six seeks to bring out the 
instabilities inherent in his division of sociality into non-normative system and 
normative lifeworld. This takes the form, on the one hand, of an empirical 
critique of Habermas' s restriction of normative criteria to the lifeworld and, on 
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the other hand, of a theoretical critique of Habennas' s attempt to protect the 
economic system from the charge of reification. Thus, in accordance with 
Habennas's own (normative) contention that validity claims are only socially 
valid when redeemed by participants, we argue that the question of whether the 
system is reificatory is a matter for participants (rather than Habennas) to 
determine. The fact that the system denies its participants the right to exercise this 
capacity is indicative of its 'invalidity'. 
In chapter seven we explore Axel Honneth' s attempt to re-connect the struggles 
of workers with the normative content of modernity. Honneth explicitly seeks to 
extend Habermas's conception of nonnative self-constitution from 
communicative action to the activities of workers. Honneth then highlights the 
fact that workers are also motivated to struggle against the maldistribution of 
such 'non-material' goods as autonomy and social recognition. Unfortunately, 
because Honneth shares Habermas' s propensity to place the 'material' realm of 
the economy beyond the 'cultural' realm of nonnativity he fails, not only to 
acknowledge the role played by the fonner in reifying the latter, but also the role 
played by worker's welfare struggles in sublating the diremption between 
material interests in self-preservation and nonnative interests in self-constitution. 
In the concluding chapter eight, we seek to re-interpret workers' welfare 
struggles in relation to the economy's reification of intersubjectivity. To this 
extent the labour movement can then be understood as expanding the scope of 
intersubjectivity by de-reifying the economic system. Trade unions are one fonn 
of expanded intersubjectivity, the institutions of the welfare state another. 
Although both are imperfect vehicles for democratic will-fonnation they can, 
nevertheless, be viewed as expanding the normative content of modernity. This 
can be seen in the fact that struggles for social welfare generate alternative 
criteria for judging social validity. Thus while the theory of welfare economics 
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provides a public forum in which the normative validity of the system can be 
assessed, the welfare state brings about a partial suspension of market value in 
favour of an intersubjectively determined form of social value. 
In contradistinction to recent attempts to interpret class-based forms of social 
opposition as solely concerned with the just distribution of material goods,4 we 
shall emphasize the role of the labour movement in generating a normative form 
of self-constitution committed to bringing about changes, not only in the welfare 
of labour, but also the accountability of capitalism. To this extent the 're-
internalization' by participants of the 'externalized' values of the economic 
system remains a key task of critical theory. 
4 Here we are thinking of Nancy Fraser's recent attempts to restrict Marxism to the realm of 
distributive justice (Fraser 1997). 
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PART I 
CHAPTER ONE: FROM SELF-CONSTITUTION 
TO SELF-OBJECTIFICATION 
14 
In this chapter we shall trace the transformation of the key enlightenment notion 
of 'self-constitution' into that of 'self-objectification' in the writings of Kant, 
Fichte and Hegel. We shall then go on to show how Marx adopts self-
objectification as the basis for his labour theory of sociality in the Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts (Marx 1975). Finally, we shall question the 
appropriateness of Marx's objective conception of sociality for a socialist critique 
of capitalism 
THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 
According to Charles Taylor, the enlightenment world view generates a schism 
between self-determining humans and deterministic natural laws (Taylor 1989). 
Thus while humanity becomes defined in terms of its autonomy, nature becomes 
defined in terms of the universal and necessary laws of Newtonian physics. An 
early and seminal formulation of this divide is to be found in Rene Descartes's 
distinction between res cogitan (thinking substance) and res extensia (extended 
substance). The ontological diremption of immaterial thought and thoughtless 
matter brings with it a new epistemological problematic, concerning how the 
former can acquire valid knowledge of the latter. However, while Descartes is 
able to provide a basis for self-certain knowledge in the form of cogito ergo sum, 
he is unable to bridge the divide between 'thinking' and 'extended' substance 
except through recourse to a benign God. 
In response to this epistemological problematic, Kant argues that if we accept that 
'subjects' can only acquire certain knowledge of themselves, then 'objectively' 
valid knowledge is only possible if the former constitute the latter. Thus rather 
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than treating the 'objective' laws of Newtonian physics as external to and 
independent of the knowing subject, Kant argues that the fonner have their 
source in the latter. In the Critique of Pure Reason (1929a) Kant then seeks to 
ground the 'epistemological' question of how valid knowledge is possible, in the 
'ontological' capacity of subjects to produce a rational universe. Kant refers to 
this as his 'Copernican revolution' despite the fact, as many have noted, it 
comprises a most un-Copernican attempt to re-Iocate humanity at the centre of 
the (knowable) universe. 
Although Kant agrees with David Hume that the universal and necessary 
structure of causality is ' ... something that exists in the mind, not in objects' 
(Hume 1978, p.165) Kant rejects Hume's contention that the structures of the 
mind are reducible to mere 'custom' (ibid., p.170). On the contrary, argues Kant, 
the mind is the repository of universal rational structures which provide the 
transcendental conditions for the possibility of objectively valid knowledge. By 
way of a 'transcendental deduction', Kant then proceeds to uncover the role 
played by rational subjectivity in the constitution of the knowable world. This 
entails dividing the world into a phenomenal realm of natural laws - we inhabit as 
empirical subjects - and a noumenal realm of unknowable 'things in themselves' 
- we inhabit as transcendental subjects. Kant then proceeds to argue that the 
fonner is predicated on the latter. The details of Kant's complex arguments do 
not concern us; what concerns us is the way in which the transcendental subject 
of the noumenal world acts upon 'things in themselves' to produce the 
phenomenal world we experience as empirical subjects. 
However, while the self-identical 'subject' comprises the 'transcendental unity of 
apperception', that unites the manifold of sensibilities, this synthesizing activity 
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belongs to the 'transcendental faculty of the imagination' (Einbildungkraft).1 To 
this extent ' ... the principle of the necessary unity of pure (productive) synthesis 
of imagination, prior to apperception, is the ground of the possibility of all 
knowledge, especially of experience' (ibid., p.l43). 
In the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant places even greater 
emphasis on the 'productive' role played by the imagination in constituting the 
knowable world. 'This synthesis is an action [Wirkung] of the understanding on 
the sensibility; and is its first application - and thereby the ground of all its other 
applications - to the objects of our possible intuition' (ibid., p.l65). To this 
extent, argues Kant, the necessary and universal 'laws of nature' arise from the 
'self-activity' of the subject's 'productive imagination' (ibid., p.152). 'However 
exaggerated and absurd it may sound, to say that the understanding is itself the 
source of the laws of nature, and so of its formal unity, such an assertion is none 
the less correct, and is in keeping with the object to which it refers, namely, 
experience' (ibid., p.148). As such the deterministic characteristics of the natural 
world rest upon the self-determining properties of a 'spontaneous' form of 
'unconditional' subj ectivity. 
Kant then goes on to argue that his 'two-fold' approach comprises the best means 
to reconcile the deterministic character of the world of experience, with the 
transcendental autonomy of human subjectivity. However, it is only by assuming 
that causality is limited to the world of appearances that Kant can argue that there 
is '... no contradiction in supposing that one and the same will is, in the 
appearance, that is, in its visible acts, necessarily subject to the law of nature, and 
so far not free, while yet, as belonging to a thing in itself, it is not subject to the 
law, and is therefore free' (ibid., p.28). However, when Kant addresses the 
As Andrew Bowie notes, the importance of this tenn is lost in translation, referring as it does to a 
process of fonnation (hildung) in which sensuous data is turned into coherent images that have 
the power (Kraft) to institute ourselves (ein) (Bowie 1990, p.18). 
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question of moral behaviour (practical reason) he believes that human autonomy 
can only be preserved by abstracting from the 'heteronomy' of the phenomenal 
realm and the material interests of its empirical subjects. 
THE CRITIQUE OF (PURE) PRACTICAL REASON 
Having located the 'active-subject' at the centre of the 'natural' world, Kant now 
argues that 'moral' action is also based on the notion of free-subjectivity. 
However, while 'pure reason' is viewed as conditioned by the sensuous 
intuitions, 'pure practical reason' is held to be a wholly 'supersensuous' and 
hence self-conditioning activity. Consequently 'empirical' activities such as 
Hobbesian 'self-preservation', Lockean 'happiness' and Humean 'self-love' are 
excluded by Kant from the formation of moral laws. 'All material practical 
principles are, as such, of one and the same kind and belong under the general 
principle of self-love or one's own happiness' (Kant 1956, p.20). 
In other words, we can only be truly moral agents if we transcend the 'material' 
interests that drive our 'empirical' selves. This calls, once more, for a bifurcation 
of humanity into two worlds. However, the line between the two is now drawn 
between the 'rational' world of subjects - insofar as they comprise ends-in-
themselves - and the 'irrational' world of objects - insofar as they comprise 
means-to-an-end. 'Everything in creation which [man] wishes and over which he 
has power can be used merely as a means; only man, and with him, every rational 
creature, is an end in itself (ibid., p.90). 
Having separated purposive subjects from purposeless objects, Kant then seeks to 
uncover the pure 'legislative form' of the moral law which alone ' ... can 
constitute a determining ground of the [free] will' (ibid., pp.28-29). To this end 
Kant re-formulates Rousseau's search for' ... a form of association ... which each, 
while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as 
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before' (Rousseau 1973, p.174). However, unlike Rousseau's substantive form of 
democratic association, Kant seeks a set of formal procedures designed to 
operationalize the promise of 'self-mastery'. Hence Kant's assertion that' ... all 
maxims are rejected which are inconsistent with the will being itself universal 
legislator. Thus the will is not subject simply to the law, but so subject that it 
must be regarded as itself giving the law, and on this ground only, subject to the 
law (of which it can be regarded as the author), (Kant 1987a, p.60). 
In this way, Kant sets out to discover a 'rule of judgement' for 'pure practical 
reason' which ensures that the activities of each subject are compatible with the 
ends of all others considered as ends in themselves. In order to bring about this 
'kingdom of ends' subjects must ask themselves if their actions conform to a 
maxim that can, at the same time, become a universal law categorically binding 
on all other rational creatures. 
Morality consists then in the reference of all actions to the legislation 
which alone can render a kingdom of ends possible. This legislation 
must be capable of existing in every rational being, and of emanating 
from his will, so that the principle of his will is, never to act of any 
maxim which could not without contradiction be also a universal 
law, and accordingly always so to act that the will could at the same 
time regard itself as giving in its maxim universal laws. (Kant 1987a, 
p.63) 
To this extent obedience to universal moral principles not only presupposes the 
autonomy of rational subjects but also confers autonomy upon them. 
Consequently, rational subjects cannot ignore categorical imperatives without 
undermining their own autonomy. 
However, the cost of converting Rousseau's conception of democratic 'self-
constitution' into a universalistic procedure for generating moral rules is paid for 
in terms of its lack of 'material', 'empirical' or 'substantive' content. 
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Consequently, Kant does not solve the problem of moral obligation - that arises 
from Hobbes's reduction of human interest to 'self-preservation' - so much as 
side step it by abstracting from the material content of human ends. 
OVERCOMING KANT IAN ANTINOMIES 
Kant's legacy is a problematic one. On the one hand, it is unclear how his critique 
of pure reason relates to his critique of (pure) practical reason - a problem he 
seeks to address in his Critique of Judgement (1987b) by re-introducing a 
teleological element into nature. On the other hand, there is the related question 
of how the opposition Kant sets up between the pure, originary, transcendental, 
universal, necessary forms of reason and the impure, given, empirical, particular 
and contingent content of material life can be reconciled with one another. 
Fichte's solution to Kant's legacy is both simple and far-reaching. In The Science 
of Knowledge (1970), Fichte argues that the essence of Kant's philosophy lies in 
its attempt to ground substance in the unconditional freedom of human 
subjectivity. Fichte then argues that because Kant locates 'things in themselves' 
beyond the bounds of the subject they serve to limit the latter's unconditional 
freedom. Consequently, argues Fichte, it is necessary to enlarge the domain of 
'practical reason' in order to assimilate the otherness of 'things in themselves'. 
To this end Fichte asserts that subjects 'posit' (setzen) not only 'themselves' but 
also the 'not-self of external things. 'The not-self itself is a product of the self-
determining self, and nothing at all absolute, or posited outside the self (ibid., 
p.195). 
However, Fichte must then explain how 'things in themselves' come to be 
mistaken for things in their own right. In answer to this Fichte introduces the 
notion of 'alienation' (Entiiusserung) into the tradition of German Idealism. 'The 
independent activity in question proceeds from the act of positing; but it is non-
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positing that we actually arrive at: hence we may to that extent entitle the latter 
an alienation' (ibid., p.154). 
Thus the fact that the 'transcendental self is not absolutely identical with itself 
means that 'something alien' now ' ... stands in conflict with the self s endeavour 
[or striving] to be absolutely identical ... ' (ibid., pp.233-4). However, once 'things 
in themselves' are recognized as alienated expressions of self-positing subjects, 
then the latter come to know themselves as the source of creation. It is therefore 
no coincidence that Fichte rests his claims to knowledge on the notion of 
'intellectual intuition' which Kant (1929, p.90) had previously reserved for the 
'primordial being' (Urwesen). Hence Fichte's claim that the ' ... intellectual 
intuition of the self-active self, is the only concept which unites the two worlds 
that exist for us, the sensible and the intelligible' (Fichte 1970, p.234). As such it 
comprises ' ... the only firm standpoint for all philosophy. From whence we can 
explain everything that occurs in consciousness ... ' (ibid.). 
Nevertheless, Hegel is critical of Fichte's claim to have reconciled 'subjectivity' 
and 'objectivity'. Even if the self-acting subject or 'I' (Ich) is understood as an 
'absolute ego', argues Hegel, it only manages to dissolve the latter into the 
former. Whereas Hegel argues that it is necessary to achieve a substantive form 
of 'subject-object identity' - one capable of reconciling the self-constituting 
powers of rational-autonomy with the substantive actuality of material-
heteronomy. To this end Hegel argues that human history comprises a series of 
'dialectical' encounters in which Spirit (Geist) finds itself confronted by an 
'other' which it then recognizes as its own 'externalization' (Entausserung). This 
then generates a higher, more comprehensive, form of consciousness that enables 
Spirit to sublate (aufheben) its own external moment through a process of 
'internalization' (or Er-innerung - literally recollection), until such time as Spirit 
realizes it comprises the self-sundering ground of the world as a totality. 
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The historical process by which universal reason comes to consciousness of itself 
as the 'subject' of the 'objective' world is a slow and tortuous one encompassing 
an eclectic mixture of physics, philosophy, phrenology, parable, historical events, 
etc. in which Spirit - at each 'stage' or 'level' (Potenzen)2 of its development _ 
overcomes a limited expression of its own 'extemalization' through a more 
comprehensive form of self-consciousness. The resulting sublation then preserves 
the past in a future-orientated unfolding of the present. As Hegel argues in his 
posthumously published lecture notes '... only the study of world history itself 
can show that it has proceeded rationally, that it represents the rationally 
necessary course of the World Spirit, the Spirit whose nature is always one and 
the same, but whose nature unfolds in the course of the world' (Hegel 1953, 
p.12). 
Thus Spirit only obtains truth 'in and for itself when it has passed through all the 
material differentiations which make up the determinations of the world and 
comes to realize that it comprises their originary self-differentiating and self-
determining ground. To this extent the question of self-knowledge is predicated 
upon the 'subject' of 'objective' reality coming to know itself as a self-
objectifying subject. In the process, the subject comes to know substance as its 
own content, while substance comes to know itself as the content of subjectivity. 
This then culminates in absolute knowledge wherein subjectivity and objectivity 
are finally reconciled as Spirits own ongoing process of differentiation and re-
unification.3 
2 Potenz is a mathematical term meaning to raise to the power of, to increase or to multiply. For a 
more detailed account of its philosophical usage see H. S. Harris's introduction to Hegel's 
System of Ethical Life (Hegel 1979, pp.15-20). 
3 Indeed, according to Hegel, Spirit not only comprises 'the identity of identity and non-identity' 
but also 'the difference of identity and difference' and hence the preservation of difference 
within identity (see Recognition by Robert R. Williams 1992, p.284). 
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To this extent Hegel can claim to have synthesized the certainty possessed by 
Descartes's res cogitan with the externality of the res extensia, now that it is 
understood that their diremption originated in a self-sundering subject-object. 
Unfortunately Hegel's elegant solution to subject-object dualism contradicts two 
fundamental principles of enlightenment thinking. On the one hand, it restores a 
teleological element to 'nature' which, unlike Kant's 'regulative idea' of natural 
purposiveness, possesses a substantive content while, on the other hand, it 
transforms human autonomy into a mere means for the realization of a supra-
human Spirit. Thus in claiming that the world is fonned by a rational bearer of 
transsubjective purposiveness Hegel not only 'subjectifies' nature, but he also 
'objectifies' humanity. In the next section we shall examine this latter 
consequence in more depth. 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 
In the Elements of the Philosophy of Right (1991), Hegel applies his conception 
of Spirit to the emergent individualism of 'civil society' (Biirgeliche 
Gesellschaft). At first sight, argues Hegel, it seems that modem individuals are 
only concerned to pursue their own empirical self-interests. On the basis of this 
Hobbesian view, Kant then seeks to ground morality in a set of procedural 
formulations which transcend the substantive basis of material interests. Whereas 
Hegel argues that even in 'civil society' individuals continue to act 'altruistically' 
(in an other-orientated fashion) insofar as each can only fulfil their needs by 
fulfilling the needs of others 'Although each appears to do precisely the opposite 
of the other and imagines that it can exist only by keeping the other at a distance, 
each nevertheless has the other as its condition' (Hegel 1991, p.22l). 
In other words, against Kant's assertion that moral laws are only possible if we 
abstract from the material interests of our empirical selves, Hegel argues that 
reciprocal obligations remain immanent to and inherent within 'civil society'. He 
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therefore congratulates political economy for having discovered within 'civil 
society' ' ... laws underlying a mass of contingent occurrences' (ibid., p.228). 
Laws which, according to Hegel, dialectically demonstrate that ' ... the particular 
is mediated by the universal so that each individual, in earning, producing, and 
enjoying on his own account [fUr sich] , thereby earns and produces for the 
enjoyment of others' (ibid., p.233). 
However, the fact that empirical individuals only fulfil social obligations through 
acts of selfishly inspired self-preservation indicates, to Hegel, that the common 
bond uniting them is only present in an alienated guise. Similarly just as the 
'division of labour' separates workers from one another by generating 
specialized tasks that each performs in isolation, so all are united in an external 
system of interdependence in which the actions of each are a condition for the 
actions of all. This then creates a dialectical relationship between individual's 
empirical interests and society's transcendental interests, which finds expression 
in the fact that particular concrete needs can only be met through the abstract 
universality of money. 
In order to overcome this diremption of concrete individuality and abstract 
universality, Hegel argues that the modem state comprises the substantive bearer 
of ethical-solidarity (Sittlichkeit),4 through which participants recognize each 
other as normative agents, and in which Spirit recognizes itself as the 
embodiment of the community's interests. 'The state is the actuality of the ethical 
Idea - the ethical Spirit as substantial will, manifest and clear to itself, which 
thinks and knows itself and implements what it knows and in so far as it knows 
it' (ibid., p.155). 
4 It is significant that Hegel's choice of the tenn Sittlichkeit serves to re-ground the universal and 
necessary 'subject' of the world in the Humean notion of 'custom' (Sitte). 
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To this extent Hegel's philosophy comprises a form of 'social democracy' avant 
fa fettre which responds to Adam Smith's call for 'freedom of trade and 
commerce against regulation from above' by arguing that' ... the more blindly 
[Spirit] immerses itself in its selfish ends, the more it requires such regulation to 
bring it back to the universal.' (ibid., p.262) In the same move Hegel also 
'materializes' Kant's transcendental philosophy by locating 'the understanding' 
within the diremptions of 'civil society', before resolving them at the level of the 
state where his own philosophy takes up residence. 
Nevertheless, while Hegel argues that 'Spirit is the nature of human beings en 
masse ... ', Spirit also acquires a set of transsubjective ends, goals and imperatives 
which serves to undermine the modem individual's claim to autonomy. 
The state in and by itself is the ethical whole, the actualization of 
freedom... Any discussion of freedom must begin not with or the 
individual self-consciousness, but only the essence of self-
consciousness; for whether human beings know it or not, this essence 
realizes itself as a self-sufficient power of which single individuals 
are only moments. The state consists in the march of God in the 
world ... (ibid., p.279). 
Thus, while modem subjectivity plays a key role in the realization of ethical 
Spirit,5 it is the latter - as the objective bearer of rationality - which comprises the 
bond that constitutes the former. Hegel then criticizes Rousseau's approach to 
self-constitution on the grounds that he only takes ' ... the will in a determinate 
form as the individual will, and he regards the universal will not as the absolutely 
rational element in the will, but only as a "general" will which proceeds out of 
this individual will as out of a conscious will' (ibid., p.l57). Indeed, because 
Rousseau foregoes objective Spirit in favour of a democratic public, social order 
is precariously erected on an arbitrary, contingent and capricious basis. This is 
5 Robert R. Williams provides a reconstruction of the importance of individual subjectivity in 
Hegel's \\ritings on 'recognition' (Williams 1992). 
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then destined to end, as the French Revolution demonstrates ' ... in the maximum 
of frightfulness and terror' (ibid.).6 
However, by grounding the social bond that unites individuals in an objective 
form of morality, Hegel does nothing to challenge the 'externality' of modem 
sociality. On the contrary, in the absence of a democratic form of life in which 
'subjects' participate in the creation of their own sociality, the former will remain 
alienated from the latter. To this extent Hegel's evocation of a supra-social Spirit, 
far from re-uniting individuals with their own social relations, merely serves to 
legitimate their diremption. 
SELF -OBJECTIFYING LABOUR 
According to Marx, the key problem with Hegel's theory of the state is that 'The 
real subject ... appears as a result, whereas the correct approach would be to start 
with the real subject and then consider its objectification' (Marx 1975, p.80). To 
this extent Marx, following Feuerbach, argues that the chief defect of Hegel's 
approach is that it attributes human powers to a non-human entity. However, 
unlike Feuerbach, Marx argues it is not possible to re-appropriate the self-
constituting powers of humanity merely by reversing the subject and predicate of 
Hegelian philosophy. On the contrary, Marx - following Hegel's own critique of 
Kant - argues that the alienation of humanity comprises a true expression of 
humanities' real alienation. In other words, if the Hegelian state appears to 
comprise an alien form of ethical community, standing over and above the 
atomized individuals of 'civil society', then this is because they are estranged 
from each other in reality. 'The atomism in which civil society is plunged by its 
particular actions is a necessary consequence of the fact that the community, the 
6 According to Hegel, any attempt to ground the rational constitution of society in the 'wild idea of 
the people' means that humanity will be: ' ... connected only as an aggregate, a formless mass 
whose commotion and activity could therefore only be elementary, irrational, barbarous, and 
frightful ... ' (ibid., p.198). 
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communistic entity in which individuals exist, civil society, is separated from the 
state, or in other words the political state is an abstraction from civil society' 
(Marx 1975, p.145). 
Thus, according to Marx ' ... the modem state which abstracts from real man, was 
only possible because and in so far as the modem state itself abstracts from real 
man ... ' (ibid., p.250), whereas if we are concerned to unite the atomized 
individuals of 'civil society' with the ethical state it is necessary to democratize 
the former. 'Democracy is the solution to the riddle of every constitution. In it we 
find the constitution grounded on its true ground: real human beings and the real 
people ... The constitution is thus posited as the peoples own creation' (ibid., 
p.87). However, although democracy remains a key aspect of Marx's critical 
theory, the more he comes to investigate the economic fabric of 'civil society', 
the more he comes to view human labour as the 'solution to the riddle of its 
constitution' (op. cit.). 
The attraction which human labour holds over democratic sociality for Marx 
arises from its capacity not only to unite individuals with their own sociality, but 
also the latter with nature. To this extent the notion of labour permits Marx to 
take up Hegel's materialization of Kant and apply it Hegel's notion of Spirit. This 
then allows Marx to generate a new synthesis which combines Feuerbach's 
materialist critique of Hegel with Hegel's idealist critique of materialism. Hence 
Marx and Engel's assertion that: 
The chief defect of all hitherto eXIstmg materialism (that of 
Feuerbach included) is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is 
conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplation, but not 
as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence in 
contradistinction to materialism, the active side was developed by 
idealism - which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity as 
such. (Marx and Engels 1970, p.121) 
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However, it is in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 that Marx 
lays the groundwork for this synthesis between the active sUbjectivity of 
humanity and the material reality of nature in self-objectifying labour. To this 
extent there is nothing problematic, for Marx, about the notion of self-
objectification, only the way in which Hegel assigns to Spirit what is a property 
of the human 'species'.7 On the contrary, Marx congratulates Hegel for having 
correctly discovered the role played by labour in the self-production of humanity. 
And even his error in attributing this capacity to Spirit is like the errors Hegel 
discusses in the Phenomenology, a true representation of the alienated character 
of existing sociality. Once the properties of Spirit are re-assigned to labour then 
Marx is then in a position to argue that 'It is ... in his fashioning of the objective 
that man really proves himself to be a species-being. Such production is his 
active species life. Through it nature appears as his work and his reality. The 
object of labour is therefore the objectification a/the species life a/man' (ibid., 
p.329). 
The attraction of this formulation is that it enables Marx to contrast the 'species' 
properties of labour with the historical form it takes in different social epochs. 
Thus on the basis of the primordial connection which labour establishes between 
the 'subjectivity' of humanity and the products in which it is 'objectified', Marx 
then claims that the separation of the former from the latter comprises a state of 
'alienation' .8 Alienation arises in the first instance because: 
... the object that labour produces, its product, stands opposed to it as 
something alien, as a power independent of the producer. The 
product of labour is labour embodied and made material in an object, 
it is the objectification of labour. The realization of labour is its 
objectification. In the sphere of political economy this realization of 
7 The English tenn 'species' translates the Gennan word Gattung which can also mean kind, sort 
and genus and need not imply a biological meaning (see Wallimann 1981, p.18). 
8 Thus just as Spirit comprises a ghostly Gemeinschaft dissolved within 'civil society', so labour 
comprises the underlying unity that not only holds capitalism together but also produces Its 
social bond. 
labour appears as a loss of reality for the worker, objectification as 
loss of and bondage to the object, and appropriation as estrangement, 
as alienation. (ibid., p.324) 
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Marx then argues that ' ... if the product of labour is alienation, production itself 
must be active alienation, the alienation of activity' (ibid., p.326). In other words, 
if workers do not control the products in which their subjectivity is objectified, 
this is because they are not in control of the process of objectification. 'The 
estrangement of the object of labour merely summarizes the estrangement, the 
alienation in the activity of labour itself (ibid.). In which case the alienation of 
labour from its properties of self-objectification is grounded in the ownership of 
production by an-other.9 'If therefore he regards the product of his labour, his 
objectified labour, as an alien, hostile and powerful object which is independent 
of him, then his relationship to that object is such that another man - alien, 
hostile, powerful and independent of him - is its master' (ibid., p.331). 
This 'master' is the capitalist and it is the very relation of workers to their labour 
which, according to Marx, ' ... creates the relation of the capitalist ... ' (ibid.). 
Consequently, although Marx describes alienation in experiential terms it cannot 
be reduced to worker's experience of capitalism as 'hostile', 'independent', 
'powerful' etc. On the contrary, alienation is an objective relationship which 
occurs even if individual workers are perfectly happy with their situation. 
However, this means that the ultimate ground for Marx's theory of alienation is 
not the 'empirical' subjectivity of 'real men' (workers), but rather the 
'transcendental' subjectivity of self-objectifying labour. Consequently, the errors 
which Marx attributes to political economy arise less from its tendency to 
discount the 'empirical' interests of workers, than its inability to acknowledge the 
9 Like Hegel, Marx assumes a distinction between the necessary properties which make up the 
essence of an entity and the contingent ownership of these properties by another. 
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key role played by labour in constituting capitalist sociality. Hence the problem 
with political economy is that it ' ... conceals the estrangement in the nature of 
labour by ignoring the DIRECT relationship between the WORKER (labour) 
AND PRODUCTION' (ibid., p.325). To this extent Marx criticizes political 
economy for naturalizing the historical separation of workers from production 
under capitalism, while obscuring the natural form of trans historical connection 
between them. Marx then criticizes capitalism for alienating labour from its own 
essential powers of self-constitution. In other words, capitalism is responsible for 
alienating ' ... man from his own body, from nature as it exists outside him, from 
his spiritual being [and from] his human essence' (ibid., p.329).IO 
As such, Marx's critique of capitalism is predicated upon ' ... an absolute 
ontological dimension of social life' (Arthur 1986, p.l2). Indeed, Arthur goes on 
to argue that, in the absence of an 'absolute' conception of labour, capitalism 
itself would acquire an 'absolute' form. 1 1 In other words, if we were unable to 
contrast the historical form taken by labour under capitalism, with its 
transhistorical form, then 'private property and exchange' would appear to be 'as 
absolute as productive activity itself (ibid.), thereby undermining the capacity of 
critical theory to grasp , '" the conditions of a positive supersession of 
estrangement ... ' (Arthur 1986, p.12). 
However, it is one thing to argue that critical theory is only possible if the 
conditions for the sublation of capitalism are 'immanent' to it, it is another to 
argue that these conditions are grounded in an ontological conception of (self-
10 Marx, like Hegel, is concerned to unite 'essence and existence' but whereas Hegel believes this 
is possible within capitalist sociality Marx argues the latter is responsible for their estrangement. 
11 To underscore this point, Arthur (1986) argues that Marx makes a systematic distinction in the 
Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (Marx 1975) between 'labour' - by which Marx means 
'alienated labour' and 'life-activity' or 'productive-life' - by which Marx means the (non-
alienated) species activity of self-objectification. However, our own reading fmds no such 
systematic usage. Although Marx does sometimes use the term 'labour' to mean 'alienated 
labour' (ibid., p.354), on other occasions he uses the term simply to mean self-objectification 
(ibid., p.324 and p.328). 
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objectifying) labour. In attempting to counterpoise a universal conception of 
labour to its particular capitalist form, Marx is in danger of comparing a 
transcendental ideal to an empirical actuality. In other words, rather than basing 
his critique of capitalism on the experiences and social struggles of 'real' men 
and women, Marx chooses to base it on an underlying conception of the species 
'man' . Marx is aware of the problematical nature of this strategy and attempts, on 
occasions, to generate a more social and historical conception of 'man'. ' ... 
[B]oth the material of labour and man as subject are the starting point as well as 
the outcome of the movement ... So the social character is the general character 
of the whole movement; just as society produces man as man, so it is produced 
by him' (Marx 1975, p.349). 
The notion that 'man' is a social being whose existence depends on its historical 
form of appearance finds its most celebrated expression in Marx's assertion that 
, ... the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its 
reality it is the ensemble of the social relations' (Marx and Engels 1970, p.122). 
However, it is difficult for Marx to maintain a socialized conception of 'man' 
without undermining his own conception of labour as the originary unity of 'man 
and nature'. Consequently, Marx also retains a notion of 'man' as the labouring 
subj ect which produces sociality in the act of purposively transforming nature. I 2 
As such, argues Richard Winfield, Marx attempts to ' ... formulate the concept of 
social production by means of a notion of labouring activity that is itself specified 
through the reflection of an ultimately presupposed subject' (Winfield 1991, 
p.137). 
Thus, rather than viewing self-objectifying subjectivity as a social process which 
describes the form taken by self-constitution under definite historical 
12 In Spectres of Marx (1994), Derrida argues that the vehement attacks on Max Stirner which 
occupy much of the German Ideology arise from Marx's failed attempt to 'exorcise' his own 
reliance on an ontology of humanity (ibid., p.170). 
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circumstances, Marx lifts the process of self-objectification out of its historical 
context in order to make it the transhistorical condition for the possibility of 
sociality in general. However, this not only severs the subject of sociality from its 
social context it also naturalizes the resulting form of objective sociality. One 
way out of this dilemma would be to view the diremption of subjectivity from 
sociality as an expression of alienation. However, it is not possible to re-Iocate 
the subject in sociality without de-objectifying sociality, as each is a condition for 
the other. This returns us to Hegel's approach to 'civil society' insofar as the 
abstract objectivity of sociality is seen to be predicated on the abstract 
subjectivity of individuals. The process of de-alienation is then understood as one 
in which the subjective and objective components of sociality are reconciled in a 
new form of social solidarity. 
Unfortunately, by grounding his approach to self-constitution on self-objectifying 
subjectivity, Marx renders it impossible for the subject to re-internalize its own 
objective creation. In other words, because Marx makes the subject of re-
internalization an abstract atomized subject it would lead to the subjectification of 
sociality. Marx then rejects the process ofre-internalization as 'idealistic', despite 
the fact that its status depends on the nature of the subject which doing the 
internalizing. Thus, in order to view Hegel as an 'idealist' Marx seeks to reduce 
Hegel's notion of Absolute Spirit to the subjectivity of human consciousness. 
MARX'S CRITIQUE OF HEGEL'S IDEALISM 
In line with his contention that the Hegelian Spirit is merely an alienated 
expression of human labour, Marx praises Hegel for having understood history as 
a process of self-constitution in which humanity alienates itself in an-other before 
returning to itself at a higher level. 'Hegel conceives the self-creation of man as a 
process, objectification as loss of object [Entgegenstandlichung] , as alienation 
and as supersession of this alienation ... he therefore grasps the nature of labour 
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and conceives objective man - true, because real man - as the result of his own 
labour' (ibid., p.386). However, Marx then argues that 'the only labour Hegel 
knows and recognizes, is abstract mental labour ... ' (ibid.). Consequently, for 
Hegel ' ... human nature, man, is equivalent to self-consciousness'. In which case 
'All estrangement of human nature is therefore nothing but estrangement of self-
consciousness' (ibid., p.387). From this Marx concludes that Hegel, under the 
rubric of 'extemalization' (Entiiusserung) erroneously equates 'objectification' 
(Vergegenstiindlichung) with 'alienation' (Entfremdung).13 It therefore follows 
that when Hegel calls for the supersession of alienation he is also calling for ' ... 
the supersession of objectivity, since it is not the particular character of the object 
but its objective character which constitutes the offence ... ' (Marx 1975, p.391). 
To this extent, argues Marx 'The reappropriation of the objective essence of 
man, produced in the form estrangement as something alien, therefore means 
transcending not only estrangement but also objectivity' (ibid., p.387). 
In other words, on the grounds that Hegel regards man ' ... as a non-objective, 
spiritual being ... ' (ibid.), Marx argues that for Hegel the return of humanity to 
itself requires the abolition of 'objectivity', whereas, according to Marx, human 
beings are self-objectifying beings that produce themselves through the purposive 
transformation of nature. On this basis, Marx then argues that while the 
overcoming of alienation will not bring about the overcoming of objectivity, the 
former, nevertheless, can only be brought about by an objective act as opposed to 
a mere change of consciousness. 
However, not everybody agrees with Marx's interpretation of Hegel. For 
example, Gillian Rose argues that 'Marx produces a Fichtean reading of Hegel's 
system as the unconditioned absolute idea which pours forth nature, which does 
13 As Arthur (1982) notes, Hegel does not in fact use the tenn 'objectification' 
(Vergegenstiindlichung) but rather Entiiusserung, meaning both 'alienation' and 
'extemalization' . 
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not recognize but creates detennination'14 (Rose 1981, p.214). In support of this 
view it is possible to find passages in which Hegel criticizes Fichte in the same 
way that Marx criticizes Hegel. Thus, commenting on Fichte's philosophy, Hegel 
argues that 'The subjective does indeed become the subject-object, but not the 
objective; and so the subject is not equal to the object' (quoted in Lukacs 1971 b, 
p.268). In other words, rather than seeking to submerge 'objectivity' within 
(human) 'subjectivity', as Marx contends, Hegel argues that it is their diremption 
which comprises Spirit's alienation. Consequently, the overcoming of alienation 
(externalization) does not require the abolition of objectivity, but rather the 
reconciliation of subjectivity and objectivity within 'Absolute Spirit'. 
Neither the subjective nor the objective alone constitutes 
consciousness; the purely SUbjective is just as abstract as the purely 
objective; dogmatic idealism posits the SUbjective as the real ground 
of the objective, dogmatic realism posits the objective as the real 
ground of the subjective ... But just as idealism asserts the unity of 
consciousness, realism with no less validity insist on its duality.' 
(Hegel quoted in Lukacs 1971b, p.271) 
The main error of Marx's critique of Hegel concerns his attempt to interpret 
Hegel as arguing that humanity is 'equivalent to self-consciousness' (op. cit.), 
when, as we have seen, Spirit and not humanity is the bearer of self-
consciousness. Consequently, for Hegel, the overcoming of estrangement is not 
identical with the overcoming of objectivity. On the contrary, the latter remains 
one of the essential properties of Spirit. Because the process of're-internalizing' 
the 'external' character of human sociality is the work of Spirit, the resulting 
fonn of ethical solidarity retains an objective character. Thus, far from reducing 
the world to human consciousness, as Marx argues, the act of're-internalization' 
actually serves to legitimate the objective character of human sociality. 
14 Richard Winfield also criticizes Marx for reducing the Hegelian enquiry 'to an egological 
positing' (Winfield 1991, p.157). 
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SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY 
It is not possible to understand Marx's theory of value, and hence the ground of 
his critique of capitalism, without understanding its relationship to Hegelian 
philosophy. From Hegel, Marx takes the enlightenment notion of self-
constitution in the guise of self-objectifying subjectivity. However, whereas 
Hegel argues that the subject of this process is a collective social-subject which is 
internally dirempted, Marx argues that the subject is purposive labour. As a 
result, the subject which originates sociality exists prior to the sociality it 
originates, while the form of sociality it produces has an inherently objective 
nature. Because Marx rejects the Hegelian moment of 're-internalization' on the 
grounds that it is idealistic, the objectivity of human sociality is viewed as an 
entirely natural property that cannot be re-appropriated by subjects without 
undermining the objective nature of humanity. 
However, as we have seen, the process of re-internalization or re-appropriation 
gains its character from the subject undertaking the process and not the process 
itself. In the case of Fichte's 'ego', the re-internalization process reduces the 
objectivity of sociality to the level of subjectivity, whereas in the case of Hegel's 
Spirit the re-internalization process absolutizes the objectivity of sociality. It is 
because Marx's notion of self-objectification shares with Fichte an individualistic 
origin that the process of re-internalization leads to the 'subjectification' of 
sociality. Consequently, Marx seeks to avoid this by denying an additional 
process of internalization. But this causes problems not only for Marx's theory of 
sociality but also for his social epistemology. 
Marx presents us with a trifurcated conception of 'subjectivity', reminiscent of 
Kant, whereby the subject is divided into: (1) the (transcendental) source of 
sociality (purposive labour); (2) (empirical) workers who experience their 
sociality as external and alienating and; (3) the bearer of social knowledge 
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(Marx). As the bearer of 'objective' knowledge, Marx is the conduit for both the 
suffering of empirical workers and the transcendental powers of self-objectifying 
labour. However, this begs the question what is the basis for Marx's knowledge 
of sociality? A comparison with Hegel is instructive here. According to Hegel, 
the ground of 'absolute knowledge' is a self-objectifying subject that comes to 
recognize itself as the subject of the world. When the subject (Spirit) recognizes 
itself as the ground of sociality it not only abolishes its alienated character, it also 
acquires absolute knowledge of the world. Hegel can then argue that his 
philosophical position expresses the point at which Spirit comes to recognize 
itself as the subject of human sociality. Implausible as this might seem, it 
nevertheless provides a basis for Hegel's own standpoint in the world. 
However, in Marx's case the subject of self-objectification is alienated from its 
own process of objectification. Consequently, it is unaware that it is the subject of 
sociality. By the same token, the empirical workers who experience sociality as a 
hostile force ruling their lives are also unaware that they are the ultimate source 
of these hostile structures. Neither can therefore provide a basis for Marx's own 
standpoint. Thus, unlike Hegel, who provides a reflexive account of the 
conditions for the possibility of absolute knowledge in the self-becoming of 
Spirit, Marx fails to secure a basis for his own claim to 'objective' knowledge. 
The origin of this failure lies in Marx's reluctance to build the re-internalization 
process into his own approach. Because Marx associates the re-internalization of 
sociality with its de-objectification, he rejects both its ontological and 
epistemological consequences. However, this not only leads Marx to naturalize 
the objectivity of sociality, but also to leave the question of his own standpoint in 
the world untheorized. And yet, as Hegel recognized, as a social theorist Marx 
cannot avoid re-internalizing sociality. On the contrary, in the very act of 
theorizing the object of knowledge (capitalism) Marx transforms it into a form of 
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'subjective' representation (Capital). But whereas Hegel can claim that the 
process of theorizing sociality as the product of a self-objectifying subject is 
identical with the latter's own consciousness, Marx's standpoint, like that of the 
Kantian understanding, remains dirempted from the productive subject of 
sociality. The subject of knowledge therefore appears to be none other than Marx 
himself. In which case his claim to objective knowledge rests upon a purely 
individualistic foundation. 
In order to overcome this problem we shall seek to locate Marx's own standpoint 
within the social and historical tradition in which it stands. In other words the 
socialist movement out of which his critique of capitalism grows. From this 
standpoint the process of theoretically 'internalizing' capitalism comprises a 
social representation on behalf of the socialist movement. However, while this 
social basis cannot, unlike Hegel's Spirit, aspire to objective knowledge, it can 
avoid the subjectivism which is its other side. As such, it goes some way towards 
Habermas's attempt to locate all knowledge claims within a set of inter subjective 
relationships in which validity is argumentatively established. To this extent, 
critical theory is not only required to reflexively incorporate the social conditions 
which make it possible, but also the normative criteria from which it condemns 
capitalist sociality. 
Much of what follows in the next three chapters will be concerned to establish the 
basis for Marx's critique in the notion of self-objectifying labour and explore its 
ramifications in terms of; (a) the subjective source of sociality; (b) the objective 
form of sociality and; (c) Marx's avoidance of a normative standpoint. In short, 
we shall be concerned to draw attention to Marx's underlying theory of sociality 
in order to argue that its transhistorical form disguises an historical content that 
owes too much to the sociality of capitalism in which it arises. We now turn to a 
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more detailed examination of the relationship between Marx's historical critique 
of political economy and his transhistorical critique of capitalism. 
CHAPTER TWO; MARX'S HISTORICAL CRITIQUE 
OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND HIS 
TRANSHISTORICAL CRITIQUE OF CAPITALISM 
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In an article on Max Horkheimer entitled 'Critical Theory and Political 
Economy' , Moishe Postone and Barbara Brick argue that: 
In Marx's mature theory, the notion that labor constitutes the social 
world and is the source of all wealth refers to capitalist or modem 
society alone, and not to society in general. Moreover, his analysis 
does not refer to labor to labour as it is generally and transhistorically 
conceived: a goal directed social activity that mediates between 
humans and nature, transforming material in a determinate manner. 
Rather Marx analyzes a peculiar role that labor purportedly plays in 
capitalist society alone: it mediates a new form of social 
interdependence ... that is abstract, quasi-objective, and historically 
dynamic. In other words, labor in capitalism constitutes a historically 
specific form of social mediation that is the ultimate social ground of 
the basic features of modernity. (Postone and Brick 1993, pp.247-8) 
The importance of Postone and Brick's analysis lies in their recognition of the 
key role labour plays for Marx in 'constituting the social world'. However, in 
contrast to their historicist interpretation of Marx's theory of labour as the 
'ultimate ground of modernity', we shall argue that this rests on a transhistorical 
conception of labour as the ultimate ground of sociality in general. To this end we 
argue Marx's 'materialist conception of history' is predicated on a 'philosophical 
anthropology' derived from Hegel's philosophy of Spirit. 
In The Gennan Ideology Marx, in association with Engels, argues that 'As 
individuals express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with 
their production, both with what they produce and with how they produce. The 
nature of individuals thus depends on the material conditions detennining their 
production' (Marx and Engels 1970, pA2). 
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This is often taken to mean that material production is important because it 
comprises the necessary and universal conditions for human life. However, 
Marx's materialist conception of history does not just rest upon but is 
ontologically entwined with labour's purposive transformation of nature. Thus, 
while the term 'species being' rarely occurs in Marx's later writings, it underlies 
the notions of 'production in general' and the 'real labour process' by means of 
which Marx contrasts the universal and necessary structures of material 
production with the historical and social structures in which they are manifest. 
Thus, according to Derek Sayer 'Marx systematically and consistently 
reformulates the categories of his predecessors as unambiguously transhistorical 
or historical concepts, the former on the basis of his analysis of production in 
general and the latter on the basis of the conclusions of his analytic' (Sayer 1979, 
p.147).1 
Sayer's interpretation of Marx not only contrasts with Postone and Brick above 
but also with Ernest Mandel's claim that 'For Marx "pure" economic theory 
which abstracts from a specific social structure, is impossible' (Mandel 1976). 
Nevertheless, in Capital Vol. I, Marx himself declares: 
On the one hand, we name the elements of the labour process 
combined with the specific social characteristics peculiar to them in 
a given historical phase, and on the other hand we add an element 
which forms an integral part of the labour process independently of 
any particular social formation, as part of an eternal commerce 
between man and nature. (Marx 1976, p.998) 
To this extent Marx not only believes that it possible but also desirable to abstract 
from historically specific forms of sociality in order to arrive at the conditions for 
social production in general. Marx pursues this strategy in order to distinguish the 
world-constituting capacities of labour in general from the alienated social form 
Although we question the degree to which Marx pursues this strategy 'systematically', 
'consistently' or 'unambiguously'. 
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this takes under capitalism. He is then in a position to accuse capital of 
appropriating the self-objectifying power's of labour, and political economy of 
confusing the two. 'By confusing the appropriation of the labour process by 
capital with the labour process itself, the economists transform the material 
elements of the labour process into capital, simply because capital itself changes 
into the material element of the labour process among other things' (Marx 1976, 
p.998). 
Marx deploys this critical strategy against Adam Smith's contention that 'capital' 
is equivalent to the 'means of production'. 'The catch is that if all capital is 
objectified labour which serves as means for new production, it is not the case 
that all objectified labour which serves as means for new production is capital. 
Capital is conceived as a thing, not as a relation'2 (Marx 1973, p.258). In short, 
Marx criticizes political economy for confusing the transhistorical content of self-
objectifying labour with the alienated form it takes under capitalism. 'The 
bourgeois economists are so much cooped up within the notions belonging to a 
specific historical stage of social development that the necessity of the 
objectification of the powers of social labour appears to them as inseparable from 
the necessity of their alienation vis-a-vis living labour' (Marx 1973, p.832). 
To this extent Marx can be said to pursue two independent but interrelated critical 
strategies in his mature economic writings. On the one hand, Marx is concerned 
to retain certain 'eternal natural laws independent of history', from which to 
launch a critique of capitalism, while on the other hand, Marx is concerned to 
undermine political economy's depiction of capitalism as ' ... encased in eternal 
natural laws independent of history ... ' (Marx 1973, p.87). However, the more 
2 Thus, when Adam Smith argues that: ' ... capital is "accumulated (realized) labour (properly, 
objectified [Vergegenstiindlichte] labour), which serves as the labour for new labour 
(production)", then this refers to the simple material of labour, without regard to the formal 
character without which it is not capital' (Marx 1973, p.257). 
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Marx attempts to historicize the categories of political economy in line with 
capitalist sociality, the more he risks his own transhistorical notion of production 
in general; while the more he attempts to criticize capitalism on the basis of 
production in general the more he risks absolutizing capitalism it fa political 
economy. 
To fully appreciate the nature of this tension, however, it is necessary to place it 
in the context of the relationship between production and exchange. According to 
Marx, production under capitalism takes place for exchange and exchange 
regulates production. Nevertheless, production also remains separate from and 
independent of exchange. As such it retains a transhistorical dimension which not 
only resists socialization by exchange but is ultimately the latter's source, 
substance and subject. Consequently, while exchange historicizes production, 
production remains the transhistorical foundation for self-objectifying labour. It is 
this formulation that Marx then uses to differentiate between 'classical' political 
economy (represented by the 'scientific' Ricardo), which argues labour in 
production determines the value at which things exchange, and 'vulgar' political 
economy (represented by the 'dull' Say), which argues value is merely an 
exchange phenomena. However, while Marx is concerned to sustain Ricardo's 
labour theory of value in contrast to Say's exchange-based approach, he is also 
concerned to acknowledge the role played by the latter in changing the social 
character form of the former. 
Nevertheless, Marx's historicization of Ricardo's labour theory of value in terms 
of production for exchange can only proceed so far before the former is 
subsumed beneath the latter. To this extent a fully historicized conception of 
labour would be unable to distinguish between the elemental properties of labour 
and the social developed properties of capital. For this reason, Marx attempts to 
steer a perilous course between; (a) historicizing the categories of political 
42 
economy - vis-a.-vis exchange relations - in order to de-naturalize capitalism and; 
(b) identifying the natural foundations of capitalism - vis-a.-vis production in 
general - in order to provide a transhistorical foundation for the labour theory of 
value. We begin by identifying the basic structures of 'production in general' . 
THE LABOUR PROCESS 
One of the clearest description of 'production in general' occurs in the section on 
the labour process in Capital Vol. I. Therein Marx argues that the fact '... the 
production of use-values, or goods, is carried on under the control of a capitalist 
and on his behalf does not alter the general character of that production' (Marx 
1976, p.283). This is because labour is ' ... first of all a process between man and 
nature, a process by which man, through his own actions, mediates, regulates and 
controls the metabolism between himself and nature' (ibid.). To this extent, Marx 
argues it is possible to abstract from all historically specific forms of sociality in 
order to depict the labour process as a process in which labour 'confronts the 
materials of nature' as a natural 'force of nature' (ibid.). It is in this context that 
Marx makes his much commented upon assertion that, unlike animals, humans 
purposively plan their productive activities in advance of their undertaking. 
A spider conducts operations which resemble those of a weaver, and 
a bee would put many a human architect to shame by the 
construction of its honeycomb cells. But what distinguishes the worst 
architect from the best bee is that the architect builds the cell in his 
mind [Kopj] before he constructs it in wax. At the end of every 
labour process, a result emerges which had already been conceived 
by the worker at the beginning, hence already existed ideally. (Marx 
1976, p.284) 
In this way Marx abstracts human purpOSIveness from any and all social 
mediations in order to bring human consciousness directly into relationship with 
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natural being.3 Thus just as purposive labour combines with nature to change the 
material world, so the transformed products (use-values) which emerge from this 
process serve to 'objectify' the purposes that go into their making. 'Man not only 
effects a change of form in the materials of nature; he also realizes his own 
purpose in those materials.' (ibid.) 'The product of the process is a use-value, a 
piece of natural material adapted to human needs through a change in its form. 
Labour becomes bound up with its object. The object is worked on [verarbeitet] 
and work is objectified [Vergegenstiindlicht]' (ibid., p.287, translation modified). 
To this extent, the labour process comprises a reciprocal relationship between 
purposive labour and nature, in which labour transforms nature in a teleological 
fashion and nature confers (technical) rules upon labour in keeping its causal 
properties. For this reason the subordination of nature to the 'sovereign power' of 
labour is matched, in equal measure, by the subordination of labour to nature.4 
Thus, while the worker purposefully determines the contours of nature, nature in 
tum ' ... determines the mode of [the worker's] activity with the rigidity of a law, 
and he must subordinate his will to it' (ibid., p.284). 
In the first instance, labour mediates a teleological relationship to nature and a 
causal relationship to humanity rather than a social relationship human beings. 
F or this reason Marx places ' ... man and his labour on one side, nature and its 
materials on the other ... ' in abstraction from the social relationships which 
provide their historical context. Consequently, what mediates between 'man and 
nature' in the labour process is not sociality but the 'instruments of production' 
3 As Richard Winfield notes: 'The fIrst moment is labour as such, that original praxis in which 
self-consciousness achieves its concrete reality independent of a system of social relations' 
(Winfield 1991, p.140). 
4 In the Theories of Surplus Value, Marx writes that: 'Man himself is the basis of his material 
production, as of any other production that he carries on. All circumstances, therefore, which 
affect man, the subject of production, more or less modify all his functions and activities, and 
therefore too his functions and activities as the creator of material wealth ... ' (Marx 1972, 
p.288). 
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(Arbeitsmittel).5 Instruments which, according to Marx, not only materialize 
human purposes but also transfer these abstract ahistorical purposes to other 
materials in the production process. To this extent Marx endorses Benjamin 
Franklin's description of humanity as a 'tool-making animal' (ibid., p.286), while 
the 'earth' comprises a 'universal instrument' of production and nature a 'field of 
employment' .6 Marx then summarizes the structure of the labour process in the 
following fashion. 
The labour process, as we have just presented it in its simple and 
abstract elements, is purposeful activity aimed at the production of 
use-values. It is an appropriation of what exists in nature for the 
requirements of man. It is the universal condition for the metabolic 
interaction [StoffweschelJ between man and nature, the everlasting 
nature-imposed condition of human existence ... it is therefore 
independent of every form of that existence, or rather it is common to 
all forms of society in which human beings live. (ibid., p.290) 
However, as Postone and Brick argue, 'purposeful activity' not only objectifies 
itself in use-values but also in the sociality of capitalism. This, in tum, calls forth 
a specifically capitalist form of 'abstract labour' which Marx argues he was the 
first to discover. 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE COMMODITY 
Marx famously begins Capital by noting that under capitalism 'wealth' takes the 
general form of 'commodities'. Commodities, in tum, have both a material and a 
social dimension. The material dimension comprises its 'use-value' and is 
synonymous with ' ... the physical body of the commodity itself, for instance iron, 
com, a diamond, which is the use-value or useful thing' (Marx 1976, p.126). To 
this extent use-values' ... constitute the material content of wealth, whatever its 
5 In German, the word Mittel can mean both instruments and methods, on the one hand, or middle 
and mediation, on the other. 
6 Marx uses this English expression in the German edition of Capital alongside the Gennan 
Wirkungsraum (realm of activity) which does not appear in the English translation. 
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social form may be' (ibid.), whereas the social side of the commodity comprise 
its 'exchange-value' and is synonymous with the monetary-fonn of use-values in 
the exchange process. 
But what is it, Marx wonders, that allows such particularistic concrete sensuous , , , 
material and altogether disparate objects to exchange with one another? Clearly it 
cannot be anything intrinsic to the use-values themselves, argues Marx, because 
they have nothing in common with one another. If, however, we disregard the 
use-value of commodities then '... only one property remains, that of being 
products of labour' (ibid., p.128). In other words, all use-values share the fact that 
they 'objectify' purposive labour.? Marx then argues that the 'two-fold' nature of 
commodities is predicated on the two-fold nature of the labour that produces 
them. 
Marx refers to the material activity which fashions use-values as 'concrete 
labour' as it corresponds to the particular fonn of the thing it produces. 'The 
totality of heterogeneous use-values or physical commodities reflects a totality of 
similarly heterogeneous forms of useful labour ... ' (ibid., p.132). Consequently, 
while concrete labour, like that of use values, changes over time and place, it 
comprises the basic building bricks of all human societies irrespective of their 
social organisation. 'Labour, then, as the creator of use-values, as useful labour, 
is a condition of human existence which is independent of all fonns of society 
... '(ibid., p.133). As such concrete labour comprises a 'force of nature' that 
combines with nature to create (materially transformed) use-values. 
Marx refers to the social activity which fashions value as 'abstract labour'. 
However Marx's account of abstract labour is not as well developed as his , 
7 Marx is well aware that just as not all use-values are 'material' so not all use-values are the 
products of labour but these complications are placed on one side for the moment in order to 
concentrate on the general theory. 
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account of concrete labour.8 Indeed, many Marxists had entirely overlooked its 
importance until the re-publication of 1.1. Rubin's Essays on Marx's Theory of 
Value (Rubin 1973). This resulted in the emergence of a distinctive new 'school' 
of sociologists and economists who seek, like Postone and Brick, to emphasize 
the distinction between Marx and Ricardo's approach to value-formation. 
At its first appearance abstract labour could be mistaken for a form of 
homogenous physical labour. Thus, having abstracted from the sensuous-
empirical characteristics of commodities, Marx informs us that 'There is nothing 
left of them but the same phantom-like objectivity; they are merely congealed 
quantities of homogenous human labour ... ' (Marx 1976, p.128). In the 
Grundrisse, Marx provides this definition with an historical foundation on the 
grounds that labour under capitalism becomes '... more and more a purely 
abstract activity, a purely mechanical activity, hence indifferent to its particular 
form; a merely formal activity, or what is the same, a merely material activity, 
activity pure and simple, regardless of its form' (Marx 1973, p.297). 
However, as Sayer notes, this would only provide Marx with a natural 
connection between labour and value in the manner of Ricardo and his socialist 
followers (Sayer 1979, p.20), whereas Marx is searching for a specifically social 
connection between the two. Hence the importance of Rubin's assertion that 
abstract labour refers not to the homogenization of (social) labour in production 
but rather the 'abstraction' from concrete objects in exchange (Rubin 1973, 
pp.131-158). To this extent, argues Rubin, abstract labour comprises the social 
form taken by concrete labour once all material content is abstracted from it by 
8 Indeed, it is arguable that Marx was unable to formulate a clear notion of abstract labour because 
of his continuing allegiance to a labour-duration theory of price determination. 
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exchange.9 Moreover, Marx argues, it is possible to discover this common 
abstract element in the simplest exchange between use-values. 
In order to express the fact that, for instance, weaving creates the 
value of linen through its general property of being human labour 
rather than in its concrete form as weaving, we contrast it with the 
concrete labour which produces the equivalent of the linen, namely 
tailoring. Tailoring is now seen as the tangible form of realization of 
abstract human labour. (Marx 1976, p.150) 
However, the more exchange comes to dominate material production the more 
one specific 'use value' emerges with the sole function of manifesting abstract 
labour. 'The specific kind of commodity with whose natural form the equivalent 
form is socially interwoven now becomes the money commodity, or serves as 
money' (ibid., p.162). As such, money comprises the material expression of 
abstract labour - the 'universal equivalent' - which facilitates the exchange of all 
use-values. Thus, while the abstraction of labour is implicit in all rudimentary 
forms of exchange, it is only with generalized commodity production that the 
qualitative equalization of use-values in terms of abstract labour manifests itself 
in quantities of the money-form. Consequently it is only under capitalism that 
use-values acquire an 'objective' social form which is capable of facilitating their 
exchange. 'The product of labour is an object of utility in all states of society; but 
it is only a historically specific epoch of development which presents the labour 
expended in the production of a useful article as an "objective" property of that 
article, i.e. as its value' (ibid., pp.153-4). 
However, the fact that the role played by abstract labour in the production of 
value is completely obscured in exchange makes it appear that exchange-value is 
a property of the things themselves. 
9 A similar fonnulation can also be found in the Grundrisse when Marx writes that' All production 
is an objectification of the individual. In money (exchange value), however, the individual is not 
objectified in his natural quality, but in a social quality (relation) which is, at the same time, 
external to him' (Marx 1973, p.226). 
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THE FETISH-CHARACTER OF COMMODITIES 
AND THEIR SECRETlo 
While we have grown so inured to the commodity structure of wealth that it 
appears perfectly ordinary to us, for Marx it is ' ... a very strange thing, abounding 
in metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties' (Marx 1976, p163). Marx 
then asks from whence does its 'mystical character' derive? Clearly not from the 
use-value as this is an 'ordinary sensuous thing'. On the contrary it derives from 
the exchange-value which 'transcends sensuousness' (ibid.). 
Whence, then, arises the enigmatic character of the product of labour, 
as soon as it assumes the form of a commodity? Clearly it arises from 
this form itself. The equality of the kinds of human labour takes on a 
physical form in the equal objectivity of the products of labour as 
values; the measure of the expenditure of human labour-power by its 
duration takes on the form of the magnitude of the value of the 
products of labour; and finally the relationship between the 
producers, within which the social characteristics of their labours are 
manifested, take on the form of a social relation between the products 
of labour. (Marx 1976, p.164) 
In other words, the 'enigmatic character' of commodities derives from the fact 
that use-values manifest properties in exchange which transcend their material 
content. However, while 'value' may appear to be a material relationship 
between things in exchange, in reality it comprises a social relationship between 
workers in production. 'The mysterious character of the commodity-form 
consists therefore simply in the fact that the commodity reflects the social 
characteristics of men's own labour as objective characteristics of the products of 
labour themselves, as the socio-natural properties of these things' (ibid., pp.164-
5). 
10 The notion of 'fetishism' has a long cultural history and was widely used in Marx's day to refer 
to the 'primitive' worship of inanimate things (William Pietz 1993). 
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Herein, then, lies the basis for political economy's tendency to confuse the 
historicity of capitalism with the transhistoricity of material entities. Because 
exchange-value appears to be a property of use-values, then value-producing 
labour appears to be a property of concrete labour and capital appears to be a 
property of means of production. In each case the sociality of the former is elided 
with the materiality of the latter in keeping with capitalism's own tendency to 
manifest social relationships as relationships between things which, in the 
specific case of 'commodity fetishism', endows objects with magical (self-
animating) properties. 
In order, therefore, to find an analogy we must take flight into the 
misty realm of religion. There the products of the human brain 
appear as autonomous figures endowed with a life of their own, 
which enter into relations both with each other and with the human 
race. So it is in the world of commodities with the products of men's 
hands. ll (Marx 1976, p.165) 
However, in order to uncover the relations between people in production that 
manifest themselves in the relations between things in exchange, Marx does not 
seek to locate the content of value in abstract labour but rather in labour in 
general. Marx then proceeds to compare the opaque form taken by the labour-
value relation under capitalism with the more transparent form it takes in other 
modes of production. 
TRANSHISTORICAL COMPARISONS 
Marx's first choice of a non-mystified 'mode of production' seems strange 
insofar as Daniel Defoe's novel of Robinson Crusoe was widely used by political 
economists to naturalize capitalist social relations. Nevertheless, despite heaping 
11 In this way Marx applies the enlightenment critique of religion to capitalism in order to show 
how the latter appears irrational in terms of the former's strictures against attributing ends to 
things. 
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scorn on 'Robinsonaides' for reducing the historicity of capitalism to an 
ahistorical account of one man's efforts to tame the elements, Marx believes it is 
possible to use the novel to his own advantage. 12 To this end Marx argues that 
Robinson Crusoe (presumably prior to 'Friday's' arrival), is never in any doubt 
that his many and varied forms of concrete labour are merely different fonns of 
the same identical human activity (ibid., p.169). To this extent he is well placed 
to abstract from the different types of concrete labour he performs in order to 
ascribe social value to its products on the basis of duration alone. As such, 
contends Marx, the relationship between Robinson and the objects of his wealth 
' ... contain all the essential determinants of value' (ibid., p.l70). 
The same can also be said of the serf in medieval Europe who, despite being 
'shrouded in darkness' and steeped in 'personal dependence' , knows that ' ... what 
he expends in the service of his lord is a specific quantity of his own personal 
labour-power' (ibid., p.170). As such, the most ignorant serf is in a better position 
than the most educated worker to understand the material conditions which 
govern their lives. 
[P]recisely because relations of personal dependence form the given 
social foundation, there is no need for labour and its products to 
assume a fantastic form different from their reality. They take the 
shape, in the transactions of sociality, of services in kind and 
payments in kind. The natural form of labour, its particularity - and 
not, as in a society based on commodity production, its universality -
is here its immediate social form. The corvee can be measured by 
time just as well as the labour which produces commodities ... ' 
(Marx 1976, p.170) 
By the same token, the patriarchal rural industry of a peasant family is quite 
capable of converting its various forms of concrete labour into the unifonn 
12 Although political economy uses the Robinson Crusoe s~ory to ~a~alize capitalisr:n - ~y erasing 
its historical character - while Marx uses it to de-mystIfy capltahsm - by revealmg Its natural 
basis - this does serve to illustrate the degree of overlap between the two approaches. 
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expenditure of labour-time. 'The fact that the expenditure of the individual 
labour-powers is measured by duration appears here, by its very nature, as a 
social characteristic of labour itself, because the individual labour-powers, by 
their very nature, act only as instruments of the joint labour-power of the family' 
(Marx 1976, p.l71), although it is only with the advent of socialism that the veil 
of mystification is finally drawn from the countenance of humanity to reveal the 
underlying 'homogeneity' of labour (ibid., p.l73). 
Each of these examples, in their different ways, illustrate that labour-duration 
comprises the basis for comparing the value of use-values in all modes of 
production - whether or not participants are aware of it. To this extent, argues 
Marx, 'necessity compels' all human beings to conform to the objective laws of 
production, whether they inhabit a feudal past, a fictitious present, or a socialist 
future. Capitalism is only different from these other 'modes of production' 
insofar as this 'natural law' assumes a mystified and mystifying guise which 
operates 'behind the backs' of participants. In other words, instead of being 
consciously undertaken by empirical individuals - on the basis of socially 
necessary 'concrete' labour-time - it is undertaken unconsciously by the 
'invisible hand' of the economic system - on the basis of socially necessary 
'abstract' labour-time. 
DOES ABSTRACT LABOUR WORK? 
Since the publication of Bohm-Bawerk' s (1896) critique of Marx, following the 
posthumous publication of Capital Vol. III in 1894, Marxists have been only too 
aware of the problems which arise from his attempt to link exchange-value to 
labour-time. For this reason, many Marxists welcomed Rubin's account of 
abstract labour because it appeared to extricate them from the problems that beset 
a 'concrete' or 'embodied labour' theory of price-determination. Thus, according 
to Weeks (1981), Eldred and Hanlon (1981) and de Vroey (1982) the problems 
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which vitiated Ricardo's labour theory of value can be avoided once it is 
acknowledged that value-producing labour acquires a socially abstract fonn 
under capitalism. This then leads the Rubin school to reject a transhistorical 
theory of value in favour of a specifically capitalist one. 
In support of this view, Dave McNally (1988) argues that under feudalism goods 
do not exchange on the basis of labour-time but on the basis of traditional 
conceptions of custom and practice which find their expression in the notion of 
'just price'.l3 By the same token, it is argued that feudal peasants simply lack a 
notion of homogenous labour-time by which to measure the 'real' worth of 
things,14 while the fact that 'labour' itself is integrated into a communal network 
of traditional life-activities means that it does not exist as an homogenous activity 
in its own right. 
However, members of the Rubin school not only argue that pnce IS not 
determined by labour-duration in pre-capitalist modes of production, they also 
argue that labour-duration cannot form the basis for an independent 
determination of value under capitalism. In order to cut the gordian knot tying a 
transhistorical notion of concrete labour-time with the specifically historical fonn 
of 'value' under capitalism, they sever the quantitative connection linking the 
two. Consequently, while continuing to use the language of 'realization' to 
describe the process in which labour finds expression in exchange, they 
effectively reverse the arrow of causation in favour of the way exchange 
'socializes' labour (de Vroey 1982, p.40). Thus Himmelweit and Mohun argue 
'Only market processes realise the quantitative expression of abstract labour, and 
l3 According to McNally, the feudal notion of 'just price' is transfonned by political economy into 
the notion of 'natural price' which then leads them to search for an independent determinant of 
'value' outside the exchange-process (McNally 1988, p.22S). 
14 According to E.P. Thompson, it is only with the industrial revolution that modem conceptions of 
measurement of labour by time come to prevail in the production process (Thompson 1966). 
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this quantitative expressIon only has a price-form' (Himmelweit and Mohun 
1978, p.84). 
By this means, the Rubin school are able to avoid the problems that arise from 
the attempt to trace the relationship between labour-time in production and price 
in exchange. Thus, on the one hand, they argue that the series of mediations 
relating the two is too complex to trace while, on the other hand, they argue that 
the fact price is determined by socially necessary abstract labour-time means that 
the amount of value any quantum of labour creates depends on its relation to all 
other quanta of labour. Given that the only place to compare one form of labour 
with another is the market, there can be no independent basis for determining 
value outside exchange. 
Having thus set up a clear line of demarcation between embodied and abstract 
labour theories of value, writers such as Diane Elson (Elson 1979) then argue that 
it is not labour-duration but money which comprises the 'social standard of 
measurement'. Thus, on the grounds that ' ... the object of Marx's theory of value 
is not price at all ... ' (ibid., p.123), Elson argues that it is preferable to describe 
Marx's 'labour theory of value' as a 'value theory of labour' (ibid.). In particular, 
Elson argues that labour is an indeterminate and fluid activity which only 
acquires a determinate social form in a specific modes of production (ibid., 
p.138). In support of this view she quotes Marx's assertion that 'Labour is the 
living, form-giving fire; it is the transitoriness of things, their temporality, as their 
formation by living time' .15 To this extent Marx's 'value theory of labour' is not 
concerned with the determination of price by labour-time, but rather the 
15 While in Capital Marx writes that 'Living labour must seize on ... things, awaken them from the 
dead, change them from merely possible into real and effective use-values. Bathed in the fIre of 
labour ... they are indeed consumed, but to some purpose, as elements in the formation of new 
use-values ... ' (Marx 1976, pp.289-90). 
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determinate form that labour acquires when it is harnessed to the production of 
capital. 
Nevertheless, Elson continues to assume that labour plays a privileged role in the 
'production' of value under capitalism. However, as Eldred and Hanlon realize, 
once the quantitative relationship between labour-time and value is broken it is 
difficult to maintain the existence of a qualitative one. 'To leave the 
determination of magnitude of value to exchange-relations seems to cut the nexus 
between productive activity and exchange-relations. The prices of commodities 
would then be completely capricious, arbitrary measurements of the magnitude of 
value, wholly divorced from the conditions of production' (Eldred and Hanlon 
1981, p.43).16 
In order to correct this, Eldred and Hanlon attempt to retain an abstract labour 
theory of price-determination, but they acknowledge it is ' ... a mediated one in 
which the labour performed in the production process has no direct relationship 
to its acknowledgement as value creating labour ... ' (ibid.). This problem arises 
from the fact that there is no empirical basis for arguing that value is a product of 
labour - or indeed that value is a product at all. On the contrary, everything under 
capitalism points away from labour as the source of value. For this reason 
Marxist attempts to maintain this relationship tend, as in the case of Elson above, 
to rely on the assumption that labour is a world-constituting activity in its own 
right. 
The fact that the notion of abstract labour remains tantalizingly undeveloped in 
Capital - despite the latter's multiple revisions - can then be explained in terms of 
the equivocal role it plays in mediating between the concreteness of production 
16 The language here echoes that of Hegel when he criticizes Rousseau for failing to acknowledge 
the role of Spirit in the detennination of the general will. 
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and the sociality of exchange. To this extent, abstract labour compnses a 
theoretical halfway house between an embodied labour theory of value (a la 
Ricardo) and an exchange-based theory of value (a fa Say). With the notion of 
abstract labour, Marx's attempts to combine the ahistorical content of the fonner 
with the historical form of the latter. It then permits Marx to range between 
production and exchange but not, unfortunately, to reconcile them. This can be 
seen from the fact that far from abandoning Ricardo's attempt to identify labour-
time as an independent measure of value, Marx not only argues that labour-
duration ultimately determines price under capitalism but also under pre-capitalist 
modes of production. To this extent the labour-value relation has a transhistorical 
essence which acquires a fetishized form of appearance under capitalism wherein 
' ... the measure of the expenditure of human labour-power by its duration takes 
on the form of the magnitude of the value of the products of labour ... ' (op. cit.). 
However, while it is quite legitimate for the Rubin school to argue that only a 
theory of abstract labour can do justice to a capitalist theory of value, it is not 
legitimate for them to argue that this is the approach that Marx himself takes. On 
the contrary, as we have seen, Capital is an ambiguous work which attempts to 
combine a transhistorical approach to labour with an historical approach to value. 
By obscuring these tensions the Rubin school abstracts, not only from the 
difficulties that Marx's labour theory of value runs into, but also from the key 
dialectic relationship which informs Marx's mature economic writings, namely 
the relationship between self-objectifying subjectivity, on the one hand, and self-
valorizing value on the other. 
Thus, insofar as capital appears to be a self-sufficient, self-reproducing, self-
propelling entity, all traces of its dependence on purposive labour are lost. It is 
therefore only by evoking the properties of the 'real', 'actual' or 'simple labour 
process' that Marx is able to claim that the 'subject' of valorization is not capital 
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but purposive labour. As such, Marx's claim that all roads lead to labour rests on 
the prior claim that labour is the universal road builder. If abstract labour is the 
source of value under capitalism, this is because labour-time is the transhistorical 
basis for valuing things in all modes of production. This, however, leaves Marx 
vulnerable to the charge he levels against political economy, namely that his own 
transhistorical categories are actually expressions of the historically specific fonn 
of capitalist sociality which he 'eternalizes' in the process. 
OBJECTIFICATION AND ALIENATION 
According to our analysis, it is only on the basis of a transhistorical notion of 
self-objectifying subjectivity that Marx is able to trace exchange-value to the 
alienated expression of labour under capitalism. The question then arises as to 
whether Marx is guilty of assigning transhistorical status to what are essentially 
capitalist social relations. The problem, however, with this line of enquiry is that 
it assumes that all social theories have an actual basis in the historical context in 
which they arise, whereas it is quite possible that the theoretical tools used to 
analyze society may only have a contingent relationship to it. Nevertheless, it is 
possible to identify an overlap between certain features of Marx's notion of self-
objectifying labour and the reified character of capitalist sociality. As a first step 
we shall compare Marx's own theory of' commodity fetishism' with the theory of 
self-objectifying subjectivity upon which it rests. 
According to Marx's theory of commodity fetishism, under capitalism things 
become personified and persons become reified (Versachliche). This arises from 
the fact that social relations that have their source in labour in production appear 
to be embodied in things in exchange. However, when we compare Marx's 
account of fetishism with his own account of the labour process we find that far 
from being a unique characteristic of capitalism this is also a property of labour 
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per se. To this extent, properties which Marx describes as 'fetishistic' in relation 
to capitalism, form the basis for his own transhistorical account of labour. 
Thus, according to Marx's theory of the labour process, purpOSIve labour 
objectifies itself in things (use-values) and use-values are the material bearers of 
objective sociality. In which case things not only possess the capacity to 
'objectify' human purposes, but human purposes are socially objectified in all 
modes of production. However, this is not dissimilar from Marx's theory of 
commodity fetishism insofar as it too argues that under capitalism things embody 
social relations and social relations acquire an objective form as a consequence. 
Indeed, it can be argued that it is only insofar as purposive labour possesses the 
general capacity to objectify itself in things, that things possess the capacity 
embody labour-relations under capitalism. In other words, if things could not 
embody purposive labour then the latter could not find expression in the social 
relationships between the former in exchange. As such the 'personification of 
objects' and the 'objectification of persons', which Marx describes as fetishistic, 
is built into his own conception of self-objectifying subjectivity. 
Thus, while there are differences between the fetishistic notion that value is an 
attribute of use-values, and the notion that value is an attribute of the (abstract) 
labour objectified in use-values, it remains the case that for the latter to occur, 
human purposes must be able to objectify itself in things. In other words, 
according to Marx, human intentions can abstract themselves from the social 
relations in which they are formulated and attach themselves to the objects they 
help fashion. These objects then pass through a number of further social 
mediations, such as distribution and exchange, before manifesting the original 
purposes that went into their creation in production. 
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The fact that Marx is unable to disentangle his theory of commodity fetishism 
from his theory of self-objectification suggests that the fonner is bound up with 
the latter. To this extent it is possible to accuse Marx of a fetishistic approach to 
labour insofar as it is embodied in things rather than social relations. But the main 
consequence is that, for Marx, 'objectification' (Vergegenstiindlichung) arises 
naturally from the transhistorical relationship between human purposes and 
inanimate objects in the 'real labour process', rather than the 'reified' 
(Versachliche)17 social relations which pertain under capitalism. 
Nevertheless, there are occasions when Marx does contemplate an alternative 
conception of 'objectification' - one grounded in the historically contingent fonn 
of alienation found in capitalism. For example, in The Gennan Ideology, Marx 
describes capitalism as an '... objective power above us, growing out of our 
control, thwarting our expectations, bringing to naught our calculations ... ' (Marx 
and Engels 1970, p.54), while in the Grundrisse, Marx argues that having 
smashed the community of antiquity 'money' transfonns all production into an 
'objectification' of the individual (Marx 1973, p.226). These passages hint at an 
alternative theory of objectification, one based in the way social subjects become 
separated from sociality and sociality acquires a life of its own over and above its 
individual bearers. Thus when Marx writes, in the Grundrisse, that exchange 
relations ' ... confront individuals as an objective relation which is independent of 
them ... ' (Marx 1973, p.161), he is indicating that the problem lies neither in the 
'subjectification' of things nor the 'thingification' of subjects, but in the capacity 
of capitalist sociality to assume an objective fonn over and above its atomized 
subjects. Marx continues this theme when he argues that: 
... it is an insipid notion to conceive of this merely objective bond as 
a spontaneous natural attribute inherent in individuals and 
inseparable from their nature ... This bond is their product. It is a 
17 In the Grundrisse, both Versachlichung and Vergegenstiindlichung are translated as 
'objectification' while in Capital, Versachlichung is translated as 'reification'. 
historic product. It belongs to a specific phase of their development. 
The alien and independent character in which it presently exists vis-
a-vis individuals proves only that the latter are still engaged in the 
creation of the conditions of their social life, and that they have not 
yet begun, on the basis of these condition, to live it. (Marx 1973, 
p.162) 
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This, however, presupposes that sociality is not a 'product' of the purposive 
transfonnation of nature, but rather a relationship between 'subjects', in which 
case there is nothing natural about objectified intersubjectivity as it presupposes 
that subjects are alienated from their own social relations. 
If, however, objective sociality is not a transhistorical attribute of labour's 
metabolic interaction with nature but an historical attribute of capitalist sociality, 
then what is it about the latter that generates the objectification of sociality? An 
answer can be found in Marx's assertion that the theories of political economy ' ... 
bear the unmistakable stamp of belonging to a social formation in which the 
process of production has mastery over man, instead of the opposite ... ' (Marx 
1976, pp.l74-175). Here Marx is suggesting that the fetishistic nature of 
capitalism derives from the fact that human sociality acquires an independent life 
of its own under capitalism which subjects participants to its objective 
imperatives. In which case 'alienation' consists, not in the fact that labour 
objectifies itself in things with a life of their own, but that social agents are 
robbed of their capacity to consciously constitute their own social relations by 
capitalism's self-regulating character. In the next chapter we shall begin by 
examining Marx's attempt to sustain an independent conception of labour in the 
face of its subordination to capital, before going on to examine Marx's attempt to 
reduce the sociality of exchange to labour in production. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
THE CAPITALIZATION OF SOCIALITY 
In the previous chapter, we argued that Marx's pursues two independent but 
interrelated critical strategies with a potential to conflict. On the one hand, 
Marx seeks to historicize the categories of political economy in order to de-
naturalize its analysis of capitalism, on the other hand, he seeks to uncover the 
transhistorical conditions of production in general from which to criticize 
capitalism. However, he can only pursue each strategy to the point where it 
undermines the other. This leads Marx to develop ever more complex and 
subtle ways to combine them while never managing to satisfactory resolve the 
contradictions they subtend. Because Marx is unable to reconcile these 
antinomies, it is not only possible to interpret his writings in conflicting ways, 
but also find sufficient textual support to justify these contradictory 
interpretations. Unfortunately, in this pursuit of 'what Marx really meant', no 
attempt is made to explain why Marx's writings lend themselves to such diverse 
interpretations. 
The reason why Marx's writings contain such tensions can ultimately be 
explained in terms of his attempt to ground the critique of capitalism, not in the 
struggles of 'real' men and women who constitute the labour movement, but in 
labour's essential powers of self-objectifying subjectivity. Having grounded the 
principle of self-constitution in self-objectifying labour, Marx can then argue 
that the whole edifice of capitalism is merely as alienated manifestation of 
purposive labour. However, this presupposes that 'labour' - as the source, 
substance and subject of value - possesses an independent existence set apart 
from the capitalist relations of production it creates. But this, as we have seen, 
is no easy task because capitalism is driven by a process of 'self-valorizing 
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value' which is entirely self-dependent and self-regulating.! Consequently, 
while acknowledging the role played by capital in the historical genesis of 
social labour, Marx argues that capital is merely an alienated expression of self-
objectifying labour. In the following section we shall argue that Marx attempts 
to preserve an independent role for labour in the face of its historical 
'capitalization' relies upon a transhistorical conception of labour grounded in 
the 'real labour process'. 
SECTION ONE: THE SOCIALITY OF LABOUR 
Our starting point is Marx's theory of commodity fetishism and its assumption 
that labour only acquires a social form in the process of exchange. 
Objects of utility become commodities only because they are the 
products of the labour of private individuals who work independently 
of each other. The sum total of the labour of all these private 
individuals forms the aggregate labour of society. Since the 
producers do not come into social contact until they exchange the 
products of their labour, the specific social characteristics of their 
private labours appears only within this exchange. (Marx 1976, 
p.165) 
Because the individual producers of commodities do not come into contact with 
each other prior to exchange,2 Marx argues that their labours ' ... do not appear 
as direct social relations between persons in their work, but rather as objectified 
(Sachliche) relations between persons and social relations between objects 
The tenns selbstverwertung and verwertung, which are consistently translated as self-valorization 
and valorization in the Penguin edition of Capital (Marx 1976, p.255), are translated by a variety 
of phrases in the Lawrence and Wishart edition such as self-expanding value, automatically 
expanding value, and spontaneously expanded value (Marx 1954, p.152). 
2 In A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx argues that 'Commodities are the 
direct products of isolated independent individual kinds of labour, and through their alienation in 
the course of individual exchange they must prove that they are general social labour, in other 
words, on the basis of commodity production, labour becomes social labour only as a result of 
the universal alienation of individual kinds of labour' (Marx 1970b, p.85). 
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(Sachen), (Marx 1976, p.166, translation modified).3 Isaac Rubin supports this 
view when he notes that for Marx 'The comprehensive equalization (through 
money) of all concrete forms of labour and their transformation into abstract 
labour simultaneously creates among [the producers] a social connection, 
transforming private into social labour' (Rubin 1973, p.130). 
The notion that the sociality of exchange is a public manifestation of private-
labour which lacks a social dimension in production is also echoed by followers 
of Rubin such as Himmelweit and Mohun who state that 'It is the process of 
exchange on the market that manifests the social character of individual labour, 
establishing the social connection between independent commodity producers' 
(Himmelweit and Mohun 1978, p.233), and Geoff Pilling who argues that ' ... 
under commodity production labour is not immediately social; it becomes 
social labour only through the mediation of the market' (Pilling 1980, p.46). 
Diane Elson also confirms this suggestion when she argues that, at this stage of 
his argument, Marx is '... abstracting from the internal organisation of each 
producing unit' (Elson 1979, p.146), although Elson does not believe Marx 
intends to argue that' ... labour as an activity has no social character, and only 
acquires one after its embodiment in commodities' (ibid.). Nevertheless, the 
question remains why is Marx 'abstracting from the internal organisation of 
each producing unit' at this stage of his argument? 
According to Ernest Mandel, Marx, in the opening chapters of Capital Vol. I, is 
not actually analyzing industrial capitalism at all but an historically prior form 
of 'petty' or 'simple commodity production', in which labour has not yet 
acquired a social form. To this extent, argues Mandel, the presentational form 
3 The English translation gives this as 'material [Dinglich] relations between persons and social 
relations between things [Dingen] .. .' (p.166). However, my German edition gives this as 
Sachliche and Sachen (objective and objects). This is important insofar as Marx uses the term 
Versachlichung and not Verdinglichung to mean 'reification'. 
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of Capital mirrors the historical development of capitalism from feudalism, 
through production for exchange in the absence of capital, to full blown 
industrial capitalism (Mandel 1976, pp.14-15). In other words, it is capitalism 
which brings about what Mandel calls 'the objective socialization of labour' 
(ibid., p.945). However, this would mean that labour does not posses a social 
character prior to its formation by capital. Although historically implausible 
there is, nevertheless, some evidence that Marx holds this view, most notably in 
the chapters which trace the transition from the formal to the real subsumption 
of labour and the subsequent discussion of it in the 'Results of the Immediate 
Process of Production' (Marx 1976). 
FROM THE FORMAL TO THE REAL SUBSUMPTION OF LABOUR 
In his writings on the historical genesis of capitalism, Marx argues that 
capitalism first establishes its hegemony over exchange - in terms of the 
commodification of land, labour and the instruments of production - before then 
going on to subject the labour process to the imperatives of capital. The first 
stage of this process consists in bringing about 'co-operation' (Marx 1976, 
Chapter 13). Thus capital is instrumental in bringing together workers such as 
weavers who were previously' ... isolated independent workers or small masters 
... ' (ibid., p.442). When the worker then ' ... co-operates in a planned way with 
others, he strips off the fetters of his individuality, and develops the capabilities 
of his species' (ibid., p.447).4 To this extent capital does appear to socialize 
what was previously individualistic forms of labour. In the process labour loses 
its individual character and becomes a social property of capital. 
[The worker's] co-operation only begins with the labour process, but 
by then they have ceased to belong to themselves. On entering the 
labour process they are incorporated into capital. As co-operators, as 
4 It is clear from the context that 'individuality' refers here to the previous historical form of 
handicraft and not to the buying and selling of labour-power. 
members of a working organism, they merely fonn a particular mode 
of existence of capital. Hence the productive power developed by the 
worker socially is the productive power of capital. (ibid., pA51)5 
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In other words, the more labour is 'socialized', 'unified' and 'brought into 
connection' by capital, the more workers lose control over their 'individual 
functions'. 'These things are not their own act, but the act of the capital that 
brings them together and maintains them in that situation ... who subjects their 
activity to his purpose (ibid., p.450). 
In the next stage of the process (dating from the middle of the sixteenth to the 
last third of the eighteenth century), capital brings about the 'Division of 
Labour' (Marx 1976, Chapter 14). In this chapter, Marx details how the labour 
process is divided up into smaller and simpler tasks which are then allocated to 
individual workers. As a consequence, workers are required to undertake a 
series of repetitive and mindless operations that transforms them into 'crippled 
monstrosities' (ibid., p.481). 
In the third and final stage of 'Machinery and Large-Scale Industry' (Marx 
1976, Chapter 15), which Marx equates with the 'industrial revolution', science 
and technology are applied to production. Workers then lose all remaining 
control over the labour process so as to transform them into 'living appendages' 
of machinery. Thus, while the conditions of work under capitalism employ 
workers '... it is only with the coming of machinery that this inversion first 
acquires a technical and palpable reality' (ibid., p.548). This then inaugurates a 
fully capitalized labour process in which the social characteristics of labour 
become the social property of capital. Commenting on this transformation in 
the 'Results of the Immediate Production Process', Marx writes that the ' ... 
5 In this passage, the previously 'isolated' character of workers could refer to either 'individual 
isolated labour-power' in the labour market or the fact that they are employed as 'uncoIll1ected 
men'. 
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social productive forces of labour, or productive forces of social labour, came 
into being historically only with the advent of the specifically capitalist mode of 
production. That is to say, they appeared as something intrinsic to the relations 
of capitalism and inseparable from them' (ibid., p.l 052). 
However, this would suggest that once the capitalization of production has been 
completed and labour is transformed into labour for capital, then it no longer 
exists as an independent entity in its own right. In the Grundrisse, Marx follows 
the logic of his own historical critique of political economy to its conclusion by 
arguing that: 
... the question whether capital is productive or not is absurd. Labour 
itself is productive only if absorbed into capital, where capital forms 
the basis of production, and where the capitalist is therefore in 
command of production... Labour, such as it exists for itself in the 
worker in opposition to capital, that is, labour in its immediate being 
separated from capital, is not productive.' (Marx 1973, p.308) 
This then would suggest that as a process of 'self-valorization' capital is a truly 
independent process which relies on nothing other than itself to reproduce 
itself. In other words, it is only insofar as labour is absorbed into capital that it 
is productive. Consequently, the source of value (insofar as Marx continues to 
argue that it has a source) must be capital, as labour has no independent 
existence from the former. 
THE SOURCE OF VALUE 
We have now arrived at the core of the tension between Marx's concern to trace 
the historical capitalization of labour and his concern to trace capital to its 
independent source in labour. In Capital, Marx writes it now appears that the: 
... entire development of the productive forces of socialized labour 
(in contrast to the more or less isolated labour of individuals) ... in 
the immediate process of production, takes the fonn of the 
productive power of capital. It does not appear as the productive 
power of labour ... And least of all does it appear as the productive 
power either of the individual worker or of the workers joined 
together in the production process. (ibid., p.l024) 
66 
Nevertheless, as the language of 'appearances' indicates, Marx has no intention 
of surrendering his labour theory of value to the productive power of capital. At 
a similar juncture in the Grundrisse, Marx argues that even when labour has 
been fully 'objectified' by capital it remains its 'subjective' source. 'The only 
thing distinct from objectified labour is non-objectified labour, labour which is 
still objectifying itself, labour as subjectivity' (Marx 1973, p.272). In other 
words, while capital may comprise objectified labour, labour retains a 
subjective identity in the living presence (Dasein) of workers. To this extent: 
' ... objectified labour, i.e. labour which is present in space, can be 
opposed, as past labour, to labour which is present in time. If it is 
present in time, alive, then it can be present only as the living subject, 
in which it exists as capacity, as possibility; hence as worker. The 
only use value, therefore, which can fonn the opposite pole to capital 
is labour, to be exact, value-creating,productive labour. (ibid.) 
On this basis, Marx then claims that labour as the alienated subject of value 
comprises capital's independent and self-generating other: 'not-capital' (Marx 
1973, p.274). 
In Capital, Marx's response to the 'capitalization' of labour is similar, but while 
retaining the notion that labour comprises the living subjectivity of workers, 
Marx now argues that it is empirically incarnated in 'individual workers'. Such 
'individual workers' at first merely appear to experience capital as imposed 
upon them from outside. 'In fact collective unity in co-operation, combination 
in the division of labour, the use of the forces of nature and the sciences, of the 
products of labour as machinery - all these confront the individual workers as 
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something alien, objective, ready-made, existing without their intervention, and 
frequently even hostile to them' (ibid., p.l054). 
Thus, despite being 'subsumed under capital', workers continue to experience 
'their own social labour' as a hostile force baring down upon them. But what is 
it that enables 'individual workers' to maintain an independent existence from 
the capitalist valorization process? The answer, according to Marx, is that 
'Labour as a social and natural force does not develop within the valorisation 
process as such, but within the actual labour process' (ibid., p.l 056). 
'Productive labour - as something productive of value - continues to confront 
capital as the labour of the individual workers, irrespective of the social 
combinations these workers may enter into in the process of production' (ibid.). 
In other words, the 'use-value' which enable workers to augment value, is 
something they possess prior to and independently of the capitalist mode of 
production. Thus, despite comprising the social form taken by labour under 
capitalism, capital remains dependent on an independent form of labour located 
within the 'actual labour process'. 
In support of this contention Michel Henry argues that' ... the very possibility of 
capitalism, rests upon the subjectivity at work in the production process, upon 
the existence of a living power ... ' (Henry 1983, p.269). Thus, even when labour 
appears to have been completely subsumed beneath capital - and the properties 
of the former have becomes the property of the latter - it comprises its 
subjective source. In other words, it seems that no matter how deeply capital 
penetrates into the production process, it can never penetrate the underlying 
material-exchange between purposive labour and nature that comprises the 'real 
labour process'. On the contrary, purposive labour remains untouched and 
untouchable by the alienated form of sociality which it originates. 
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But what manner of subjectivity is this which retains its world constituting 
powers in the face of its social constitution by capital? It cannot be the 
'empirical' subjectivity of actual workers as their purposes have been 
subordinated to the 'plan', 'will' and 'ideas' of the capitalist (Marx 1976, p.450). 
It must therefore be a form of transcendental subjectivity which, according to 
Henry, comprises the condition for the possibility of capital. 'The subjective 
character of labor results from the fact that it is the actualization of the labor-
power, which in its tum is nothing other than the subjectivity of the individual, 
what in him is most alive, what defines him, what constitutes his personality' 
(ibid., p.226). 
However, insofar as this 'non-economic' form of subjectivity compnses the 
'reality of economic reality' (ibid., p.230), labour cannot be said to 'objectify' 
itself. On the contrary, as the transcendental condition for capitalist sociality the 
subjective source of capital remains forever independent of its own economic 
creation. Hence Henry's assertion that 'It is the result of labour that is objective, 
not the living labour itself which is and remains subjective ... ' (ibid., p.210). 
Henry then uses this formulation to resolve the problem - which to his credit he 
recognizes - concerning the overlap between the structure of self-objectification 
and the structure of commodity fetishism (ibid.). 
However, while we are sympathetic to Henry's interpretation of Marx, we view 
the suggestion that the edifice of capitalism rests on a form of originary 
subjectivity, which it can never manifest itself within without becoming 
corrupted by, along with the radical reduction of capital to subjectivity under the 
formula 'c = 0' (ibid., p.265), as the point at which Marx's labour theory of value 
collapses back into the subjectivist tradition of classical German idealism from 
which it evolved. But then how else can Marx resist the historicizing tendencies 
of capitalism to socially form labour in its own image and on the basis of its own 
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imperatives, without a transcendental conception of subjectivity, grounded in the 
'real labour process'? In the absence of what Habennas calls a 'subject-centred' 
conception of labour (Habennas 1987b), which in common with its idealist 
ancestry grounds the 'substance' of sociality in 'the power of living subjectivity', 
the purposes of workers would be subordinated to capital, and the oppositional 
fonn of 'not-capital' completely absorbed into self-valorizing value. 
Before attempting to develop an alternative conception of 'not-capital', we shall 
first examine the effect of our analysis on Marx's explanation for the sociality of 
exchange. As we have seen, Marx's theory of commodity fetishism rests on the 
notion that the 'private labours' of independent individuals acquire their reified 
expression in the social relation between things in exchange. However, if labour 
is socialized in production as capital, then it is not labour as such but its capitalist 
fonn which produces commodities. In other words, if labour is not a 
transcendental fonn of subjectivity which objectifies itself in things, then it 
cannot be the source of exchange-value. What the market 'socializes' is not, 
therefore, the 'private labours' of 'independent producers' but the private capitals 
of individual finns. As such, the market comprises the process through which 
individual capitals come into relation with the total capital, and thereby discover 
whether the products they produce are socially demanded at a price consistent 
with their profitable production. 
SECTION TWO: THE SOCIALITY OF USE-VALUES 
According to Marx, the distinction between use-values and exchange-values 
corresponds to the distinction between material and social substance. Thus, while 
use-values comprise the commodity's material content, exchange-value 
comprises its social fonn. 6 Although use-values have a long and important 
6 Although Marx notes that this distinction is already present within Aristotle's De Republica. /,i,c. 
(Marx 1976, fin pp.255-6). 
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history - especially in relation to the means of production - they are not, 
according to Marx social entities in their own right (Marx 1976, p.l26).1 On the 
contrary, they are viewed as the 'material bearers' of sociality which originate 
from the purposive labour objectified in them during production. 
However, the notion that use-values are merely the material repositories of a fonn 
of sociality which contribute nothing towards the sociality of exchange is 
vulnerable, according to Jean Baudrillard (1988), to Marx's own historical 
critique of political economy. Baudrillard therefore criticizes Marx for treating 
the use-value as an ' ... objective, final relation of intrinsic purpose, which does 
not mask itself and whose transparency, as fonn, defies history (even if its 
content changes continually with respect to social and cultural detenninations)' 
(ibid., p.64). 
Thus, just as Marx accuses political economy of 'naturalizing' capitalist sociality 
by equating its historical fonn with the material content of production in general, 
so Baudrillard accuses Marx of retaining a 'naturalistic' conception of use-values 
as the uncorrupted and incorruptible 'other' to or 'limit' of capita1.8 'Use value is 
the expression of a whole metaphysic: that of utility. It registers itself as a kind of 
moral law at the heart of the object - and it is inscribed there as the finality of the 
'need' of the subject' (ibid., p.67). 
Baudrillard is aware that by undennining the independent existence of use-values 
he is also undermining Marx's own critical standpoint. Nevertheless, Baudrillard 
7 In the Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy Marx is most emphatic that: 
'To be a use-value is evidently a necessary prerequisite of the commodity, but it is 
immaterial to the use-value whether it is a commodity. Use-value as such, since it is 
independent of the determinate economic form, lies outside the sphere of investigation of 
political economy. It belongs in this sphere only when it is itself a determinate form' (Marx 
1970b, p.28). 
8 Derrida makes the same point in Spectres of Marx (1994, p.460) without citing Baudrillard's 
more extensive critique. 
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argues against the attempt to ' ... posit the "restitution" of use value, at the end of 
political economy, under the sign of the "liberation of needs" and the 
"administration of things" as a revolutionary perspective' (ibid., p.72-73). On the 
contrary, Baudrillard advocates jettisoning the notion of a non-alienated realm' ... 
entombed beneath exchange value, like the natural harmony of earthly paradise 
broken by sin and suffering ... inscribed as an invulnerable essence to be 
disinterred at the last stage of History, in a promised future redemption' (ibid., 
p.74). 
On what then can we ground the critique of capitalism? In response to this 
question, Baudrillard argues that 'We must therefore displace everything into the 
sphere of the symbolic, where challenge, reversal and overbidding are the law ... ' 
(ibid.). 'Gone are the referentials of production, signification, affect, substance, 
history and the whole equation of "real" contents that gave the sign weight by 
anchoring it with a kind of burden of utility - in short its form as representative 
equivalence' (1988, p.12S). In other words, with the collapse of the 'material' 
realm of use-values into the 'social' realm of utility, capitalist economic 
hegemony is complete. We must therefore tum to the realm of symbolic 
exchange where transgressive possibilities continue to thrive. 
Needless to say, Baudrillard's flight from 'economic' into 'symbolic exchange' is 
viewed by many Marxists as vitiating his critique of Marx. However, while 
Kellner seeks to deflect Baudrillard's analysis away from Marx towards' ... a 
specific version of structuralist Marxian anthropology ... ' (Kellner 1989, pA8), it 
remains the case that even the 'dialectical and historicist versions' of Marxism 
which Kellner views as untouched by Baudrillard's writings remain vulnerable to 
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his historicizing approach. 9 Unfortunately, Baudrillard fails to undertake a 
systematic critique of Marx's own writings on use-value. 
FROM MATERIAL TO SOCIAL USE-VALUES 
In the opening sections of Capital, Marx argues that use-values comprise the 
material content of commodities whose social relations they 'bear' . Thus, 
according to Marx, use-values are 'realized', without social mediation, in acts of 
metabolic consumption between individuals and material entities. 'The use-value 
of a thing is realized without exchange, i.e. in the direct relation between the 
thing and man ... ' (ibid., p.177). However, as Marx's account unfolds he drops 
the abstractions which support his 'two-fold' approach to commodities. In the 
first instance Marx acknowledges that 'Commodities cannot themselves go to 
market and perform exchanges in their own right. We must, therefore, have 
recourse to their guardians, who are the possessors of commodities' (Marx 1976, 
p.178). 
Nevertheless, the 'guardians' or 'custodians' (Hiitern) of use-values do not confer 
social characteristics upon them. This is because ' ... the characters who appear on 
the economic stage are merely personifications of economic relations; it is as the 
bearers (Trager) of these economic relations that they come into contact with 
each other'lO (ibid., p.179). To this extent individuals in exchange comprise 
'personifications' of' economic relations' whose (objective) sociality is generated 
elsewhere (i.e. by purposive labour in production). 
9 On the one hand, Kellner claims that Marx anticipates Baudrillard' s critique with his historical 
conception of human needs (Kellner 1989, p.36) while, on the other hand, he argues that 
Baudrillard's attempt to historicize human needs renders him: ' ... unable to articulate standpoints 
from which one can criticize capitalist society ... ' (ibid., p.37). 
10 As Marx's translator notes, the notion that an object or person performs the role of 'the 
receptacle, repository, bearer (Trager) of some thing or tendency quite different from it appears 
repeatedly in Capital ... ' (Marx 1976, fin, p.179), although no explanation is offered for this. 
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Nevertheless, use-values do possess a social character insofar as workers' ... not 
only produce use-values, but use-values for others, social use-values' (ibid., 
p.131).11 But if use-values are social entities in their own right (and not just 
parasitic upon labour), then what is it that confers sociality upon them? A clue to 
this can be found in Marx's assertion that the labour embodied in use-values only 
counts as socially necessary if it passes the test of exchange. In other words, ' ... 
the labour expended on [use-values] only counts in so far as it is expended in a 
form which is useful for others. However, only the act of exchange can prove 
whether that labour is useful for others, and its product consequently capable of 
satisfying the needs of others' (ibid., p.179-80). Thus, given that socially useful 
labour must be embodied in socially useful things, the process of exchange is 
vital for determining whether things are socially useful or not. 12 However, this 
contradicts Marx's earlier assertion that 'The use-value of a thing is realized 
without exchange ... ' (op. cit.). It now seems that it is only through exchange that 
a thing acquires its socially useful status by being brought into relation with 'the 
needs of others' .13 
Once it is acknowledged that use-values are social entities in their own right -
which are realized in exchange - then there is no longer any need to trace the 
sociality of exchange-value to self-objectifying labour in production. On the 
contrary, we now have a perfectly plausible explanation for the sociality of 
exchange without recourse to the metaphysics of labour. As Robert Nozick 
excitedly notes, in the matter of a few sentences Marx undermines his own 
conception of socially necessary labour and with it the labour theory of value. 
11 To which Engels adds not only must the product be a use-values for others, but the product' ... 
must be transferred to the other person, for whom it serves as a use-value, through the medium of 
exchange' (ibid.), although we would add through the medium of monetary exchange. 
12 Weare assuming here, like Marx, a pure form of market capitalist economy in which all goods 
and services are produced for exchange, and there is no state intervention to realize 'social use-
values' in an alternative fashion. 
13 Cutler et al. also argue that 'Demand/utility has a crucial and hidden place in [Marx's] theory of 
value' (Cutler et al. 1977, p.86). 
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'What is socially necessary, and how much of it is, will be detennined by what 
happens on the market!! There is no longer any labor theory of value; the central 
notion of socially necessary labor time is itself defined in tenns of the processes 
and exchange ratios of a competitive market' (Nozick 1974, p.260). 
Marxists response to N ozick tend to be along the same lines as Hilferding' s 
response to Bohm-Bawerk insofar as they re-emphasize the peculiar significance 
of the use-value of labour-power (Kay 1979). Nevertheless, exchange-based 
theories of value are more plausible because they rely on an empirical conception 
of self-regarding subjectivity, located in consumer preferences, rather than a 
transcendental conception of self-objectifying subjectivity, located in production. 
THE SOCIALITY OF EXCHANGE 
If the sociality of exchange does not derive from labour in production, then an 
alternative approach to 'value' is called for, one capable of acknowledging the 
role consumers play in bestowing value on things. As we have seen, Marx also 
acknowledges that things only possess 'value' if they are 'subjectively' desired 
by individuals. However, this insight remains undeveloped by Marx, or his 
followers, because it undennines his labour theory of sociality. Nevertheless, 
demand plays a key role in detennining the social content value. 14 
According to neo-classical economICS value, rather than expressIng the 
transcendental subjectivity of 'individual workers' in production, expresses the 
empirical subjectivity of individual consumers in exchange. To this extent it 
arises out of an actual process of evaluation through which individuals express 
their 'subjective preferences'. Thus, rather than locating subjectivity in the fonn-
14 According to Rosdolsky (1977), Marx does acknowledge the role demand plays in the 
determination of value once he drops 'a series of simplifying assumptions' in Capital Vol. III. At 
this stage in his argument the notion of 'socially necessary labour' is a function of supply and 
demand (ibid., p.90). 
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gIvIng fire of labour, neo-classical economics locates it in the free-choice of 
(sovereign) consumers.15 This has certain advantages over Marx's approach 
insofar as its conception of individualism is more in keeping with the historical 
development of market-capitalism. 16 In other words, while neo-classical 
economics tends to abstract from the historical genealogy of utility-maximizing 
individuals, its concept of subjectivity has stronger historical foundation than 
Marx's transhistorical notion of 'individual workers'. 
However, if Marx underestimates the role played by subjective-evaluation in the 
social formation of value, neo-classical economics tends to overestimate it. 
Hence, the importance of Georg Simmel' s (1978) attempt to criticize both Marx's 
failure to acknowledge the role of subjective preferences and neo-classical 
economics' failure to acknowledge the objectivity of value. Contra neo-classical 
economics, Simmel argues that' Although the individual buys because he values 
and wants to consume an object, his demand is expressed effectively only by an 
object in exchange. Thus the subjective process which ... create the object as a 
"value", changes to an objective, supra-personal relationship between objects' 
(Simmel 1978, p.79). In other words, because a thing must not only be 
subjectively but also effectively demanded, consumers must be in possession of 
the 'objective' means to translate their preferences into a valid form of social 
demand. Consequently, just as unpurchased goods do not possess utility, so 
individuals without purchasing power do not possess socially valid needs. Only 
needs which are rendered 'effective' by money are considered socially valid in a 
(pure) market-economy. 
15 In this simplified version of neo-classical economics we are abstracting from the key role played 
by 'entrepreneurs'. 
16 Although Marx is aware that market capitalism generates a modem form of abstract 
individualism, he fails to apply this to his own conception of subjectivity. Thus, in the 
Grundrisse, Marx notes that 'The real point is not that each individual's pursuit of his private 
interest promotes the totality of private interests - the general interest ... The point is rather that 
private interests is itself already socially determined interests, which can be achieved only within 
the conditions laid down by society and with the means provided by society ... ' (Marx 1973, 
p.156). 
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In The Philosophy of Money, Simmel attempts to steer a path between the 
abstract objectivism of Marx's theory of value, and the abstract subjectivism of 
neo-classical economics approach, on the basis of an interactive approach to 
monetary-exchange which contends that' ... society is a structure that transcends 
the individual, but that is not abstract. Historical life thus escapes the alternative 
of taking place either in individuals or abstract generalities. Society is the 
universal which, at they same time, is concretely alive' (Simmel 1978, p.101). 
According to Simmel, an adequate conception of value requires an adequate 
conception of exchange, while an adequate conception of exchange requires an 
adequate conception of sociality. Unfortunately Marxism and neo-classical 
economics both begin from an ungrounded 'subject-centred' approach to 
sociality. They therefore privilege the intentions of individual subjects (whether 
purposive labour or consumer preferences) whose unintended affect is to create 
an objective social system with self-regulating powers, whereas Simmel argues 
that 'money' is neither an objective nor a subjective entity but a dialectical 
combination of the two. 'The form taken by value in exchange places value in a 
category beyond the strict meaning of subjectivity and objectivity. In exchange 
value becomes supra-subjective ... ' (Simmel 1978, p.78). 
Simmel then deploys his interactionist approach against Marx's claim that value 
is embodied in objects prior to exchange on the grounds that, like the Medieval 
notion of 'just price', Marx assumes that value resides ' ... in the object as a 
quality of its isolated existence, with which it entered the act of exchange, 
regardless of the relations between buyers and seller' (ibid., p.126), whereas for 
Simmel value only arises in exchange on the basis of subjects effective demand 
for things. Consequently, there is no difference between 'value' and 'price' in 
Simmel's account as the former is conferred upon things in exchange on the basis 
of the latter. 
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However, this does not mean, as some argue (see Deutschmann below) that 
Simmel adopts a neo-classical approach to value. On the contrary, Simmel 
stresses that exchange comprise a social relation sui generis which endows value 
with a supra-subjective character. 
The desire and sentiment of the subject is the driving force in the 
background, but it could not by itself bring about the value-fonn, 
which is the result of balancing objects against each other. The 
economy transmits all valuations through the fonn of exchange, 
creating an intermediate realm between the desires that are the source 
of all human activities and the satisfaction of needs in which they 
culminate. The specific characteristic of the economy as a particular 
form of behaviour and communication consists not only in changing 
values but in the exchange of values. (SimmeI1978, p.81) 
In other words, while Simmel argues against Marx that things are not valorized 
prior to exchange by purposive labour, he argues against neo-classical economics 
that exchange is not reducible to the valorization of things by subjective 
preferences. On the contrary, for Simmel, money mediated exchange comprises a 
form of social interaction (Wechselwirkung) which unites the objective and 
subjective opponents of value in a dialectical fashion. 17 Thus contra neo-classical 
economics, Simmel argues that exchange is an 'objective' process, but contra 
Marx, he argues it includes a 'subjective' component based on the preferences of 
consumers. Rather than adopting either the 'methodological collectivism' of 
Marx's objective approach to structures, or the 'methodological individualism' of 
neo-classical economics' subjective approach to agency, Simmel argues that the 
'objectification' of sociality is dialectically dependent on the 'subjectivity' of 
individuals. 'If the notion of the personality as counterpart and correlate must 
grow in equal measure to that of objectivity, then it becomes clear from this 
17 Simmel makes use of the fortuitous overlap in German between interaction and exchange to 
emphasize his differences with Marxism, and between interaction and effective-exchange to 
emphasize his differences with neo-classical economics. 
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connection that a stricter evolution of concepts of objectivity and of individual 
freedom go hand in hand' (SimmelI978, p.302). 
To this extent the objectivity of sociality is itself a socially specific consequence 
of the historical emergence of autonomous subjects. Thus, just as the autonomy 
of the individual is an indispensable condition for the autonomy of the system, so 
the more individuals are free to pursue their own personal preferences, the more 
de-personalized the economy becomes. 'The elimination of the personal element 
directs the individual towards his own resources and makes him more positively 
aware of his liberty than would be possible with the total lack of relationships. 
Money is the ideal representative of such a condition since it makes possible 
relationships between people but leaves them personally undisturbed ... ' (Simmel 
1978, p.303). 
In short, both objectivity and subjectivity are historical products of a monetary-
system that dialectically depend on one another. However, unlike Adam Smith 
who argues that the conjunction of self-regulating markets and self-regarding 
individuals is a morally beneficial arrangement, Simmel argues that it comprises 
the very epitome of modern 'reification' (Versachlichung). 
REIFICATION 
As we have seen, Marx views objectification as a process that emerges naturally 
from subjects in production. Consequently, unlike Hegel, Marx denies that it is 
matched by an equal and opposite form of'subjectification' which serves to 'de-
externalize' sociality,18 whereas Simmel argues that monetary-value not only 
18 Michel Henry argues that in the Grundrisse, Marx does develop a notion of 're-subjectification' 
insofar as ' ... objectified labour ... is tom from the jaws of death only by the action of living 
subjectivity and only inasmuch as this action never ceases to be realized' (Henry 1983, p.260). 
However, this does nothing to change the fact that for Marx objective sociality is perfectly 
natural. 
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brings about the 'objectification' of subjective values but also the 
'subjectification' of objective values. To this extent, for Simmel, 'reification' not 
only refers to the process whereby sociality acquires an objective character (in the 
form of an impersonal economic system), but also to the corresponding process 
whereby sociality acquires a subjective character (in the form of consumer's 
personal evaluations).19 Thus on the objective side of the equation money ensures 
that ' ... a direct interaction between individuals, becomes crystallized in the form 
of money as an independent structure' (ibid., p.175), while on the subjective side 
of the equation 'Money ... no matter how much it translates impulsive-subjective 
modes of behaviour into supra-personal and objective modes, is none the less the 
breeding ground for economic individualism and egoism' (ibid., p.437). In short, 
money simultaneously combines and dirempts the objective economic system 
and the subjective form of individuality in a dialectical fashion. 
This, in tum, suggests that Simmel adopts a different relationship to Hegel's 
notion of Spirit than Marx. While Marx re-locates the self-objectifying 
subjectivity of Spirit in labour, Simmel re-locates the capacity of Spirit to 
dialectically combine objectification and subjectification in money. In other 
words, unlike Marx's one-sided appropriation of self-objectification as a 
transhistorical property of labour, Simmel appropriates both sides of the dialectic 
and grounds it in the historically specific hegemony of money. In the process, 
Simmel serves to remind us that Hegel's Spirit comprises a structure of 
intersubjectivity whose supra-social form is predicated upon the atomization of 
individuals in 'civil society'. 
19 Under the rubric of the 'objectification of culture' (ibid., p.459), Simmel argues that modernity 
not only 'de-personalizes' feudal forms of obligation, by making them part of the objective 
money-system, but also 'personalize' individuals by generating new forms of subjective 
autonomy no longer tied to obligatory moral duties (ibid., p.338). 
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According to Nigel Dodd (1994), it is Simmel's 'intersubjective' approach to 
reification which comprises its superiority to Marx's. '[Simmel's] analysis of 
alienation differs from that of Marx in so far as Simmel focuses above all on 
interaction, on the relationship between subject and subject, while Marx's 
approach is rooted in a philosophical anthropology chiefly concerned with the 
interaction between humans and nature, the relationship between subject and 
object' (Dodd, p.47).20 This view is endorsed by Peter Beilharz who argues that 
'For Simmel, modernity rests upon complexity, difference, dependence, therefore 
on interdependence and intersubjectivity' (Beilharz 1996, p.27). However, 
Christoph Deutschmann, writing in the same journal argues that 'Simmel's 
analysis starts from the premise of a philosophy of conSCIousness. 
Philosophically, it unfolds within the neo-Kantian subject-object frame of 
reference, economically in that of the doctrine of subjective utility' 
(Deutschmann 1996, p.7). Deutschmann then goes onto argue that it is 'well 
known' that Marx's approach' ... does not start from the individual but from the 
social subject ... ' (ibid.). 
Although we have little sympathy with Deutschmann's overall interpretation of 
Marx, his approach to Simmel is indicative of a tension that runs throughout his 
writings on money and modernity. Thus, while Simmel argues that money is a 
form of social interaction which simultaneously combines, differentiates and 
sublates the subjective and objective components of sociality, he also retains a 
subject-object approach which vitiates the critical potential of his theory of 
reification. This is evidenced in Simmel's contention that 'Money is perhaps the 
clearest expression and demonstration that man is a "tool-making" animal, which, 
20 As we have seen the notion that money serves to 'reify' sociality is not entirely foreign to Marx, 
although most examples of this tendency appear in the Grundrisse. For example Marx argues that 
' ... the existence of money presupposes the objectification [Versachlichung] of the social bond' 
(Marx 1973, p.160). (In Capital, the term Versachlichung is translated as 'reification '). 
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however, is itself connected with the fact that man is a "purposive" animal' 
(Simmel 1978, p.211). 
To this extent Simmel combines an historical approach which equates reification 
with the monetarization of sociality, with an ahistorical account which equates it 
with the 'tool-making' capacities of the species. In support of this view, Simme1 
argues that ' ... money is the purest reification of means, a concrete instrument 
which is absolutely identical with its abstract concept; it is a pure instrument ... ' 
(Simmel 1978, p.211). Simmel then goes on to argue that money's capacity to 
reify sociality is an inevitable consequence of modernity's capacity to control 
nature. Thus, in a formulation reminiscent of both Weber and the later Frankfurt 
School, he argues that 'reification' is a consequence of the use of technical means 
to achieve instrumental ends. 'If we consider the totality of life, then the control, 
of nature by technology is possible only at the price of being enslaved in it ... ' 
(ibid., p.482). From this alternative perspective the 'reificatory' character of 
money appears as an inevitable if tragic consequence of the general 
'objectification of life' (Versachlichung des lebens), which we can only resist by 
attempting to define those 'objects which are not meant to be sold' (Simmel 
1978, p.403).21 
While Simmel' s historical attempt to draw limits to the hegemony of money-
exchange is superior to Marx's transhistorical one it, nevertheless, tends to ignore 
that the capacity to determine the limits of the economy presupposes the 
existence of an 'intersubjective' realm in which such normative decisions are 
taken. In other words, Simmel abstracts from the fact that any attempt to limit the 
reifying effects of money is dependent on the capacity to construct a non-reified 
form of sociality. To this extent Simmel's neo-Kantian approach fails, ironically, 
21 Similar attempts to limit the legitimate sphere of money can be also be found in Michael Walzer 
(1983), Jurgen Habermas (1987a), and Andre Gorz (1989). 
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to pay sufficient attention to the (social) conditions for its own possibility.22 Thus 
Simmel has little to say about the origins of an 'intersubjective' realm in which 
non-pecuniary forms of social evaluation operate. Instead, he retreats to an 
essentialist conception of humanity as the other of money. 
Thus the domination of the means has taken possession not only of 
specific ends, but of the very centre of ends, of the point at which all 
purposes converge and from which they originate as final purposes. 
Man has thereby become estranged from himself; an insuperable 
barrier of media, technical inventions, abilities and enjoyments has 
been erected between him and his most distinctive and essential 
being. (ibid., p.484)23 
Thus, while Simmel provides a worthwhile corrective to Marx's reductionist 
approach to the sociality of exchange, his view that history culminates in the 
'objectification of culture' foregoes an intersubjective alternative to the latter. 
This can be seen from Simmel' s assertion that socialism is either an atavistic 
reaction to the 'complete heartlessness of money' (ibid., p.346), or the 'final 
developmental product of the rationalistic monetary economy' (ibid.). What is 
missing from Simmel' s account is any sense of an oppositional form of 
intersubjectivity with the capacity to heal the dialectic of money and redeem its 
reification of normativity. But then Simmel also ignores the all important 
interface between money and labour, along with the efforts of worker's to de-
commodify labour in pursuit of a more just form of sociality. Consequently, any 
attempt to use Simmel's writings to supplement Marx's approach to exchange-
value must also seek to supplement Simmel' s approach to money through an 
analysis of its application to labour. With this in mind, we now tum to the pivotal 
role played by Marx's theory of exploitation to his critique of capitalist sociality. 
22 Simmel's decision to include in his list of inalienable property 'businesses and factories' (ibid.) 
says less about the method he employs to determine the limits of the market, and more about the 
influence of socialist ideas in Gennany at the time. 
23 The fact that this defInition of humanity contradicts his earlier conception of 'man' the 'tool-
maker' only emphasizes the tensions in Simmel's approach. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: MARX, 
MORALITY AND EXPLOITATION 
The tension between Marx's historical critique of political economy and his 
transhistorical critique of capitalism is the key to understanding the debates 
which continue to rage over Marx's theory of exploitation. Here it appears as a 
contradiction between; (a) the assertion that exchange is just because worker's 
are paid the value of the commodity they sell to capital and; (b) the assertion that 
exchange is unjust because workers are paid less than the value they produce for 
capital. In this chapter we propose to explore this tension in terms of the various 
relationships Marx delineates between labour and its products. For the purposes 
of exposition we shall distinguish six different forms of relationship. 
(1) the materio-natural realm of production in which concrete 
labour interacts with nature to produce use-values. 
(2) the materio-social realm of production in which labour in 
general objectifies itself in use-values. 
(3) the transhistorical-social realm of production In which 
labour in general objectifies itself as economic sociality. 
(4) the social realm of production in which abstract labour 
objectifies itself in (exchange-)value. 
(5) the socio-historical realm of exchange in which 'labour' is 
sold to capital for a wage. 
(6) the intersubjectively constituted property claims that arise 
from historically emergent social movements. 
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These admittedly artificial distinctions are, nevertheless, heuristically justified 
insofar as they help clarify both the range of connections between labour and its 
products in Marx's writings, and the tensions which exist between them. We 
shall, in particular, be concerned with the tensions which arise between the 
'materio-social' levels 1-3 and the 'historical' level 5 which the 'social' level 4 is 
formulated to reconcile. However, we begin with a discussion of the relationship 
between the materio-natural realm (level 1) and the materio-social levels (2 and 
3). 
NATURAL VERSUS SOCIAL PROPERTY-RIGHTS 
Marx's decision to base his critique of capitalism on a labour theory of value was 
undoubtedly influenced by the work of Ricardian socialists such as Hodgskin, 
Bray and Ravenstone. They, in tum, were attracted to Ricardo's theory of value 
because, unlike Adam Smith's 'adding-up' approach, value is determined by 
labour-time prior to its distribution between the owners of land, labour and 
capital. The Ricardian socialists then found it relatively easy to convert Ricardo's 
quantitative theory of price-determination into a qualitative theory of property-
rights. 1 Thus, according to Hodgskin, labour not only determines the price at 
which commodities exchange but also comprises the source of material wealth 
(Rubin 1979). The fact that wealth is then allocated, on the basis of private 
property, to the owners of the 'factors of production', indicates that workers are 
'robbed' of their legitimate property. 
In order to finesse this critique, Ricardian socialists presuppose that the role 
workers play in the production process gives them a 'natural property right' to the 
'wealth' (use-values) of society.2 Hence Hodgskin's assertion that the present 
According to Rubin, Ricardo approach was fonnulated to legitimate the interests of the emergent 
industrial bourgeoisie against those of the land-owning class (Rubin 1979). 
2 This is somewhat different to the Lockean claim that workers have a right to all they have 
'mixed their labour with' . 
85 
distribution of wealth is ' ... a palpable violation of that natural law which gives 
wealth to labour only ... ' (Rubin 1979, p.347, my emphasis). Against this Marx 
argues that 'Labour is not the source of all wealth. Nature is just as much the 
source of use values ... as labour, which itself is only the manifestation of a force 
of nature, human labour power' (Marx 1968, p.315). As a natural force amongst 
natural forces, human labour is not, according to Marx, the sole producer of use-
values. On the contrary, this transhistorical form of 'concrete labour' merely 
helps, along with nature and the means of production, to produce particular 
concrete use-values, whereas the labour that produces value is an historical form 
of abstract-labour that universalizes itself in exchange-value under capitalism. 
However, it would be a mistake to think that because concrete labour (level 1) is 
not the transhistorical source of wealth, that abstract labour (level 4) is a purely 
historical phenomena. On the contrary, Marx's claim that abstract labour 
comprises the source, substance and subject of value rests on a 'philosophical 
anthropology' which views 'labour in general' as the transhistorical subject of 
self-objectification (levels 2 and 3). To this extent, Marx's historical contention 
that value is the alienated expression of abstract labour, is predicated on the 
transhistorical claim that purposive labour objectifies itself in use-values in all 
modes of production (Marx 1976, p.170). 
Nevertheless, while Marx is critical of the Ricardian socialists natural rights 
approach to labour-entitlement, there is evidence that his own labour theory of 
value relies on such a notion. We can see this in Marx's claim that 'surplus 
product' is only possible if labour can produce more in a day than it needs to 
sustain it for a day. 'If one day's work were necessary in order to keep one 
worker alive for one day, then capital would not exist' (Marx 1973, p.324). 
If, however, only half a working day is necessary in order to keep 
one worker alive one whole day, then the surplus-value of the 
product is self-evident, because the capitalist has paid the price of 
only half a working day but has obtained a whole day objectified in 
the product; thus has exchanged nothing for the second half of the 
working day. The only thing which can make him into a capitalist is 
not exchange, but a process through which he obtains objectified 
labour time, i.e .. value, without exchange. (ibid.) 
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In order to establish that surplus-product arises in production (as opposed to 
exchange), Marx argues that it is the sole product of labour (as opposed to a 
combination of labour, nature and means of production). To this extent Marx 
appears to argue that only labour possesses the capacity to produce more products 
than are consumed in its production.3 This is evident in the crucial distinction that 
Marx then makes between 'necessary labour-time' - the time workers spend 
producing the use-values which reproduce themselves (Marx 1976, p.324), and 
'surplus labour-time' - the time workers spend working unpaid creating the 
'surplus-product' (ibid., p.325). Once again Marx appears to assume that labour 
produces the actual concrete things use-values, rather than the social entitlement 
to them value. 
To this extent Marx renders himself vulnerable to his own critique of Ricardian 
socialism. Thus, according to Gavin Kitching, if labour is not the sole source of 
use-values then both nature and the means of production also possess the capacity 
to produce more use-values than are originally invested in their production 
(Kitching 1988, pp.lOO-l). This can be illustrated with reference to a fisherman 
who uses his hands to catch two fish per day while only needing one fish per day 
to live. Half his day comprises 'necessary labour-time' (catching one fish) and 
the other half 'surplus labour-time' (catching one fish). If we then assume that it 
takes him one day to produce a net that enables him to catch ten fish per day, the 
sacrifice of a day's fishing increases his surplus, day in day out, to nine fish. To 
this extent the fishing net (cost = two fish) is responsible - at a material level - for 
3 This has similarities to Quesnay's 'physiocratic' view that surplus (net) product arises from the 
difference between the cost of agricultural inputs and the value of agricultural output (Rubin 
1979, p.126). 
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augmenting the fisherman's surplus-product. The fact that he can then rent the net 
to another in return for seven fish per day is irrelevant to the role played by the 
net in the augmentation of surplus fish. 
However, in order to prioritize the labour of the fisherman over the role of the net 
in augmenting the production of use-values, Marx argues that the surplus arises 
solely from the difference between; (a) the amount of time spent reproducing 
labour (one fish) and; (b) the amount of time that is worked in excess of this (one 
fish without a net and nine fish with a net). In which case Marx, like his 
Ricardian predecessors, confuses the material capacity of labour (level 1) to 
'help' produce use-values with the social capacity of labour to establish a right of 
ownership by 'objectifying' itself in them (levels 2-3).4 Thus, if we assume that 
concrete labour plays no special part in the production of things, then it can play 
no special part in the augmentation of surplus-products. In which case it is not the 
materio-natural relationship between labour and products but the materio-social 
connection which establishes a right of ownership.5 
Nevertheless, the transition from materio-natural to materio-social remains at the 
level of the transhistorical insofar as for Marx sociality is a natural product of 
self-objectifying labour. Thus, even if we were to conclude that workers only 
'help' in the production of use-values, it remains the case that the latter also 
'objectify' their purposes in the former, which in tum forms the basis for a 
transhistorical-social right of ownership between 'the immediate producers' and 
the use-values they 'help' produce in all modes of production. It is this 
4 Indeed it could be argued - as Marx does with reference to 'primitive communism' - that labour, 
in the absence of means of production, is incapable of producing a surplus (although this is 
disputed by Marshall Sahlins 1974), in which case, the very existence of the distinction betw.een 
'necessary' and 'surplus labour-time' depends upon the development of the means of pro due non. 
5 As Marx argues in his Critique of the Gotha Programme: 'Man's labour only becomes a source 
of use-values, and hence also of wealth, if his relation to nature, the primary source of all 
instruments and objects of labour, is one of ownership from the start, and if he treats it as 
belonging to him' (op. cit.). 
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transhistorical-social right that Marx employs to argue that exploitation is 
common to all modes of production in which a surplus is extracted from workers. 
'What distinguishes the various economic formations of society - the distinction 
between for example a society based on slave-labour and a society based on 
wage-labour - is the form in which this surplus-labour is in each case extorted 
from the immediate producer, the worker' (Marx 1976, p.325). To this extent 
'surplus-value' is merely an historical expression of the transhistorical form of 
objectified 'surplus-labour' that exists in all modes of production in which labour 
is exploited. 'It is important for a correct understanding of surplus-value to 
conceive it as merely a congealed quantity of surplus labour-time, as nothing but 
objectified surplus labour, as it is for a proper comprehension of value in general 
to conceive it as merely a congealed quantity of so many hours of labour, as 
nothing but objectified labour' (Marx 1976, p.325). 
However, Marx not only assumes that workers possess a transhistorical right to 
all they have laboured upon, he also assumes that this right trumps the historical 
form of property-rights which prevail in that mode of production. In other words, 
it is not just that slave-labour and feudal-labour is unjust, in terms of our modern 
(intersubjectively formulated) normative standpoint; rather Marx is making the 
much stronger point that it is unjust on the basis of an objective property-right 
that connects all workers to all the use-values they have laboured upon. 
However, while workers have a 'moral' right to all they (help) produce in all 
modes of production, exploitation is more transparent in some modes of 
production than in others. For example, feudalism has a less mystificatory 
character than capitalism insofar that the latter is subject to commodity fetishism. 
Thus under capitalism 'The wage-form ... extinguishes every trace of the division 
of the working day into necessary labour and surplus labour, into paid labour and 
unpaid labour' (Marx 1976, p.680), whereas under feudalism' ... the labour of the 
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serf for himself, and his compulsory labour for the lord of the land, are 
demarcated very clearly in space and time' (ibid.). Consequently, ' ... every 
peasant knows that what he expends in the service of his lord is a specific 
quantity of his own personal labour-power' (Marx 1976, p.170). 
This, however, assumes that not only are feudal peasants the real owners of the 
things they produce, but they know this to be the case irrespective of the complex 
tapestry of social obligations which legitimate feudal property rights. Against 
this, Rodney Hilton (1973) argues that medieval peasants tended to accept the 
lowly station in which 'God had placed them' along with the system of 
obligations that went with it. Consequently, when peasants did rise up against 
their social situation, it was usually as a result of the lord having broken some 
customary arrangements, rather than any insight on their behalf into their 
objective exploitation (Hilton 1973, p.114). Thus, rather than endorsing Marx's 
transhistorical approach to ownership, feudal peasants tended to be mired in the 
historical forms of property right that prevailed at the time. In which case, even if 
we wish to argue that they possess a legitimate property right to the things they 
produce, this is not empirically expressed in their own consciousness. On the 
contrary, this appears to be a case of Marx projecting back upon feudalism an 
altogether modem sense of property rights, that he then locates in the 
consciousness of unsuspecting peasants. Finally, it is ironic for Marx to argue that 
capitalism is more prone to fetishism than feudalism, when his own theory of 
fetishism is modelled on the obfuscatory nature of religion (Marx 1976). 
What is clear from above discussion is that Marx does lay claim to a 
transhistorical conception of property rights, which establishes a form of materio-
social relationship between workers and the use-values they (help) produce. 
Thus, while property rights have a social dimension for Marx, this takes an 
'objective' rather than an 'intersubjective' form, that renders them amenable to 
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an epistemological as opposed to a normative validity claim. However, this 
contradicts Marx's assertion that property-rights are relative to the historical 
context in which they appear. This apparent contradiction has generated a vast 
literature - much of it concerned to reconcile Marx's transhistorical theory of 
exploitation with his historical approach to property rights under capitalism. 
EXPLOITATION AND EXCHANGE 
The controversy over Marx's labour theory of exploitation centres on his attempt 
to provide his transhistorical conception of the connection between labour and 
use-values an historical form in keeping with production for exchange under 
capitalism. The key to this controversy concerns the difference between the value 
workers produce and the value workers receive from capital. According to Marx, 
these two amounts are different because they refer to two different things. Thus 
while workers sell their 'capacity to labour' (Arbeitsvermogen) or 'labour-power' 
(Arbeitskriift) to capitalists,6 they, on the other hand, come into possession of a 
'use-value' with the capacity to create value. In other words, while workers may 
appear to sell their 'labour' (or more accurately their labour for a given amount of 
time or 'labour-time') to capital, what they actually sell is their 'capacity to 
labour' i.e. ' ... the aggregate of those mental and physical capabilities existing in 
the physical form, the living personality, of a human being, capabilities which he 
sets in motion whenever he produces a use-value of any kind' (ibid., p.270).7 
Like all commodities, the value of 'labour-power' is determined ' ... by the 
labour-time necessary for the production, and consequently also the reproduction, 
of this specific article' (ibid., p.274). As such it ' ... represents no more than a 
definite quantity of the average social labour objectified in it' (ibid.). To this 
6 The term mogen derives from moglich, meaning possible or potential, while the term A rbeitskriift 
is used in German to denote the selling of labour as in the phrase: seiner Arbeitskriift verkaufen. 
7 Note the overlap here between Marx's and the Ricardian socialist's conception of labour as the 
physical producer of use-values. 
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extent ' ... the value of labour-power is the value of the means of subsistence 
necessary for the maintenance of its owner'8 (ibid.). While this introduces a 
degree of indeterminacy into the value of labour-power - insofar as it contains 'an 
historical and moral element' (ibid., p.275) - as long as capitalists pay workers a 
wage commensurate with the standards prevailing at the time, they have satisfied 
the 'law of equivalence' which the labour theory of value establishes. 
It then follows that workers receive a fair and just wage in exchange for their 
labour-power based on the 'objective' amount of value embodied in the worker. 
As Marx argues in the Critique of the Gotha Programme 'Do not the bourgeois 
assert that the present-day distribution is 'fair'? And is it not, in fact, the only 
'fair' distribution on the basis of the present-day mode of production?' (Marx 
1968, p.317). As such, the realm of exchange - which includes the buying and 
selling of labour-power - comprises: 
... a very Eden of the innate rights of man. It is the exclusive realm of 
Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham. Freedom, because both 
buyer and seller, let us say of labour power, are determined only by 
their free will. They contract as free persons, who are equal before 
the law. Their contract is the final result in which their joint will 
finds a common legal expression. Equality, because each enters into 
relation with the other, as with a simple owner of commodities, and 
they exchange equivalent for equivalent. Property, because each 
disposes only of what is his own. And Bentham, because each looks 
only to his own advantage. (Marx 1976, p.280) 
The fact that labour also happens to be the source of value does not in any way 
affect capital's entitlement to the products of labour. On the contrary argues 
Marx: 
8 There is also the suggestion that the value of labour-power is commen~urate with the value 
consumed in the production process. In other words, the cost of reproducmg labour IS equal to 
the cost of consuming labour. However, just as workers need to consume whether they work or 
not, so leisure also consumes energy that needs to be replenished from the wage. 
The owner of the money has paid the value of a day's labour-power; 
he therefore has the use of it for a day, a day's labour belongs to him. 
On the one hand the daily sustenance of labour-power costs only half 
a days labour, while on the other hand the very same labour-power 
can remains effective, can work, during a whole day, and 
consequently the value which its use during one day creates is double 
what the capitalist pays for that use; this circumstance is a piece of 
good luck for the buyer, but by no means an injustice towards the 
seller. (Marx 1976, p.301) 
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However, Marx then invites us to look behind' ... this sphere of simple circulation 
... which provide the "free-trade vulgaris" with his views, his concepts and the 
standard by which he judges society of capital and wage-labour ... ' (Marx 1976, 
p.280). We then find ourselves in a world in which 'the physiognomy of our 
dramatis personae' take on a new guise as the' ... money-owner now strides out 
in front as a capitalist ... ' while the 'possessor of labour-power' holds back in a 
timid and frightened fashion (ibid.). But it is not just the power relations that have 
changed from one of equality to inequality. In production, capitalists now find 
themselves in possession of two 'use-values': '... a specific form of useful 
labour, such as tailoring, cobbling, spinning etc.' (Marx 1976, p.681) and' ... the 
universal value-creating element ... by virtue of which it differs from all other 
commodities ... ' (ibid.). Although capital adequately compensates workers for the 
use-value of concrete labour - which is embodied in the reproduction costs of 
labour - it also acquires the use-value of abstract value-producing labour - for 
which no equivalent is exchanged. It is this second use-value that comprises' ... a 
source not only of value, but of more value than itself (ibid., p.301). Insofar as 
capitalists then exploit the capacity of labour to produce value, they also exploit 
workers, by making them create surplus value - value for which they receive no 
payment. However, this would suggest that exchange is not at all/air but merely 
a mask behind which workers are duped out of their value-producing capacities. 
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CAPITALISM AND JUSTICE 
According to Joseph McCarney, there is no inconsistency between equivalence in 
exchange and the extraction of surplus-value once we distinguish between the 
spheres of exchange and production. 'Marx thinks that capitalist exchange is just 
according to the relevant conception of justice and that the capitalist 
appropriation of surplus-value falls outside the field of reference of that 
conception altogether' (McCarney 1992, p.33). 
Thus, while Marx employs an historical notion of justice (based in the exchange 
of equivalence), he considers '... capitalist exploitation to be neither just nor 
unjust, falling as it does outside the domain of the category of justice' (ibid., 
p.36). When making use of the value-creating qualities of 'labour' capitalists do 
not therefore infringe the system's own code of justice. McCarney then finds 
support for this view in Marx's assertion that 'If ... the amount of value advanced 
in wages is not merely found again in the product, but augmented by a surplus 
value, this is not because the seller has been defrauded: it is merely due to the fact 
that this commodity has been used up by the buyer' (Marx 1976, p.732). And 
indeed it is possible to find many passages in Marx's writings in which he state 
that capitalist exploitation is neither just nor unjust, insofar as it falls outside the 
realm of justice constituted in exchange.9 
The use-value of labour-power, in other words labour, belongs just as 
little to its seller as the value of oil after it has been sold belongs to 
the dealer who sold it. The owner of the money has paid the value of 
a day's labour-power; he therefore has the use of it for a day, a day's 
labour belongs to him. (Marx 1976, p.301) 
9 Thus Marx argues: ' ... the law of exchange requires equality o~y between. the e~change-\"al~es 
of commodities given in exchange for one another ... it has nothing to do WIth therr consum~tl~n 
... ' (ibid.). Consequently, ' ... surplus-value which costs the worker labour but the capitahst 
nothing ... becomes the legitimate property of the capitalist' (Marx 1976, p.731). 
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Nevertheless 'labour-power' and 'oil' are far from identical. Thus the seller of 
labour-power, unlike the seller of oil, cannot be detached from their commodity. 
Consequently, for capital to make use of labour it must also employ the seller of 
labour-power. 10 
In a wide-ranging review of Marx's writings, Geras (1992) argues that far from 
being just - or falling outside the domain of justice - the production of surplus 
value comprises an injustice that Marx also employs to criticize capitalism (ibid., 
p.53). The question is not, according to Geras, does Marx believe capitalism to be 
unjust, but by what criteria does he judge this to be the case? Could it be, asks 
Geras, that Marx criticizes production relations on the basis of exchange 
relations, in order to demonstrate that capitalism is unable to abide by its own 
historically constituted principles of justice? This is the position of Alan Ryan 
who argues that 'In buying labour-power the capitalist does not violate the rule of 
"equals for equals"; in using labour-power he does ... [C]apitalism is in 
contradiction with itself, forced to produce in ways that violate the principle of 
justice which it is simultaneously forced to profess' (Ryan in Geras 1992, p.46). 
However, while there is evidence that Marx does criticize the inequities of 
production from the standpoint of exchange, contra Ryan Geras argues that 
Marx's theory of exploitation rests on criteria which not only belong outside 
exchange but capitalism as well. To this extent, argues Geras, Marx possesses 
two conceptions of justice: a relativistic one deriving from exchange and a ' ... 
broader non-relativistic notion of justice implicit in his work and governing some 
of his most fundamental judgements' (Geras 1992, p.40). It is on the basis of this 
non-relativistic standpoint that Marx argues '[T]here is only an apparent 
exchange, since ... the capital which is exchanged for labour-power is itself 
10 Although an oil-energy theory of surplus products is possible if less energy is needed to extract 
oil than the energy that oil is capable of generating. 
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merely a portion of the product of the labour of others which has been 
appropriated without an equivalent ... ' (Marx in Geras 1992, p.49). 
From this transhistorical perspective, exchange is no longer viewed as the 
historical basis for social justice, but rather a 'mere semblance' behind which 
occurs '... the constant appropriation by the capitalist, without exchange, of a 
portion of the labour of others ... ' (Marx quoted in Geras 1992, p.49). Thus, 
according to Marx, while 'vulgar economists' are content to record: 
... each act of exchange by itself, apart from any connection with the 
act of exchange preceding it and following it ... the matter looks quite 
different if we consider capitalist production in the uninterrupted 
flow of its renewal, and if in the place of the individual capitalist and 
the individual worker, we view them in their totality, as the capitalist 
class and the working class confronting each other. But in so doing 
we should be applying standards entirely foreign [total fremdJ to 
commodity production. (Marx 1976, p.732, my insert) 
Although the purchase of labour-power by capital may appear to comprise a just 
relation, insofar as the exchange of equivalents refers to the reproduction costs of 
concrete labour, this merely masks an unjust relation which permits capital to 
appropriate the productive powers of abstract labour. To this extent exchange-
value is nothing but an 'illusion' which obscures its real source in labour. 'All the 
notions of justice held by both the worker and the capitalist, all the mystifications 
of the capitalist mode of production, all capitalism's illusions about freedom, all 
the apologetic tricks of vulgar economics, have as their basis the form of 
appearance ... which makes the actual relation invisible, and indeed presents to 
the eye the precise opposite of that relation' (Marx 1976, p.680). As such, 
exchange relations merely obscure the act of robbery by which capital forces 
workers to produce a surplus for it. Thus, far from accepting the validity of 
exchange-relations, Marx argues that they are merely an 'illusion' which 
obscures the real basis for property-rights in production. 'Even if ... equivalent is 
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exchanged for equivalent, the whole thing still remains the age-old activity of the 
conqueror, who buys commodities from the conquered with the money he has 
stolen from them' (Marx 1978, p.728). 
To this extent, Marx is forced to abandon his earlier attempts to employ a 
historical conception of justice (based in exchange), in favour of a 'totally alien' 
(total fremd) transhistorical conception (based in production in general), in order 
to argue that labour is exploited. 1 1 
ALIENATED SELF-CONSTITUTION 
Geras's analysis reveals the difficulty that Marx has in reconciling an historical 
approach to ownership - based in exchange - and a transhistorical approach -
based in production. Given their incompatibility Marx must privilege one above 
the other, and as we have seen he privileges the latter above the former. However, 
if we peel away the layers of Marx's theory of exploitation we find that what first 
appears to be a contradiction between different forms of distributive justice 
comprises a contradiction between different forms of self-constitution. 
In the first instance, Marx's theory of exploitation gives rise to a contradiction 
between the distributive form of justice established by equivalent-exchange - as 
measured by the socially necessary (abstract) labour-time workers receive in 
exchange - and the distributive form of injustice indicated by surplus-value - as 
measured by the unpaid socially necessary (abstract) labour-time workers 
contribute to capital. Marx resolves this contradiction in favour of the latter by 
arguing that equal-exchange is a mere 'appearance', 'semblance', or 'illusion' 
which serves to 'mystify' the real connection between labour and its products. 
11 According to Marx it is quite 'irrational' to talk about the 'value of labour' as 'value' is merely 
the (social) form taken by 'objectified labour' under capitalism. To this extent labour cannot be 
assigned a value within the system because as 'the substance, and the immanent measure of value 
... ' (Marx 1976, p.677) it falls outside the realm it produces. 
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This, however, means abandoning the contention that the buying and selling of 
labour-power is a just relationship, in favour of the contention that all value is an 
alienated objectification of human labour. 
This, in tum, indicates that Marx's labour theory of value is not simply a theory 
of distribution as Nancy Fraser (1997) argues,12 but also a theory of alienation as 
Gould (1978) notes. Underlying the quantitatively unequal distribution of value 
lies the qualitatively more profound alienation of social labour. To this extent, the 
power of capital to rob workers of value is predicated upon the power of the 
former to rob the latter of their capacity to produce sociality. As Brod (1992) 
notes: 
From Hegel, Marx retains the idea that the possession of property as 
the extemalization and objectification of my will is a necessary part 
of the free development of my personality. Within Marx's system, 
this conception yields the concept of alienation, where what is wrong 
with capitalist production is not the violation of some principle of 
distributive justice but rather the violation of the essence of a free 
human being. (Brod 1992, p.74) 
In which case the most fundamental injustice perpetrated by capital comprises the 
alienation of humanity from the powers of 'self-constitution' which reside in 
labour. 
Nevertheless, Brod's comparison with Hegel is slightly misleading as there exist 
important differences between Hegel's and Marx's conceptions of 
'extemalization'. For Marx, the right of labour to own use-values is established 
through labour's objectification of itself in value, while Hegel argues that 
ownership is an intersubjectively mediated right that must be recognized by 
12 While Fraser admits that she is presenting a stylized conception of Marxism in order to make 
good her analytical distinction betwe~n re.distribu~on and recognitio? s~e ~ev~rtheless writes 
that the injustice suffered by labour 'IS qumtessentIally a matter of distnbutIon. (Fraser 1997, 
p.17) 
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others in exchange. Consequently, while Marx argues that the social basis for 
legitimate property-rights is actually 'produced' by labour, Hegel argues that 
legitimate property-rights arise from the fact that the 'parties recognize each other 
as persons and owners of property' (Hegel 1991, p.103). Thus, insofar as 
exchange is unjust for Marx it is because workers are not in command of their 
own objectification process, whereas insofar as exchange is just for Hegel it is 
because workers freely sell their 'labour-time' to capital.13 
At the same time, these conflicting accounts of freedom are to be found in Marx's 
own approach to the 'alienation' of labour. Thus, on the one hand, Marx argues 
that because workers 'freely' consent to alienate their 'labour' to capital for an 
agreed period of time, capital has a perfect right to use it for this agreed period. 
'The owner of money has paid the value of a day's labour-power; he therefore 
has the use of it for a day, a day's labour belongs to him' (Marx 1976, p.301). On 
the other hand, Marx argues, the freedom of worker's to alienate their labour-
time to capital is a pure 'illusion' which masks the reality that labour is the 
alienated source of value. 
This 'illusion' arises from the fact that workers do not actually sell 'the value of a 
day's labour-power' (op. cit.), but rather their 'capacity to labour'. In other 
words, a potential activity rather than an actual amount of labour-time. 'The use 
of labour-power is labour itself. The purchaser of labour-power consumes it by 
setting the seller of it to work. By working, the latter becomes in actuality what 
previously he only was potentially, namely labour-power in action, a worker' 
(Marx 1976, p.283). Thus, while it may seem that the justice of exchange is 
grounded in the freedom of workers to alienate their labour-time to capital, it can 
13 Hegel's approach also rests on a subject-centred conception of sociality. Nevertheless, the 
transcendental agent of self-constitution (Geist) does not render the intersubjective contracts of 
exchange 'illusionary' on its way to becoming actualized in the state, although this then creates a 
tension between the 'intersubjective' agreements of civil society and the 'objective' conception 
of the state. 
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only be grounded in the fact that workers receive a fair exchange for their labour-
power. Having thus fairly purchased the potential to labour, capitalists are then in 
a position to set it to work. This, according to Marx, gives rise to a clash of rights 
between the purchaser who tries to make the working day as long as possible, and 
the seller who wishes to reduce the working day to a particular normal length 
(Marx 1976, p.344). 'There is here an antinomy, of right against right, both 
equally bearing the seal of the law of exchange. Between equal rights, force 
decides' (Marx 1976, p.344). However, Marx limits this struggle to the struggle 
to establish the 'normal' length of the working day. As long as labour works for 
capital and capital makes labour work in excess of the value of labour-power 
workers remain exploited. This is because value is no mere means to legitimately 
allocate social property, but rather the legitimate property of self-objectifying 
labour. 
Herein lies the importance of Marx's assertion that labour, as the 'substance, and 
the immanent measure of value ... has no value itself (ibid., p.677). In other 
words, because labour is the source of value it cannot itself have a value, its value 
is determined by the value it embodies, but this is the value of labour-power not 
labour-time. Thus, just as labour cannot be fairly paid for its activity, so capital 
cannot fairly command it. Consequently, while it appears that worker's are 'free' 
to alienate their labour-time to capital, they only posses the freedom to sell their 
labour-power. By the same token, while it appears that capitalists have purchased 
an agreed amount of labour-time, labour, as the source, substance and subject of 
value, remains an inalienable property of workers. 
If the justice of exchange is a distributive affair, dependent on the buying and 
selling of labour-power, then the injustice of production arises from the fact that 
self-objectifying labour is the secret of and animating force behind self-valorizing 
value. In which case Marx's theory of 'exploitation' does not rest upon a 
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nonnative validity claim to the effect that workers ought to receive all the use-
values they help produce, but rather an epistemological claim to the effect that 
workers are the source of the legitimate right to own property under capitalism. If 
workers have a socially valid claim to the use-values they help produce, it is 
because they produce the means of social validation. 
By ascribing labour the capacity to constitute itself as the sociality of capitalism 
Marx can dispense with moral criticisms of the latter. Indeed, Marx dispenses 
with the capacity to make moral judgements altogether, insofar as he 
demonstrates that the principles of equality etc., which capitalism establishes in 
exchange, are merely mystifications that obscure its real content. Having, thus, 
reduced the intersubjective relations of exchange to the properties of self-
objectifying labour, Marx undermines the possibility of building upon the 
intersubjective freedoms of exchange to create an alternative form of social 
validity. Any attempt to generate an alternative form of intersubjective property-
rights is rendered otiose by the objective property-rights that labour produces in 
the alienated fonn of value. 
Unfortunately, this formulation bears all the hallmarks of the capitalist form of 
sociality in which it appears. For all Marx's critical insights into the workings of 
capitalism, his approach endorses its objectification of sociality (and 
corresponding subjectification of individuals). Thus, rather than attempting to 
expand the nonnative sphere of capitalist sociality in order to 'de-reify' monetary 
relations, Marx counterpoises an objective morality, grounded in the objective 
right of labour to own all use-values, to the objectivity of capitalist sociality. In 
other words, rather than attempting to reveal the normative relations that lie 
hidden within money-relations, Marx leaves the social form of value 
unquestioned in order to argue that labour is its secret content. 
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However, Geras believes Marxists are merely deceiving themselves when they 
claim not to be engaged in making normative validity claims (Geras 1992, p.67). 
On the contrary, argues Geras when Marx argues that capitalism exploits 
workers, he is making a normative validity claim about the injustice of 
capitalism. By then arguing that this is an objective fact of capitalism, Marx is 
merely compounding the error by transforming it into an objective morality 
claim, in line with capitalism's own reification of morality. Hence Benhabib's 
attempt to re-ground opposition to capitalism in the normative claims of 
participants as then '... humanity itself would only be a telos of struggle and 
would not refer to a pre-existent subject. Not what the theorist claims to be the 
human interest, but what struggling social actors themselves would come to 
recognize as their own common goals and desires, would constitute human 
interests' (Benhabib 1986, p.131). 
In other words, it is impossible to determine what is right and wrong, just or 
unjust, valid or invalid, outside the social context in which such judgements are 
made. By abstracting the subject of sociality from the form of sociality it creates, 
Marx not only abstracts from the social and historical context in which social 
validity claims are made, but also from the social struggles that make his own 
critical standpoint possible. To this extent, Marx's conception of self-constitution 
corresponds to what Winfield calls a 'natural will' in which: 
... agency does not arise within any enacted practical relation, but 
rather precedes them all as an irreducible postulate. In other words, 
its autonomy exists not in virtue of any agreements or institutions, 
but in a state of nature that is a 'natural' condition precisely by 
existing independently of the will's self-determination. Since the will 
itself exists in such a state of nature, being given rather than 
determined and brought into existence through willing's own act, the 
state of nature is logically prior to any instituted relations that could 
be in accord with the freedom of the will. (Winfield 1991, p.92) 
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Against the notion that 'self-determination' is a transhistorical property of our 
'species being', Winfield argues that it is an historical property of our 'social 
being'. It therefore follows that' ... freedom is not a natural or monological 
potential, but an actual structure of interaction consisting in the interdirected and 
mutually respected actions of a plurality of wills' (ibid.). 
On occasions Marx argues that self-constitution is a presuppositionless property 
of social beings - for example when he asserts that 'human wealth' ultimately 
comprises the' ... absolute working out of [humanity's] creative potentialities, 
with no presuppositions other than the previous historical development ... ' (Marx 
1973, p.488).14 However, a 'presuppositionless' notion of self-constitution is only 
possible if it acknowledges its own ground in 'previous historical development' 
(op. cit.).15 Insofar as Marx fails to do this, he is guilty of transforming the 
historically emergent notion of self-constitution into a natural presupposition of 
the species. Thus, rather than contrasting capitalism with the principles of self-
constitution it is responsible for generating, Marx makes the normative capacity 
for self-constitution into an ontological capacity of self-objectifying labour. 
If Marx can afford to dismiss 'the rights of man' as ' ... nothing but the rights of a 
member of civil society, i.e. the rights of egoistic man, of man separated from 
other men and from the community' (quoted in Lukes 1985, p.65), this is because 
labour remains the true basis of capitalist sociality.16 However, an immanent 
critique of the system must begin from the historically developed freedoms which 
14 According to Benhabib, 'This passage expresses in a nutshell the normative i~eal under.l~ing 
Marx's critique of capitalism. Marx's vision is that of an active humanity, dynamIC, enterpnsmg, 
transfonning nature and unfolding its potentials in the process' (Benhabib 1986, p.112). 
15 It could be argued that these capacities must have potentially existed in ~re.vious so~ieties ~~far 
as they too are the unconscious creations of their participants. However, It. I~ only WIth capItalIsm 
that the self-constitution of sociality becomes a conscious property of partICIpants. 
16 Lukes argues that Marx possesses a 'narrow and impoverished' concepti~n of 'the ri~hts of man' 
which abstracts from their application to ' ... a non-egoistic, non-bourgeOls forms of lIfe, and thelT 
consequent relevance to the struggle for socialism ... ' (Lukes 1985, p.65). 
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capitalism itself generates)7 In other words, from the principles of Liberte, 
Egalite and Fraternite which capitalism in its revolutionary hey day forged in 
opposition to feudalism, but then sought to restrict in line with the procrustean 
imperatives of the system. Thus, while Marx is right to argue that the ultimate 
basis for social struggle comprises the struggle for self-constitution, he is wrong 
to make this a natural property of self-objectifying labour. On the contrary, it is 
the labour movement, in pursuit of its own welfare aims, which renders the 
system accountable to its participants. 
TOWARDS A NORMATIVE THEORY OF OWNERSHIP 
According to Marx, workers have a right to their products because they objectify 
themselves in them. This right is based not on the fact that workers are the sole 
producers of use-values, but the fact they are the sole producers of their title of 
ownership - value. Thus, insofar as value is the basis for the legitimate ownership 
of things under capitalism, and value is the 'product' of labour, workers have an 
absolute right to own all the wealth (use-values) they (help) produce. However, if 
value is not a quasi-naturalistic product of labour, but an intersubjectively 
mediated form of entitlement that is constituted in and through exchange, then the 
objective connection between labour and use-values is broken. Any attempt to re-
establish this link would have to do so on the basis of intersubjectively 
constituted normative criteria. 
According to Gerry Cohen, it is possible to establish a link between labour and its 
products without recourse to a labour theory of value. This is because 'Whether 
or not workers produce value, they produce the product, that which has value' 
(Cohen 1988, p.226). To this extent whether workers produce value is ' ... 
unnecessary to the thesis that labour is exploited' (ibid., p.229). On the contrary. 
17 Marx himself argues on occasions that the proletariat must' ... continue the agitation, betrayed by 
the bourgeoisie ... ' (Marx 1974, p.145). 
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argues Cohen 'The worker continues to look exploited if he creates the valuable 
thing and does not get all the value of the thing created' (ibid.). However, Geras 
is sceptical that the act of making a thing is an adequate basis for establishing a 
relationship of ownership. According to Geras, ' ... the bare fact of having made a 
thing is no more than an arbitrary relation to that thing, of unclear moral 
relevance' (Geras 1992, p.60). What is morally relevant, argues Geras, is the fact 
that 'labour costs effort' (ibid. ).1 8 On this basis, workers are entitled to the 
products they produce because of the 'effort' expended in their production - an 
'effort' for which they receive no 'just reward' (ibid., pp.60-61).19 
This approach claims several advantages over Marx's socio-natural approach to 
value. In the first place, it accords with worker's own judgement that capitalists 
appear to do little for the wealth they receive. In the second place, unlike Marx's 
model which assumes that the rate of surplus value can vary inversely to the 
worker's experience of oppression, Geras' s equation of exploitation and 
oppression is more in keeping with common sense notions of 'exploitation'. 
Finally, this theory can be applied to other modes of production without assuming 
the existence of a transhistorical ontology of labour. 
However, 'effort' is a difficult thing to measure. Does it mean that coal miners 
are more exploited than computer operators? Do coal miners become less 
exploited (rather than more exploited as Marx argues) when machines lighten 
their workload? To this extent Geras's conception of 'effort' adds little to the 
claim that ownership derives from the 'fact of having made a thing'. In this 
18 A similar formulation can be found in Marx when he argues that '... real labour is what the 
worker really gives to the capitalist in exchange for the purchase price of labour ... It is the 
expenditure of his life's energy, the realization of his productive faculties; it. is his mov~ment and 
not the capitalists'. Looked at as a personal function, in its reality, labour IS the functlon of the 
worker, and not of the capitalist' (Marx 1976, p.982). 
19 A similar argument can also be found in Cohen when he distinguishes between worke~ who 
produce 'what has value' and capitalists who are not 'labourers in that sense~. ~us, accor~g to 
Cohen while workers supply labour ' ... the capitalist supplies capital, which IS not a kind of 
labour' (Cohen 1988, p.227). 
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respect his approach resembles that of Ricardian socialists such as Hodgskin, 
who condemns the fact that '... labourers must share their produce with 
unproductive idlers' (Rubin 1979, p.349), and Bray who claims that 'Every man 
has an undoubted right to all that his honest labour can procure him' (Rubin 
1979, p.348). 
However, as Geras acknowledges, such 'rights' are social relations and cannot be 
read off from the material relationship between 'producer and product'. Marx 
establishes a social connection between the two by declaring that the mediating 
relation of value is itself the product of self-objectifying labour. If we therefore 
wish to replace Marx's ontology of labour with a normative theory of social 
ownership, then we not only require an alternative conception of property-rights, 
but also an alternative form of sociality in which the former is located. In other 
words, it is also necessary to acknowledge that alternative claims to ownership 
are grounded in alternative forms of sociality. This can be seen from Ralph 
Chaplin's song 'Solidarity' with which Cohen begins his article on exploitation. 
It is we who ploughed the prairies, built the cities where they trade, 
Dug the mines and built the workshops, endless miles of railroad 
laid, 
Now we stand outcast and starving, 'mid the wonders we have made 
... (Cohen 1988, p.209) 
This not only expresses the right of workers to own the things they have played a 
part in producing (without presuming a labour theory of value), but it also 
registers the importance of solidarity in generating such an entitlement. 
In the absence of a metaphysical conception of labour, workers are endowed with 
the capacity to sell their labour-time to capital. Consequently, the capitalist 
ownership of wealth not only appears legitimate, it is legitimate in terms of 
capitalist sociality. Marx attempts to circumvent this fact by circumventing its 
intersubjective basis, but he only succeeds in naturalizing the objectivity of 
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capitalist sociality. If we therefore reject Marx's rejection of nonnatively 
grounded validity claims, the only way to confront the nonnative validity claims 
of capitalist property rights is on the basis of an alternative set of nonnative 
validity claims. 
To this extent Marx and Geras both identify the weakness in capitalist property 
rights as stemming from their constitution in exchange. However, whereas Geras 
complains that workers are '... on the wrong end of a system of distributive 
injustice' (ibid., p.69). Marx complains that they are on the wrong end of a 
system of social relations that constitutes them as workers. If we then transfer the 
capacity of social-constitution from self-objectifying labour to the labour 
movement, then it is possible to redeem Marx's emphasis on production by 
arguing that before workers can respond to the injustices of distribution, they 
must respond to the injustices of their production by, as and for capital. In other 
words, before they can generate an alternative set of property rights, they must 
generate an alternative form of social solidarity in opposition to capital. 
Unfortunately, attempts to reformulate critical theory along nonnative lines 
have tended to bypass the role played by workers in re-shaping society. Thus 
Benhabib's (1986) attempt to provide an intersubjective basis for the 
emancipatory ethos of self-constitution privileges 'linguistically mediated 
socialization' (ibid., p.136) at the expense of the economy's capacity to 
'instrumentalize' labour (ibid., p.167). Consequently, despite defining critical 
theory as the transformation of transsubjectivity into intersubjectivity (ibid., 
p.l03), Benhabib's rejection of Marx's 'humanization of the species through 
social labour' (ibid., p.167), abandons workers to the transsubjective 
imperatives of the system. In the following chapter we shall investigate the 
Habermasian source of Benhabib's intersubjective reformulation of critical 
theory, in order to discover whether its emancipatory ethos can be extended to 
labour. 
107 
PART II 
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CHAPTER FIVE: COMMUNICATIVE REASON 
In the first part of our thesis we sought to identify the tensions which arise from 
Marx's attempt to ground the historical appearance of self-valorizing value in the 
transhistoricallabour process which comprises its animating essence. Rather than 
comprising a natural domain from which to criticize the distortions of capitalism, 
we have argued that Marx's ontology of self-objectifying labour is parasitical 
upon the capitalist sociality it is designed to critique. In particular, Marx's 
adoption of self-objectifying subjectivity as the transhistorical ground for self-
constitution serves to naturalize both the 'subjectivity' of social agency and the 
'objectivity' of social structures. Consequently, rather than viewing 'value' as a 
form of reified normativity which dirempts agents from their social structures 
while ensuring the former generate the latter in an unintended fashion, Marx 
treats value as a non-normative form of sociality to which he opposes a non-
normative form of 'scientific' critique. 
In recent years, the subject-centred basis for Marx's critique of capitalism has 
been criticized from an intersubjective perspective. In particular, Jurgen 
Habermas has sought to transform Marx's subject-centred conception of self-
constitution into an intersubjective one in order to ground critical theory in the 
normative content of modernity. To this end, Habermas seeks to ' ... transfer the 
concept of praxis from labour to communicative action' (1987b, p.321). 
However, because Habermas's normative re-working of self-constitution is 
limited to the 'symbolically' constituted lifeworld, the 'materially' constituted 
economic system is placed beyond the redemptive reach of human praxis. 
In order to understand Habermas' s dualistic account of modernity it is necessary, 
however, to understand the problems encountered by the tradition from Marx 
through Georg Lukacs to the Frankfurt School in which he stands. The work of 
Max Weber is crucial to this tradition, insofar as it is responsible for transforming 
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the remnants of normativity which cling to Marx's conception of self-
objectification, into an instrumental conception of labour as the basis for an 
objective form of sociality. The next section will therefore examine Weber's 
seminal critique of Marx and the equally seminal response it drew from Lukacs. 
FROM MARX TO LUKACS 
Whereas Marx argues that the developing 'forces of production' are destined to 
liberate humanity from capitalist 'relations of production' (Marx 1976, p.929), 
Weber argues that the constraining nature of the latter are in fact an indispensable 
outcome of the former. Thus, the more humanity employs instrumental-reason 
(Zweckrationalitiit) 1 to dominate nature, the more humanity comes to be 
dominated by instrumental-reason. This manifests itself as an increasingly 
'objectified' form of sociality in which human autonomy is progressively 
sacrificed to bureaucratic efficiency. Consequently, even if were it were possible 
to 're-internalize' the economy - via some form of central planning mechanism -
it would remain enthral to external structures beyond the control of participants. 
'The primary source of the superiority of bureaucratic administration lies in the 
role of technical knowledge which, through the development of modem 
technology and business methods in the production of goods, has become 
completely indispensable. In this respect it makes no difference whether the 
economic system is organized on a capitalist or a socialist basis' (Weber 1978, 
p.223). 
Thus, unlike Hegel whose notion of 'externalization' (Entiiusserung) also 
contains the promise of a redemptive 're-internalization' (Er-innerung), Weber's 
conception of objectified sociality is irredeemable.2 To this extent Weber denies 
The Gennan tenn rationalitiit can be translated as efficiency and like the tenn rationaiisierung 
carries the sense of rationalizing, i.e., through time and motion studies etc. 
2 At one point Weber argues with reference to bureaucratic forms of organization that this 'lifeless 
machine is congealed spirit (Geist)' (Marcuse 1988, p.222). 
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the validity of Marx's attempt to distinguish between: (1) the natural fonn of 
'objectification' (Gegenstiindlichung) which because it arises from labour's 
purposive transformation of nature is beyond sublation (Aufhebung) and; (2) the 
historical form of 'alienation' (Entfremdung) which because it arises from 
labour's lack of conscious control over its objectification process can be 
overcome. Although Weber follows Hegel in associating objectification with 
alienation, he does not believe it can be overcome without undermining the vast 
increases in technical-efficacy that come with it. Consequently, Weber foresees 
the Enlightenment promise of emancipation terminating in a bureaucratic 'iron 
cage' (stahlhiirtes Gehiiuse) it is our fate to build and our tragedy to inhabit 
(Weber 1992, p.181). 
The impact of Weber's sociology on the subsequent development of critical 
theory lay in its capacity to exploit the tension in Marx's writings between self-
objectification and self-alienation - a tension which during the twentieth century 
has grown into an open conflict between the 'scientific socialism' of the orthodox 
Communist Party and the 'humanistic' socialism of Western Marxism (Gouldner 
1980). However, Weber's transformation of self-objectification into instrumental-
reason did not go unchallenged. Having come to Marx via Weber's teachings, 
Lukacs was well placed to recognize the threat posed by the latter's fatalistic 
diagnosis of modernity to the former's emancipatory project. To this extent, 
Lukacs understood that if social objectification is an inevitable by-product of 
augmenting the 'forces of production', then Marx's dream of liberation from 
capitalism's alienated 'relations of production' was unrealizable. 
In the essay 'Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat' (1971), Lukacs 
sought to counter Weber's pessimistic elision of objectification and alienation, 
not by separating them as Marx had done,3 but by viewing objectification as an 
3 Marx's Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts were not available to Lukacs until the 1930s. 
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expreSSIon of alienated self-creation. To this end, Lukacs argues that the 
objective nature of capitalist sociality arises not from the increasing deployment 
of technical-reason, but the increasing alienation of producers from their own 
sociality. Lukacs, following Simmel, refers to the modem coupling of objectivity 
and alienation as 'reification' (Verdinglichung). However, unlike Simmel who 
views reification as an inevitable consequence of modernity, Lukacs argues that it 
is an historically contingent consequence of the 'autocephalous' nature of 
capitalist sociality,4 which places the autonomy of atomized individuals III 
opposition to the autonomy of the system they unintentionally produce. To this 
extent, argues Lukacs: 
.,. the immediate, practical as well as intellectual confrontation of the 
individual with society ... in which for the individual the commodity 
structure of all 'things' and their character to 'natural laws' is found 
to exist already in a finished form, as something immutably given -
could only take place in the form of rational and isolated acts of 
exchange between isolated commodity owners. (Lukacs 1971a, p.92) 
Thus, as for Simmel, reification refers to both the 'objectification' of sociality 
and the dialectical 'subjectification' of its individual agents. The agent are 
consequently fated, argues Lukacs, to '... do no more than look on helplessly 
while [ their] own existence is reduced to an isolated particle and fed into an alien 
machine' (ibid., p.90). Hence the assertion that' ... for the first time in history -
the whole of society is subjected, or tends to be subjected, to a unified economic 
process, and ... the fate of every member of society is determined by unified 
laws' (ibid., p.92). 
In order to provide a solution to the problem of reification, Lukacs returns to the 
tradition of German idealism, beginning with Kant's attempt to placed self-
4 The tenn 'autocephalous', meaning self-governing, is the tenn Weber uses to defme the modem 
capitalist economy (Weber 1978, p.63). It has since been superseded by Luhmann's use of the 
tenn 'autopoietic'. 
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constituting subjectivity at the centre of his critical analysis of objective 
structures. Lukacs then argues that Kant's recourse to a 'transcendental' fonn of 
subjectivity, in order to overcome the diremption of 'autonomy' and 
'heteronomy', is symptomatic of the alienation of 'empirical subjects' from their 
own social relations under capitalism. To this extent the 'epistemological 
doublings'5 which characterize Kant's analysis of subjectivity express' ... the 
unresolved, insoluble and ... permanent conflict between freedom and necessity 
... ' in social reality (ibid., p.124). 
Kant's failure to sublate the dialectic of autonomy and heteronomy leads Fichte 
and then Hegel to seek a more comprehensive conception of reason capable of 
internalizing its own dirempted ('doubled') parts. 'In contrast to the dogmatic 
acceptance of a merely given reality - divorced from the subject - they required 
that every datum should be understood as the product of the identical subject-
object, and every duality should be seen as a special case derived from this 
pristine unity' (ibid., pol23). However, if the heteronomy of the 'objective' world 
is the creation of an alienated form of self-constituting 'subjectivity', it is then 
incumbent upon Fichte and Hegel to identify the 'subject' which not only 
externalizes itself in the world but also 're-internalizes' the world it has produced. 
In other words ' ... it is necessary both to discover the site from which to resolve 
all these problems and to also exhibit concretely the 'we' which is the subject of 
history, that "we" whose action is in fact history' (ibid., p.144). 
However, just as Hegel rejects Fichte's self-objectifying 'ego' (Ich) as too 
individualistic, so Lukacs rejects Hegel's World Spirit (Geist) as supra-
individualistic. Thus, according to Lukacs in Hegel's account: 
5 Michel Foucault appears to have independently arrived at a similar verdict some half a century 
later (Foucault 1970, Chapter 9). 
... the spirit of a people only seems to be the subject of history, the 
doer of its deeds ... in fact it is the World Spirit that makes use of that 
'natural character' of a people which corresponds to the actual 
requirements and to the idea of the World Spirit and accomplishes it 
deeds by means of and in spite of the spirit of the people. (ibid., 
p.146) 
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Lukacs then argues that 'the "we" which is the subject of history' compnses 
human labour. Unfortunately under capitalism this 'we' is obscured by the fetish 
character of commodities. Hence the importance of Marx's attempt to reveal 
show that' ... beneath the cloak of the thing lay a relation between men ... beneath 
the quantifying crust there was a qualitative living core. Now this core is revealed 
it becomes possible to recognize the fetish character of every commodity based on 
the commodity character of labour power ... ' (ibid., p.169). 
However, unlike Marx who separates self-objectification from self-alienation, 
Lukacs argues that the sublation of the latter requires the 're-subjectification' of 
the former. Thus, insofar as the world only assumes an objective form because it 
is predicated upon a contemplative form of subjectivity, the more the latter 
realizes that it is the source of the former the more reification is overcome. In 
other words, because the proletariat's consciousness ' ... is not the knowledge of 
an opposed object but is the self-consciousness of the object the act of 
consciousness overthrows the objective form of its object' (ibid., p.178). By 
recognizing itself as the producer of capital, the proletariat breaks the spell of 
commodity fetishism and re-appropriates the 'objective' structures of capitalism 
for the 'subject of history'.6 '... [W]hen the worker knows himself as a 
commodity his knowledge is practical. That is to say, this knowledge brings 
about an objective structural change in the object of knowledge , (ibid.). 
6 Later in the same essay Lukacs argues that: ' ... the proletariate represents the true reality, namely 
the tendencies of history awakening into consciousness' (ibid., p.l99). Thus, while the proletariat 
is seen as the 'subject of history', history is seen as the unfolding of 'objective' tendencies which 
come together in the 'subject-object unity' of proletarian consciousness. 
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However, by assuming that a change in worker's consciousness brings about a 
change in objective reality, Lukacs lays himself open to the charge of 'idealism' 
(Althusser 1979, p.140). Thus, despite stressing the role of 'party organization' in 
de-reifying the system, Lukacs was officially condemned by the Fifth Congress 
of the Comintem for his idealist tendencies. This, coupled with the publication of 
Marx's Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (Marx 1975), then leads 
Lukacs to re-formulate his elision of self-objectification and self-alienation in 
favour of Marx's distinction between them. Consequently, in the Preface to the 
German 1967 edition of History and Class Consciousness (Lukacs 1971), Lukacs 
argues that his attempt to 'out-Hegel Hegel' was a failure because ' ... when the 
identical subject object transcends alienation it must also transcend 
objectification at the same time. But ... to take it back into the subject would 
mean the end of objective reality and thus of any reality at all' (ibid., p.xxiii). 
Lukacs now argues that 'objectification is ... a phenomena that cannot be 
eliminated from human life in society', on the grounds that 'objectification is a 
neutral phenomena' which accompanies all human practices (ibid., p.xxiv). To 
this extent, any attempt to 're-subjectify' the objectivity of sociality 'would mean 
the end of objective reality' (ibid.). However, the failure of History and Class 
Consciousness to reconcile subjectivity (autonomy) and objectivity 
(heteronomy), coupled with the rise of Stalinism in the USSR, only seemed to 
prove Weber's pessimistic conclusion that ' ... socialism would, in fact, require a 
still higher degree of formal bureaucratization than capitalism' (Weber 1978, 
p.225). 
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FROM LUKACS TO HABERMAS 
While Lukacs was unable to resolve the problems created by his attempts to re-
incorporate capitalist objectivity into an historically emergent 'subject-object 
unity', his critical combination of Simmel, Weber and Marx proved highly 
influential upon Western Marxism and in particular its Frankfurt offshoot. Thus 
Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno and Herbert Marcuse were each in their , 
different ways, influenced by Lukacs' expansion of Marx's theory of commodity 
fetishism into a general critique of Occidental rationality. However, it is not the 
Frankfurt school's earlier sUbsumption of Weber's fatalistic diagnosis of 
modernity beneath Marxism's emancipatory conception of material progress, but 
their later reversal of this schema for which they are best known.? For many, the 
writings of the 'first generation' are epitomized by Horkheimer and Adorno's 
The Dialectic of Enlightenment (1972), in which they argue that modem forms of 
alienation have their primordial source in the struggle of humanity to preserve 
itself in the face of nature. 'Men pay for the increase of their power with 
alienation from that over which they exercise their power. Enlightenment 
behaves toward things as a dictator towards men' (ibid., p.9).8 To this extent, 
argues Habermas, Horkheimer and Adorno sought to ' ... anchor the mechanism 
that produces the reification of consciousness in the anthropological foundations 
of the history of the species, in the form of existence of a species that has to 
reproduce itself through labor' (Habermas 1984b, p.379). 
However, by making capitalism the inevitable expression of instrumental labour, 
the resulting 'totally administered society' left little room for critical theory. 
Thus, the more capitalism resembles Weber's 'steel shell' of bureaucratic-
domination, the less possible it becomes to find a 'subject' capable of re-
internalizing the system. This then leads to what Habermas sees as Horkheimer 
7 See Goran Therborn's 'The Frankfurt School' in New Left Review No. 63 (1970). 
8 A stance echoed by Marcuse's contention that: 'Not only the application of technology but 
technology itself is domination (of nature and men) ... ' (Marcuse 1988, p.223). 
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and Adorno's increasingly desperate search for an uncorrupted 'other', capable of 
grounding their own critical stance towards the system. A search, which 
according to Habermas, culminates in Adorno's quasi-Heideggerian notion that 
the reconciliation of subjectivity and objectivity lies in the 'mimetic' character of 
high art. According to Habermas, the failure of his Frankfurt predecessor's 
attempts to overturn the diremption of sUbjectivity and objectivity lies in their 
indebtedness to a 'philosophy of consciousness' (Habermas 1984b, p.386). In 
order to correct this error, Habermas adopts the 'intersubjective tum' of twentieth 
century philosophy in order to provide critical theory with a nonnative 
foundation. 
The basic outlines of Habermas' s approach are already visible in the essay he 
writes on the occasion of Marcuse's 70th birthday (19/7/1968) entitled 
'Technology and Science as "Ideology" , (1971).9 In this essay, Habennas 
criticizes Marcuse for identifying an instrumental stance towards nature with the 
domination of humanity per se, on the grounds that critical theory is then only 
possible if we can adopt a non-instrumental relationship to nature, i.e., one in 
which' ... we can encounter her as an opposing partner in a possible interaction' 
(ibid., p.88). Rejecting Marcuse's attempt to generate such a non-instrumental 
relationship to nature, Habermas argues that 'symbolic interaction' comprises the 
only form of opposition to 'purposive-rational action' (ibid.). 
Habermas then distinguishes between the purposive-rational action of 'labour' 
whose instrumental orientation to nature is regulated by technical rules (ibid., 
pp.91-92),10 and the communicative action of 'interaction' whose ethical 
orientation to others is regulated by consensual norms. In this way, Habennas 
9 An earlier essay with this title dating from 1967 appears in the English collection Theory and 
Practice (Habermas 1973). 
lOA number of writers, such as Thomas McCarthy (1978), have detected similarities between this 
distinction and one made by Hannah Arendt in the Human Condition (1958). 
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seeks to overcome Weber's fatalistic entwinement of objectification and 
alienation by separating 'instrumental labour' from 'communicative action' and 
locating critical theory within the latter. In other words, while Habermas accepts 
Weber's thesis that purposive-labour generates an objective social system beyond 
normative redemption, the normative content of modernity is preserved in an 
intersubjectivity constituted form of communicative action. 
To this extent Habermas departs from his Frankfurt predecessors in two key 
respects. On the one hand, he is relatively untroubled by the loss of freedom 
which accompanies the progressive accumulation of 'instrumental reason' in the 
system while, on the other hand, he views communicative action as a normative 
bulwark against the former's tendency to subject human praxis to the technical 
criteria of efficiency. In other words, by separating the subject-object relations of 
labour's 'kingdom of means' from the subject-subject relations of symbolic 
interactionism's 'kingdom of ends', Habermas seeks to limit 'heteronomy' to the 
former while preserving 'autonomy' within the latter. 
To this end, Habermas substitutes Adorno and Horkheimer's mimetic orientation 
to nature for an intersubjective notion of 'reciprocal recognition' modelled on 
George Herbert Mead's theory of 'symbolic interaction' (ibid.). 'This means, on 
the one hand, a change of paradigm within action theory: from goal-directed to 
communicative action and, on the other hand, a change of strategy in an effort to 
reconstruct the modem concept of rationality that became possible within the 
decentration of our understanding of the world' (ibid., p.391-2). 
In other words, it is no longer a question of avoiding what Horkheimer and 
Adorno saw as the inevitable reduction of 'self-reflection' to 'self-preservation', 
but of endowing the latter with a normative character whereby '... the human 
species maintains itself through the socially coordinated activities of its members' 
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(ibid.). To this extent, Habermas argues, it is possible to avoid the one-
dimensional amalgam of objectification and alienation by recognizing that the 
self-constitution of the species takes two separate routes, one leading through 
instrumental labour and the other through normative interaction. Thus, the fact 
that' ... coordination has to be established through communication - and in certain 
central spheres through communication aimed at reaching agreement - then the 
reproduction of the species also requires satisfying the conditions of a rationality 
that is inherent in communicative action' (Habermas 1984b, p.397). 
Habermas is in a position to contrast the objective forms of sociality which are 
predicted upon instrumental labour's commitment to 'self-preservation', with the 
intersubjective forms of sociality which are predicated upon a nonnatively 
informed conception of language. 'The utopian perspective of reconciliation and 
freedom is ingrained in the conditions for the communicative sociation of 
individuals; it is built into the linguistic mechanism of the reproduction of the 
species' (ibid., p.398). In keeping with his dualistic approach to modernity, 
Habermas then develops a theory of the 'uncoupling' of the (economic and 
administrative) system from the (symbolic) lifeworld in which communicative 
action is located. 
THE UNCOUPLING OF SYSTEM AND LIFE WORLD 
The System 
In the pre-modem era, the 'material' and 'symbolic' realms are integrated within 
an overarching normative order so that' ... services circulate primarily in the non-
economic form of normatively required, reciprocal measures of assistance ... In 
the non-monetarized economic activities of archaic societies, the mechanism of 
exchange has so little detached itself from nonnative contexts that a clear 
separation between economic and non-economic values is hardly possible' 
(Habermas 1987a, p.163). 
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However, as the capacity of the species to dominate nature develops, their arises 
an independent economic realm which uncouples itself from the lifeworld (ibid., 
p.168). In other words, the more developed the 'forces of production' become, 
the more the social 'relation of production' are transformed into an economic 
system, ancephalously governed by the 'non-normative steering mechanism' of 
money. In conjunction with the emergence of the modem self-regulating 
economy there emerges an administrative state apparatus, which achieves its own 
independence from the normative lifeworld insofar as it relies on the quasi-
instrumental 'steering mechanism' of power. Consequently, the more 'money' 
and 'power' come to transcend their intersubjective context in the lifeworld, the 
more linguistically mediated forms of 'social integration' are replaced by non-
linguistically mediated forms of 'system integration'. 'Media such as money and 
power attach to empirical ties; they encode a purposive-rational attitude toward 
calculable amounts of value and make it possible to exert generalized, strategic 
influence on the decisions of other participants while bypassing processes of 
consensus-orientated communication' (Habermas 1987b, p.183). 
In a process that Habermas refers to as the 'technicization of the lifeworld', the 
system acquires the capacity to 'ethically neutralize' sociality in the interests of 
instrumental efficiency (Habermas 1987a, p.310).11 However, whereas Weber 
viewed this as an all encompassing process of bureaucratization, Habermas 
argues that the rise of non-normative steering mechanisms is offset by the 
accompanying rise of a normatively steered lifeworld. 
11 The economic system can then be viewed as consisting of three interdependent forms of 
'technical reason': (1) the strategic action employed by utility-maximizing individuals; (2) the 
functional reason which regulates the economy in an 'autopoietic' fashion and; (3) the 
instrumental reason which institutionalizes the 'purposive' transformation of nature. 
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The Lifeworld 
Alongside of, and in response to, the emergence of a functionally integrated 
system, there also arises a symbolic lifeworld comprising the latter's non-material 
residue. Habermas takes the notion of 'lifeworld' (Lebenswelt) from Husserl and 
Schutz, for whom it represents the general background values, beliefs and ideas 
which make up the intersubjective world of everyday life. To this extent, the 
lifeworld is both reproduced by participants through their symbolic interactions 
and comprises an historical resource that transcends them. Habermas then 
expands their notion of lifeworld to include: (a) the normatively integrated 
sociality that preceded modernity; (b) the portion of sociality which is 
'technicized' by the system without reificatory consequences; and (c) the 
remaining symbolic sphere in which communicative action emerges. While the 
lifeworld retains pre-modem residues, Habermas is concerned to emphasize the 
extent to which its rationalization by the system generates a compensatory form 
of communicative action, which performs three key 'functions' for the latter. 
'Under the functional aspect of mutual understanding, communicative action 
serves to transmit and renew cultural knowledge; the aspect of co-ordinating 
action, it serves social integration and the establishment of solidarity; finally 
under the aspect of socialization, communicative action serves the formation of 
personal identities' (Habermas 1987a, p.137). These in tum correspond to the 
structural distinction between 'culture', 'society' and 'personality'. 
I use the term culture for the stock of knowledge from which 
participants in communication supply themselves with interpretations 
as they come to an understanding about something in the world. I use 
the term society for the legitimate orders through which participants 
regulate their membership in social groups and thereby secure 
solidarity. By personality I understand the competencies that make a 
subject capable of speaking and acting, that put him in a position to 
take part in processes of reaching understanding and thereby to assert 
his own identity. (Habermas 1987a, p.138) 
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It is then possible to differentiate those aspects of the lifeworld which fall within 
the private and those which fall within the public sphere. 
The institutional core of the private sphere is the nuclear family, 
relived of productive functions and specialized tasks socialization; 
from the systemic perspective of the economy, it is viewed as the 
environment of private households. The institutional core of the 
public sphere comprises communicative networks amplified by a 
cultural complex, a press and, later, mass media; they make it 
possible for a public of art-enjoying private persons to participate in 
the reproduction of culture, and or a public of citizens of the state to 
participate in the social integration mediated by public opinion. 
(Habermas 1987a, p.319) 
It is this 'public sphere' that carries the normative hopes of humanity, insofar as it 
enables participants to reflexively interrogate the background assumptions of 
their culture through the deployment of' communicative reason' . 
THE EMERGENCE OF COMMUNICATIVE REASON 
The notion of communicative reason comprises Habermas' s most important 
reworking of the critical tradition in which he stands. Nevertheless, it groans 
under the weight of the theoretical burden placed upon it having come to 
subsume: (1) Rousseau's 'popular sovereignty'; (2) Kant's 'practical reason' (3) 
Hegel's 'ethical totality' (4) Marx's 'utopia of labour'; (5) Mead's 'symbolic 
interaction'; (6) Durkheim's 'organic solidarity'; (7) Lukacs's 'subject-object 
identity'; (8) Pierces's 'communicative community'; (9) Parson's 'culture' and; 
(10) linguistic theory from Wittgenstein through Austin to Apel. To this extent, 
communicative reason seeks to combine all the normative counterweights to 
instrumental reason that have emerged in contradistinction to the subsumption of 
the lifeworld beneath '... an instrumental attitude toward work interpreted in 
utilitarian terms' (Habermas 1984b, p.241). 
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In this way, Habennas seeks to collectivize the nonnative content of modernity 
within a set of symbolic procedures whose post-metaphysical 'ethic of 
brotherliness' serves to counterbalance Weber's (and more recently Foucault's) 
one sided association of rationality with instrumental-domination (ibid., p.198). 
Against Weber's contention that nonnative ends lose their 'objective' force once 
they are replaced/displaced by the instrumental ends of the system, Habermas 
argues that the dissolution of a theologically-based fonn of substantive morality 
engendered a new fonn of procedural morality (ibid., pp.209-215).12 Thus, in the 
wake of the system's emergence '... the binding force of moral agreement 
grounded in the sacred' is transfonned into a mode of' ... moral agreement that 
expresses in rational fonn what was always intended in the symbolism of the 
holy' (Habennas 1987a, p.81). In the modern world, 'Convictions owe their 
authority less and less to the spellbinding power and the aura of the holy, and 
more and more to a consensus that is not merely reproduced but achieved, that is, 
brought about communicatively' (ibid., p.89). In other words, the more the 
system comes to 'de-linguistify' the primordial lifeworld - by making social 
integration a function of 'non-nonnative' steering mechanisms - the more the 
'linguistification of the sacred' means that' ... social integration no longer takes 
place directly via institutionalized values but by way of intersubjective 
recognition of validity claims raised in speech acts' (ibid.). 
Although Habennas denies that this schema possesses a teleological intent 
(Habennas 1990, p.210) he, nevertheless, employs an evolutionary thematic to 
trace the development of communicative reason through a series of 'problem-
solving' stages culminating in 'post-conventional morality' (1990, p.125). To this 
extent ' ... morality as grounded by discourse ethics is based on a pattern inherent 
in mutual understanding in language from the beginning ... ' (ibid., p.163). As 
12 In this way Habennas seeks to redeem the original sense of religion from the latin religare 
meaning 'to bind' together. 
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such, communicative reason is seen to realize the possibilities of an 'ideal speech 
situation' inherent in language orientated towards mutual understanding from the 
outset. 
On attaining its 'post-conventional' stage, participants are no longer engaged in 
seeking to justify moral beliefs on the basis of traditionally ascribed norms, but 
rather subject all such 'conventional' norms to the coruscating scrutiny of rational 
discourse. This, however, makes ' ... the autonomous justification of morality an 
unavoidable problem' as the 'very perspective that makes consensus possible are 
now at issue' (ibid., p.l62). Fortunately, the modem problem of 'self-assurance' 
contains its own solution, as the conditions which render normative justification 
possible are located within the 'discursive procedure that redeems claims to 
validity' (ibid. 163). Consequently, the threat of 'relativism', which haunts the 
intersubjective redemption of validity claims, can be avoided by discovering the 
rules of 'fundamental reciprocity' inherent within the primordial structures of 
communicative action (ibid.). It therefore follows that 'Once a community of 
believers has been secularized into a community of cooperation, only a 
universalistic morality can obtain its obligatory character' (Habermas 1987a, 
p.90). 
In short, the transition from a religious to a communicative-based ethic of social 
regulation is able to realize in secular form the universal and unconditional form 
of normative integration inherent in sacred forms of social solidarity. To this 
extent, Habermas' s approach to communicative reason is modelled on 
Durkheim's appropriation of the binding force of the sacred for modem sociality 
(Durkheim 1965).13 In both cases, the authors are concerned to retain the 
universal, unconditional and quasi-transcendental properties of pre-modem forms 
13 To this extent, communicative reason also comprises an attempt to preserve in modem guise the 
ethical claims of religion in terms of both the 'linguistification of the sacred' and the 'causality of 
fate'. 
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of morality while foregoing their theological content. However, unlike 
Durkheim's substantive conception of the collective conscious, Habennas's 
conception of communicative reason is a purely procedural affair limited to the 
dialogical generation of consensus. 
The rationality of values underlying action preferences is not 
measured by their material content but by fonnal properties ... Only 
values that can be abstracted and generalized into principles, 
internalized largely as formal principles, and applied procedurally, 
have so intensive a power to orient action that they can cut across 
various partiCUlar situations and, in the extreme case systematically 
penetrate all spheres of life and bring an entire bibliography, or even 
the history of social groups, under a unifying idea. (l984b, pp.l71-
172) 
To this extent 'communicative reason' is a child ofWeberian rationalism, insofar 
as it eschews any substantive notion of 'the good life' (Habennas 1990, p.178) in 
favour of formal procedures designed to endow arguments that have successfully 
navigated its 'tribunal of reason' (the phrase is Kant's) with universal validity. 
To this extent 'discourse ethics', as Habermas calls the procedures which 
transform Kant's 'monological' into a 'dialogical' conception of 'practical 
reason', seeks to make actual argumentative practices the test of reason. Thus, 
while retaining Kant's goal of achieving 'a universally valid view of the world' in 
which what is good for each is in the interests of all (Habermas 1995, p.117), 
discourse ethics no longer relies on the categorical imperative to ensure that each 
acts on maxims that comprise rules for all. In its place, Habermas proposes 'an 
inclusive and non-coercive rational discourse among free and equal participants' 
that is capable of generating a 'we-perspective' through a Meadian process of 
'ideal role taking' in which each adopts the standpoint of the other (ibid.). 
At the same time, Habermas takes over Kant's trifurcation of reason in the fonn 
of separate 'validity spheres', each with its own criteria of evaluation. To this 
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extent, argues Habennas, modernity is built upon a clear separation between; (a) 
orientations towards the 'objective world' in which validity claims are judged on 
the basis of their truth and efficacy; (b) orientations towards the 'intersubjective' 
(or social) world in which validity claims are judged on the basis of their ethical 
correctness and rightness; and (c) orientations towards the 'subjective world' in 
which validity claims are judged on the basis of their sincerity and authenticity 
(Habennas 1984b, p.84). However, all three remain united by the procedural 
rules of dialogical redemption. 'Speakers integrate the three formal world-
concepts, which appear in the other models of action either singly or in pairs, into 
a system and presuppose this system in common a framework of interpretation 
within which they can reach an understanding' (ibid., p.98). To this extent, all 
three worlds are located within a normatively regulated context presided over by 
the democratic principles of discourse ethics. 
'MEDIATIZATION' VERSUS 'COLONIZATION' 
Although the emergence of a system co-ordinated by 'instrumental reason' and a 
lifeworld co-ordinated by 'practical reason' are 'complimentary developments', 
they are not in complete harmony. 'Only if we differentiate Gesellschafthandeln 
into action orientated to reaching an understanding and action orientated to 
success can we conceive the communicative rationalization of everyday action 
and the fonnation of subsystems of purposive-rational economic and 
administrative action as complimentary developments. Both reflect, it is true, the 
institutional embodiment of rational complexes, but in other respects they are 
counteracting tendencies' (Habermas 1984b, p.341). 
To this extent the 'uncoupling' of lifeworld and system generates forms of 
'complimentary' and 'counteracting tendencies' so that' ... the institutions that 
anchor steering mechanisms such as power and money in the lifeworld could 
serve as a channel either for the influence of the lifeworld on formally organized 
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domains of action or, conversely, for the influence of the system on 
communicatively structured contexts of action' (Habermas 1987a, p.l85). 
Thus, just as the system subjects the lifeworld to technical-regulation so the 
lifeworld subjects the system to ethical-regulation.14 This then creates conflict: 
... between, on the one hand, a rationalization of everyday 
communication that is tied to the structures of intersubjectivity of the 
lifeworld, in which language counts as the genuine and irreplaceable 
medium of reaching understanding, and, on the other hand, the 
growing complexity of subsystems of purposive-rational action, in 
which actions are coordinated through steering media such as money 
and power. (Habermas 1984b, p.342) 
To this extent modernity finds itself threatened on two sides. On the one side, 
'atavistic' social movements ranging (somewhat incongruously) from Marxism 
to 'religious fundamentalism', seek to dissolve the system into the lifeworldl5 
and, on the other side, 'positivistic' forces seek to dissolve the lifeworld into the 
system in the name of 'instrumental reason'. 
However, while both generate 'pathological' consequences, Habermas's 
reputation as a critical theorist rests on his attempts to protect the lifeworld from 
the threat posed by the system. A threat that arises at the point at which 
communicative action no longer benefits from its rationalization by the system 
but is disadvantaged by its incursions. 'The rationalization of the lifeworld makes 
possible the emergence and growth of subsystems whose independent 
imperatives tum back destructively upon the lifeworld itself (Habermas 1987a, 
14 This fmds sociological expression in the tendency of functionalism to dissolve the lifeworld into 
the system, and interactionism to dissolve the system into the lifeworld. 
15 The annexation of the system by the lifeworld can take various forms, such as a utopian Marxist 
extension of ethically orientated self-regulation based on praxis philosophy: a neo-conservative 
extension of aesthetically orientated expressivism that Habermas associates with both 
Aristotelian communitarians and Heideggerian postmodernism; or a liberal bourgeois extension 
of symbolic interaction of the sort endorsed by Richard Rorty on hermeneutic grounds 
(Habermas 1987b). 
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p.186). Habermas then formulates this in terms of an imperialistic metaphor in 
which '... the imperatives of autonomous subsystem make their way into the 
lifeworld from the outside - like colonial masters coming into a tribal society _ 
and force a process of assimilation upon it' (Habermas 1987a, p.355). 
This is not, however, an altogether appropriate analogy, given that the 'tribal' 
lifeworld which the 'colonial' system invades is only worth protecting from the 
system because it has already have been rationalized by it. To this extent the 
rationalization of the lifeworld at first progressive (insofar as it transforms a 
theologically based substantive morality into a secular from of procedural 
morality), becomes regreSSIve (insofar as it subsumes 'practical' under 
'instrumental reason'), giving rise to 'pathological consequences' such as 
'reification', 'anomie', 'meaninglessness', 'loss of freedom', 'hedonism' and 
'distortions' in communicative action (Habermas 1987a, p.148 and p.325). 
The aim of critical theory is not, therefore, to free the lifeworld per se from its 
reified incarceration within a non-normative economic system, but to protect the 
(rationalized) portion of the symbolic lifeworld from its absorption by the 
system. 16 In other words, the aim is ' ... no longer to supersede an economic 
system having a capitalist life of its own and a system of domination having a 
bureaucratic life of its own but to erect a democratic dam against the colonization 
of the lifeworld' (Habermas 1992b, p.444). This, however, raises the question as 
to how one determines the point at which 'mediatization' become 'colonizations', 
'rationalization' becomes 'reifications' and 'heteronomy' threatens to subsume 
'autonomy' . 
16 As Berger (1991) notes for Habermas: ' ... the site of reification is not the factory, and its source 
is not a particular form of organization of alienated . labour :' but rather '... the border be~een 
'lifeworld' and 'system', and consists in the deformatIon ofhfeworld structures by fonTIS alien to 
everyday practice' (p.175). 
If bureaucratization has to be viewed, to begin with, as a normal 
component of modernization processes, the question arises of how to 
distinguish from this those pathological variants to which Weber 
referred to with his thesis of a loss of freedom. In order to locate at 
least in analytic terms, the threshold at which the mediatization of ~he 
lifeworld turns into its colonization .. .' (Habermas 1987a, p.318) 
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The difficulty with attempting to locate this 'threshold' is that while instrumental 
reason seeks to universalize its objective standpoint in the name of technical 
efficacy, practical reason seeks to universalize its intersubjective standpoint in the 
name of democratic participation. 
Nevertheless, according to Stephen Crook, Habermas employs the method of 
'rational reconstruction' to '... objectively specify the appropriate balance 
between spaces and rationalities with reference to a developmental logic' (Crook 
1991, p.119). The problem with employing system criteria to determine the scope 
of the system, however, is that it can only judge the lifeworld on the basis of its 
capacity to reproduce the system. To this extent the lifeworld is asked to justify 
practical reason on the basis of functional reason. This in tum leads Habermas to 
subsume communicative action within a Parsonian form of structural 
functionalism which judges the validity of the former in terms of system's need 
for 'mutual understanding', 'coordinating action' and 'socialization' (Habermas 
1987a, p.137), whereas if we were to adopt the perspective of the lifeworld, the 
system would have to justify itself in terms of its capacity to facilitate practical 
reason. In which case, argues Thomas McCarthy, even questions of social 
evolution and system complexity' ... must on Habermas's own principles, be 
subordinate to communicative rationalization of life as a measure of progress' 
(McCarthy 1991, p.133).I7 
17 According to the evolutionary biologist Stephen Ja~ G~ul,d (199~), not onl,Y is it in,appropriate to 
apply evolutionary models to the history of humaruty, It IS also mappropnate to VIew bIologIcal 
evolution in terms of a developmental logic. 
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However, if only the procedures of discourse ethics are capable of generating 
valid normative rules for human conduct, then Habermas' s attempts to employ 
systems criteria to determine where 'mediatization' ends and 'colonization' 
begins is invalid. Indeed, insofar as Habermas employs the method of rational 
reconstruction to determine the limits of the lifeworld he is guilty of by-passing 
the normative rules of discourse ethics. Habermas' s tendency to locate his own 
standpoint beyond the threshold of discourse ethics is evidenced in his assertion 
that redeemed validity claims possess a universal legitimacy which transcends the 
time and place of their redemption. 
THE INTERNAL 'COLONIZATION' OF COMMUNICATIVE REASON 
In the Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Habermas writes of his concern to 
steer ' ... between the Scylla of absolutism and the Charybdis of relativism .. .' 
(Habermas 1987b, p.300). However, like Odysseus before him (Homer 1992, 
pp.126-131), Habermas is more concerned to avoid the 'whirlpool' of relativism 
than the 'monster' of absolutism. I8 For this reason, argues Albrecht Wellmer, 
Habermas adopts the notion of 'unconditional validity claims' in order to attain 
, ... a standard which transcends each particular language and each particular life-
form' (Wellmer 1991, p.164). Thus, according to Habermas, communicative 
reason is endowed with a 'transcendental moment of universal validity' which 
'bursts every provinciality asunder' (Habermas 1987b, p.322). Although validity 
claims must always be raised 'here and now' they possess a capacity which 
'''blots out" space and time ... ' (Habermas 1987b, p.323),19 and transforms 
historically valid ethical 'evaluations' into universally valid 'moral' ones. 
18 In Gennany, as in Britain, the Scylla and Charybdis have come. to repres~nt two e~ual1y 
unattractive options. However, in the original story Odysseus is adVIsed by C~ce to aVOld .the 
latter at the expense of passing by the fonner. The fact that Haberrnas then ~ssoclates absolutism 
with the Scylla and relativism with the Charybdis is, therefore, symptomatic of his tendency to 
embrace the fonner in order to circumvent the latter. 
19 The word tilgt, translated here as 'blots out', can also be rendered as 'obliterates' 
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From whence then does this 'universal' capacity arise? On the one hand, argues 
Habermas, it is inherent in language orientated towards mutual understanding 
from the outset, on the other hand, he argues, it is realized when the system 
rationalizes the lifeworld. To this extent' ... the formally organized spheres of 
action of the bourgeoisie (the economy and the state apparatus) form the 
foundation of the post-traditionallifeworld of the homme (the private sphere) and 
the citoyen (the public sphere)' (Habermas 1987a, p.328). In other words, the 
capacity of the 'post-traditionallifeworld' to transcend its own historical context 
forms the basis for discourse ethics to generate a 'post-conventional morality'. 
Thus while the substantive content of validity claims arises from the parochial 
lifeworld, the formal rules of discursivity arise from the developmental logic of 
the system. In which case, it is only when the system rationalizes the lifeworld 
that a genuinely universalistic form of communicative action arises. 
However, this creates a tension in Habermas's approach between the capacity of 
the system to invest communicative reason with context-transcending powers and 
the fact that the system negates the autonomy of participants. In other words, the 
very structures which permit communicative reason to transcend its historical 
context also ensure that the system transcends the normative claims of its 
participants. Although Habermas is more cautious than Karl-Otto Apel (1987, p 
272) in endowing intersubjective-interaction with the capacity to generate 
transsubjective-propositions, he is convinced that' every argumentation, 
regardless of the context in which it occurs, rests on pragmatic presuppositions 
from whose propositional content the principle of universalism (U) can be 
derived' (Habermas 1990, p.82), where 'U' ensures that all claims which pass the 
dialogical test of discursive procedures are imbued with a 'context transcending 
validity' (ibid., p.89). In order to support this claim Habermas adopts Apel's view 
that, in the act of refuting such presuppositions, we cannot avoid employing 
them. In other words, the inescapability of these discursive rules manifest 
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themselves in a 'performative contradiction' in which the speaker employs the 
very rules he is seeking to deny. To this extent' ... the existence of performative 
contradictions helps to identify the rules necessary for an argumentation game to 
work; if one is to argue at all, there are no substitutes' (Habermas 1990, p.95). 
However, it is one thing to argue that all participants within a discursive-context 
'must' observe certain rules of argumentation if they wish to be considered 
legitimate interlocutors, it is another to argue that these rules transcend the 
context in which they are operationalized and are therefore capable of 
universalizing redeemed validity claims. 
Habermas is keenly aware of these problems, especially in relation to Apel' sIess 
sensitive handling of them, and argues that the 'must' to which agents are 
subjected by the rules of discourse comprise only a 'weak transcendental 
necessitation' rather than the 'prescriptive must of a rule of action' (Habermas 
1993, p.81). In which case, the rules of discourse are too weak to compel action, 
but strong enough to lift redeemed validity claims out of their historical context.20 
However, according to Benhabib, it is only possible to extract from an 'ideal 
speech situation' what has already been put into it (Benhabib 1986, p.292). 
Consequently, Habermas must have already located a transsubjective core 
'beyond time and space' beneath the intersubjective context in which validity 
claims are redeemed. 
Whether this capacity is inherent within communicative reason from the outset, 
or results from the rationalization of the lifeworld, the fact that the rules of 
communicative reason possess an objective structure which is not constituted by 
intersubjectively redeemable validity claim generates, according to Benhabib, a 
performative contradiction in its own right. In other words, if normative rules are 
20 On occasions Habermas translates his ethic of universal agreement into an apriori universal fact: 
'A cognitivist ethical theory understands the operation of practical reason in purely eplstenuc 
terms' (Habermas 1993, p.78). 
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only legitimate when they have been intersubjectively redeemed by participants, 
then pre-existing rules (or 'facts of reason' as Habermas following Kant calls 
them) have, by definition, not been discursively redeemed and must therefore be 
invalid. In order to escape this performative contradiction, Benhabib argues that 
we need to acknowledge that '... even the so-called ''universal'' pragmatic 
presuppositions of human discourse have a cultural-historical content built into 
them' (Benhabib 1986, p.306). 
Thus, insofar as we are committed to a universalistic perspective it derives from 
the historical changes wrought by the Enlightenment (ibid., p.306), which sought 
to apply a set of ethical principles that 'transcend' all 'empirical' differences. To 
this extent, argues Bernstein ' ... the force of the claim of universality derives not 
from its utter universality, its speaking to the unlimited communication 
community, but rather from the fact that it acknowledges claims which existing 
universality suppresses; the new universality reveals past universality to be the 
non-acknowledgement of implicit claims, the reification of an inessential 
particularity' (Bernstein 1995, p.194). In this way Bernstein not only calls into 
question the claim of 'utter universality', but also the institutional context upon 
which it is utterly dependent. Thus, if communicative reason can be said to 
possess a substantive content '... its force is ... the claim of a radical and 
participatory democratic polity against the silencings and neutralizations of 
democratic ideals consequent upon the rationalization of the economy ... ' (ibid.). 
It therefore follows that the universality claimed by communicative reason 
derives not from the capacity of the system to 'technicize' the lifeworld, but from 
the capacity of the lifeworld to include all those who are 'silenced' and 
'neutralized' by the system. Thus, whereas Habermas argues that the universality 
of communicative reason is allied to the system's capacity to 'ethical neutralize' 
the lifeworld, Bernstein argues that it is only possible to operationalizc 
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universalistic principles against the system's 'silencings and neutralizations of 
democratic ideals' (op. cit.). In which case, the universality of communicative 
action is not realized by the system's capacity to transcend intersubjectivity, but 
by the lifeworld's capacity to render the system accountable to its participants. In 
the next chapter we shall investigate this further in relation to Habennas' s 
assertion that communicative reason comprises an 'ethical totality' capable of re-
normatizing sociality as a whole. 
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CHAPTER SIX: RE-NORMATIZING THE SYSTEM 
Habermas's key contribution to the tradition of critical theory consists In 
retrieving a normative conception of self-constitution from its subsumption 
beneath self-objectifying labour. However, by limiting the scope of nonnative 
self-constitution to communicative action, Habermas then excludes workers from 
the normative content of modernity. Rather than arguing that labour's lack of 
normative content is a function of its subordination to the system, Habennas 
argues that the system's lack of normative content is a function of the its 
institutionalization of labour. Nevertheless, it is difficult to reconcile the 
exclusion of labour from normative consideration with communicative action's 
inclusive approach to the validation of social regulation. If, as Habennas argues, 
social regulation is only valid when agreed by those concerned, then workers too 
have a right to participate in decisions affecting the use of their labour. 
To this extent there exists a tension at the heart of Habermas's approach between, 
on the one hand, the capacity of discourse ethics to stretch 'like a skin around 
society as a whole' (Habermas 1996, p.409) and, on the other hand, the capacity 
of the economic system to 'jut out' of the normative lifeworld and thereby render 
'holistic concepts of society' (ibid., p.436) redundant. In this chapter we shall 
explore this tension at greater length in relation to the normative content of 
labour, beginning with Habermas's critique of Marx. 
A REDEMPTIVE CRITIQUE OF MARX?l 
In Knowledge and Human Interests (1972), Habermas argues that Marx's 
writings contain two competing versions of 'self-constitution': an instrumental 
In an interview which appears as the 'Concluding Remarks' to Habermas and ~e Public Spbere 
(1992b), Habermas not only declares himself to be a fierce defender of MarxIan SOCIal theory 
(PA64) but also 'the last Marxist' (p.469). 
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version located in the purposive transfonnation of nature which develops in the 
forces of production; and a social version located in the relations of production 
which develops in class struggle. To this extent, argues Habennas, ' ... the self-
constitution of the species takes place not only in the context of men's 
instrumental action upon nature but simultaneously in the dimension of power 
relations that regulate men's interaction among themselves' (Habermas, 1972, 
p.51). 
Thus, just as the 'species' owes its emancipation from 'external forces of nature' 
to the development of 'technically exploitable knowledge', so it owes its 
emancipation from 'the compulsion of inner nature' to 'the revolutionary activity 
of struggling classes' (ibid., p.53). Unfortunately, Marx then subsumes the latter 
within the fonner to the detriment of labour's nonnative content. However, rather 
than attempting to rescue the nonnative content of social labour from its 
subordination to instrumental action, in his later writings Habermas argues that 
Marx's 'production paradigm' ' ... screens out of the validity spectrum of reason 
every dimension except those of truth and efficiency. Accordingly, what is learnt 
in innerwordly practice can only accumulate in the development of the forces of 
production. With this productivist conceptual strategy, the nonnative content of 
modernity can no longer be grasped ... ' (Habennas 1987b, p.320). 
Habermas therefore rejects Gyorgy Markus's attempt to re-affinn the normative 
content of labour on the grounds that ' ... the production and useful employment 
of products has structure-forming effects only for the metabolic process between 
human beings and nature ... ' (Habermas 1987b, pp.80-1). In contrast to Markus, 
Habermas argues that an ' ... emancipatory perspective proceeds ... not from the 
production paradigm, but from the paradigm of action orientated toward mutual 
understanding' (ibid., p.82). 
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Insofar as Marx's notion of labour continues to possess a normative content it 
derives, according to Habennas, from the pre-modern lifeworld.2 On this basis 
, 
Habennas argues that Marx's theory of 'revolutionary praxis' comprises an 
atavistic attempt to '... bring the independent economic process back into the 
horizon of the lifeworld again, and free the realm of freedom from the dictates of 
the realm of necessity'3 (Habennas, 1987a, p.352). In support of this view, 
Habennas argues that Marx's critical strategy consists of opposing a pre-
capitalist conception of 'concrete labour' - which derives its normative content 
from the aesthetic-expressive character of craftwork - to a fully capitalized 
conception of 'abstract labour' ,4 which is ' ... indifferent to the natural-material 
object of use and to the need it satisfies ... [and] to the particular kinds of activity 
as well as to the working individuals and their social situations' (Habermas 
1987 a, p.341). 
Thus, while Habennas contends that '... the transformation of concrete into 
abstract labour is a process in which communal and individual life becomes 
reified' (Habennas 1987a, p.336), he does not believe it is possible to de-reify 
'communal and individual life' without undennining the rational structure of 
modernity. Consequently, Habennas accuses Marx of failing to acknowledge that 
capitalism's 'abstraction' of labour comprises an evolutionary advance over its 
'concrete' predecessor. 'Marx conceives of capitalist society so strongly as a 
totality that he fails to recognize the intrinsic evolutionary value that media 
steered subsystems possess' (ibid., p.339). In contradistinction to which, 
Habennas argues that the economies transfonnation of 'concrete' into 'abstract 
2 In fact Habennas is far from consistent in this as he also argues that Marx '... unmasked the 
humanistic self-understanding of modernity by suing for the normative content of bourgeois 
ideals' (Habennas 1987b, p.282). 
3 Habermas accuses Marx of dreaming of a future society in which ' ... the objective semblance of 
capital has dissolved and the lifeworld, which has been held captive under the dictates of the law 
of value, gets back its spontaneity ... ' (ibid., p.340). . 
4 To this extent, Habermas conflates Marx's productivist notion of 'abstract labour' m the 
Grundrisse, with the exchange based notion that supersedes it in Capital (Rubin 1973). 
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labour' comprises ' ... a higher and evolutionary advantageous level of integration 
by comparison to traditional societies ... ' (ibid., p.339). For this reason Habermas 
advocates the abandonment of Marx's backward looking labour-based critique, in 
favour of a forward looking communication-based one which can clearly ' ... 
distinguish the destruction of traditional forms of life from the reification of 
posttraditionallifeworlds' (ibid., p.340). Habermas then concludes his critique of 
Marx by arguing that 'In an extensively rationalized lifeworld, reification can be 
measured only against the conditions of communicative sociation, and not against 
the nostalgically loaded, frequently romanticized past of premodern forms of life' 
(ibid., p.342). Having thus transferred the normative content of modernity from 
'the revolutionary activity of struggling classes' (op. cit.) to arguments over 
validity claims, Habermas then re-iterates Weber's contention that ' ... the 
abolition of private capitalism would not at all mean the destruction of the iron 
cage of modem industrial labour' (ibid., p.340). 
However, in order to deny that Marx's notion of labour possesses a modem form 
of normative content, Habermas presents a one-sided and often erroneous 
interpretation of Marx. Thus, far from criticizing capitalism from the standpoint 
of feudalism, Marx not only celebrates the former's dissolution of the latter, but 
also the key role played by capital in facilitating the collectivization of labour. 5 
Thus in The Manifesto of the Communist Party, Marx famously portrays , 
capitalism as a revolutionary force wakening the forces of production from their 
slumbers and throwing off the parochialism of feudal social relations. 'The 
bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, 
patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly tom asunder the motley feudal ties 
that bound man to his "natural superiors", and has left remaining no other nexus 
5 Weber also argues that the discipline of the factory gives rise to the possibility of socialism (in 
Marcuse 1988, p.213). 
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between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous "cash payment" , 
(Marx 1952, p.44). 
Although Marx concedes that the proletariat, in the early stages of its 
development, may seek ' ... to restore by force the vanished status of the workman 
of the Middle Ages' (ibid., p.54), once workers have been collectivized by the 
bourgeois factory system, they then exchange the nostalgia of the past for the 
anticipation of a future built on the ruins of present day capitalism. It is therefore 
incorrect to argue that Marx's approach is atavistic when he regards socialism as 
necessary to liberate the forces of production from their capitalist fetters. 
However, the maIn error In Habermas's critique of Marx concerns his 
interpretation of the latter's notion of abstract labour. While it is the case that 
abstract labour comprises a specifically capitalist form of social labour, it also 
comprises, for Marx, the activity through which the species constitutes itself 
socially. To this extent it is not concrete use-value forming labour, but abstract 
value-forming labour which comprises the vehicle for self-objectifying 
subjectivity. Thus, rather than opposing a traditional form of expressive-labour to 
a modem form of instrumental-labour, Marx opposes the capacity of labour to 
generate sociality to the alienated form this takes when labour works for capital. 
The tension in Marx's approach is not between concrete and abstract labour but 
rather between the value-creating capacities of abstract labour and the socially 
emancipating achievements of the labour movement. In other words, between 
precisely those two forms of self-constituting labour which Habermas identifies 
in his early writings. 
The opposition between these two versions of self-constitution arises from the 
fact that while abstract labour is the basis for self-objectifying subjectivity, the 
labour movement is the basis for transforming capitalism into ' ... an association, 
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in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development 
of all' (ibid., p.76). Thus, while the former underwrites a purely objective account 
of sociality which permanently renders sociality external to its social agents, the 
latter is concerned to subject the objective structures of capitalism to the 
democratic planning of its participants. To this extent, Marx's notion of self-
objectifying labour conflicts with his depiction of the working class as the agent 
of its own emancipation (Marx 1974, p.82). 
However, rather than taking issue with Marx's subordination of the labour 
movement to a notion of self-objectifying subjectivity which mirrors capital's 
objectification of sociality, Habermas uses Marx's conception of self-
objectification to legitimate its subordination to capital. Habermas then declares 
labour to be a purely instrumental activity devoid of intersubjective content, 
which can be quite legitimately subordinated to capital without normative injury. 
Nevertheless, Habermas's instrumental conception of labour conflicts with his 
critique of subject-centred reason. Thus, the more Habermas argues that 
communicative reason is designed to replace an 'exhausted' subject-centred 
approach to sociality, the more the former must possess the capacity to sublate 
the former. To this end, Habermas announces that communicative reason is a 
successor to Hegel's 'ethical totality' that views the diremptions of modernity as 
expressions of a 'damaged intersubjectivity'. 
DIREMPTIONS AND EXCLUSIONS 
In response to those authors who have prematurely bid farewell to the 'dialectic 
of enlightenment' (Habermas 1987b, p.86), Habermas contrasts Hegel's 
diremption to Nietzsche's exclusion model of reason. 'Whereas the diremption 
model of reason distinguishes solidary social practice as the locus of a historically 
situated reason in which the threads of outer nature, inner nature and society 
converge, in the exclusion model of reason the space opened up by utopian 
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thoughts gets completely filled in with an irreconcilable reason reduced to bare 
power' (Habermas 1987b, p.306). Thus, while the diremption model views the 
antinomies of modernity as expressions of an alienated form of ethical totality 
(Sittlichkeit); the exclusion model seeks to rescue the other of instrumental reason 
from its subordination to the latter. In other words, whereas the diremption model 
seeks to generate 'a more far-reaching and comprehensive reason' (ibid.) capable 
of sublating the 'division' (Entzwieungen)6 between instrumental reason and its 
expressive other, the exclusion model seeks to valorize the latter whether in the , 
form of Nietzsche's cult of Dionysus, Heidegger's world-constituting 'Being', 
Bataill's notion of 'heterogeneity', Derrida's originary notion of difference, or 
Foucault's 'the body and its pleasures'. 
Habermas then rejects Kantian attempt to define the limits of reason in favour of 
, ... a horizon of reason reaching beyond this drawing of boundaries' (ibid., 
p.302). To this end, Habermas seeks to locate the validity spheres of 'outer 
nature, inner nature and society' (ibid.) within a 'solidary social practice' 
modelled on Hegel's 'ethical totality' (Habermas 1987b, p.316). Thus while 
retaining' ... its purely procedural character as disburdened of all religious and 
metaphysical mortgages' communicative reason is viewed as ' ... directly 
implicated in social-life processes insofar as acts of mutual understanding take on 
the role for coordinating action' (Habermas 1987b, p.316). 
However, rather than seeking to re-internalize the economic system within the 
participatory lifeworld, Habermas seeks to incorporate the lifeworld within a 
systems-theoretic approach to self-constitution. Consequently, the 
comprehensiveness of communicative reason derives, not from its capacity to 
render the system accountable to intersubjective validity claims, but from its 
6 The tenn is more commonly translated as 'diremption', although Benhabib (1986) translates It as 
'bifurcation' . 
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capacity to act as a '... medium through which the lifeworld as a whole is 
reproduced' (Habermas 1987b, p.299). To this extent, the universality of 
communicative reason arises from its capacity to perform essential functions for 
'lifeworlds in general'. However, this means adopting a systems-theoretic 
approach in which '... interaction participants ... no longer appear as originators 
who master situations with the help of accountable actions, but as the products of 
the traditions in which they stand ... ' (ibid.). A similar change of perspective can 
be found in The Theory of Communicative Action Vol. II. 'These reflections 
suggest a change of method and of conceptual perspective, namely an 
objectivating view of the lifeworld as a system ... Survival imperatives require a 
functional integration of the lifeworld that takes effect in and through the 
symbolic structures of the lifeworld and cannot be grasped directly from the 
perspective of participants , (Habermas 1987a, pp.348-49). 
However, far from overcoming a subject-centred conception of reason, this only 
serves to exchange the micro-subject of individual agents, for what Benhabib 
calls an 'anonymous species-subject' that ascribes the ethical-interests of 
humanity to the self-reproducing characteristics of the system. To this extent, 
argues Benhabib, Habermas' s comprehensive conception of reason draws its 
power from a 'collective singularity' rather than 'the experience of moral and 
political activity from which a genuine "we" can emerge ... ' (Benhabib 1986, 
p.331). 'Habermas reverts to the discourse of the philosophy of the subject at 
those points in his theory when the reconstruction of the species competencies of 
an anonymous subject - humanity as such - does not remain merely an 
empirically fruitful research hypothesis, but assumes the role of a philosophical 
narrative of the formative history of the subject of history' (ibid., pp. 330-1). 
Thus, despite criticizing Nietzsche et al. for the 'destructive manner' in which 
they argue that ' ... the embodied, speaking and acting subject is not master in its 
own house ... ' (Habermas 1987b, p.310), but rather '... dependent upon 
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something prior, anonymous and transsubjective - be it the dispensation of Being, 
the accident of structural formation, or the generative power of some discourse 
formation ... ' (ibid.). Habermas now subsumes the intersubjective lifeworld 
within a transsubjective system which makes the self-constitution of the former a 
functional component of the latter. 
However, this is not the most dramatic reversal that Habermas's search for a 
comprehensive conception communicative reason undergoes. On the contrary, in 
one of the strangest passages to be found in Habermas' s work, he then argues that 
communicative reason comprises a 'disenchanted' version of Hegel's 
'unfathomable causality of fate' (Habermas 1987b, p.316). In pursuit of this 
putatively 'disenchanted' version, Habermas then associates Hegel's 'causality of 
fate' with the Judaic notion of a 'covenant between Yahweh and the people of 
Israel ... ' on the grounds that sociality is constituted by a 'dialectic of betrayal and 
avenging force' (ibid., p.325). To this end, Habermas quotes Klaus Heinrich's 
assertion that: 
Keeping the covenant with God is the symbol of fidelity; breaking 
this covenant is the model of betrayal. To keep faith with God is to 
keep faith with life-giving Being7 itself - in oneself and others. To 
deny it in any domain of being means breaking the covenant with 
God and betraying one's own foundation ... Thus betrayal of another 
is simultaneously betrayal of oneself; and every protest against 
betrayal is not just protests in one's own name, but in the name of the 
other at the same time ... (ibid.) 
Despite having asserted that the comprehensiveness of communicative reason 
must be obtained without 'religious and metaphysical mortgages' (op. cit.), 
Habermas now argues that 'The theory of communicative reason ... lets itself be 
guided by an intuition that can be expressed in the concepts of the Old Testament 
7 Not only does this fonnulation contradict Habennas's disenchanted employment of self-
constituting intersubjectivity, but also his critique of Lebensphilosophie. 
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... ' (ibid., p.325). This 'intuition' rests on the notion of a 'covenant' (Bundes) 
between 'partners' (Bundesgenosse), in which a crime against one another is also 
a cnme against one's self and the 'universal confederation' 
(Bundesgenossenschaft) in which all are united.8 It is then possible to discover 'In 
the restlessness of the real conditions of life, there broods an ambivalence that is 
due to the dialectic of betrayal and avenging force' (ibid., p.325). 
However, by tying Hegel's 'causality of fate' to an Old Testament conception of 
crime and punishment, Habermas exchanges an intersubjective form of 'ethical 
totality' for a transsubjective one based on a pre-modem form of 'cosmic 
morality'. Thus, rather than viewing 'crime' as an infringement of moral 
obligations which derive their validity from their intersubjective constitution, 
Habermas views such crimes as an infringement of a pre-constituted moral order 
whose obligatory structure transcends those regulated by it. But if, as Habermas 
argues, in his more democratic moments, normative solidarity is no stronger, 
deeper or broader than the rules we generate to govern ourselves, then anything 
above and beyond this comprises a 'crime' against the modem ethic of self-
constitution. To this extent, Habermas's own theologically inspired conception of 
a causality of fate 'betrays' the normative content of modernity, which 'avenges' 
itselfby invalidating Habermas's 'ethical totality'. 
Perhaps realizing that he has strayed too far from the legitimating principles of 
communicative reason, Habermas then attempts to steer a course back towards its 
human bearers.9 Thus, while continuing to appeal to the 'transcendental 
necessity' of 'fate' in opposition to the empirical reality of 'day to day 
communicative practices' (ibid., pp.325-6), Habermas argues that 'concrete 
8 The English translation obscures the key role played by the concept of bund (bond) and bundes 
(confederation) in these passages (see Habennas 1985, pp.377-378). 
9 It is worth recalling that the reason Habennas embarks on this journey is to sublate the 
'doublings' of transcendental and empirical subjectivity which arise from a subject-centred 
approach to sociality (ibid., p.298). 
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forms of life' manifest the normative properties of 'lifeworlds in general' (ibid.). 
However, these 'universal structures' of morality can only manifest themselves 
'through the medium of action orientated towards mutual understanding' (ibid.). 
To this extent, communicative reason comprises a medium through which the 
substantive content of morality discloses itself to the ethical world of human 
practices. 
What is most surpnSlng about the above discussion is the degree to which 
Habermas is willing to sacrifice his own ethic of self-constitution to a more 
comprehensive conception of intersubjectivity. However, this is a self-defeating 
exercise that at best confirms the suspicion of writers such as Foucault, with 
regard to the hubris of reason, and at worst mirrors the latter's own subsumption 
of human agency beneath a transsubjective system of power (Foucault 1977). In 
the event, it suggests that it is impossible to combine a modem ethic of self-
constitution with a universal approach to normativity. Thus, just as Hegel 
relinquishes the autonomy of modem individuals to the authority of Spirit, so 
Habermas subsumes practical reason beneath its functional other. Nevertheless, 
the entire legitimacy of communicative reason rests upon a universalistic 
conception of practical reason. Consequently, any attempt to circumvent this 
principle compromises the normative content of modernity and its claim that 
social rules are only valid if agreed to by all concerned. 
If we are, therefore, concerned to generate a comprehensive form of 
intersubjectivity, grounded in the modem ethic of self-constitution, it is necessary 
to 're-internalize' the economic system. Just how far this can proceed before 
threatening the conditions which make democratic participation possible can only 
be answered, as McCarthy notes, 'by testing and learning in different and 
changing circumstances' (McCarthy 1991, p.133). The role of critical theory 
should not, however, be to limit the scope of democratic participation in advance, 
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or employ 'technical' criteria which by-pass the normative content of modernity. 
On the contrary, critical theory should locate itself within the democratic forces 
unleashed by modernity and then seek to extend them throughout sociality as a 
whole. To quote McCarthy' ... for critical social theory, the "utopian" idea of 
self-conscious self-determination must remain a regulative idea, in light of which 
we might at least recognize when we are compromising and why' (ibid.). To this 
end, we argue that Habermas' s account of the uncoupling of system and lifeworld 
is flawed on both empirical and theoretical grounds. 
SYSTEM AND LIFEWORLD INTERDEPENDENCIES 
In the face of his inability to supplement his neo-Kantian conception of 'practical 
reason' with an Hegelian version of 'ethical totality' (Habermas 1990), Habermas 
evokes a form of 'exclusion model' to divide modem rationality into its 
'practical' and 'functional' forms.lO Having abandoned the attempt to sublate the 
dialectic of 'heteronomy' and 'autonomy' (Habermas 1987b, p.302), Habermas 
now adopts Kant's equation of the former with the technically practical realm 
and the latter with the morally practical realm (Kant 1987, p.lO).ll He then 
argues that ' ... the classical model of bureaucracy is right in one respect: actions 
within organizations falls under the premises of formally regulated domains of 
action' (Habermas 1987a, p.310). Thus, on the grounds that morality resides in 
the process of achieving consensus by communicative means, Habermas argues 
that insofar as 'inner organizational relations' do not manifest this requirement, 
they are 'ethically neutralized' (ibid., p.311). 
However, it remaIns unclear as to how far the 'uncoupling of system and 
lifeworld' serves to disconnect the former from the normative concerns of the 
lOWe do not, therefore, agree with Eva Knodt that the system/lifeworld distinction is 'rooted in the 
classical rational/irrational distinction' (Knodt 1994). 
11 Thus, just as Kant allocates labour to the heteronomous realm of 'political economy' (ibid., 
p.ll ), Habermas argues that the domination of labour is inseparable from its rationalization. 
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latter. In his reply to criticisms, Habermas (1991, p.257) argues that system and 
lifeworld overlap each other in a mutually dependent manner. Nevertheless, in his 
more recent accounts of the system-lifeworld divide (Habermas 1996), Habermas 
does little to assuage accusations of 'dualism'. On the contrary, the opposition 
between the two spheres appears to have grown starker the more Habermas 
foregoes Weber's 'instrumental' in favour of Luhmann's 'functional' approach to 
systems rationality (Habermas, 1996, p.353). It is, therefore, possible to argue 
that on empirical grounds alone Habermas fails to do justice to the 
interdependencies of modem sociality and hence the degree to which labour 
possesses a recognized normative content. Thus, according to Honneth, 'If 
capitalist societies are conceived ... as social orders in which system and 
lifeworld stand over against each other as autonomous spheres of action, two 
complementary fictions emerge: (1) the existence of a norm-free organization of 
action and (2) the existence of power-free spheres of communication' (Honneth 
1991, p.298). 
However, just as Honneth does not believe that there exists a pure realm in which 
the rational interest in 'universal morality' is realized, so he does not believe that 
its stands in opposition to an equally pure realm of 'instrumental action'. On the 
contrary, argues Honneth, the capacity of participants to intersubjectively 
influence the system is matched by the capacity of the economy's objective 
imperatives to influence the lifeworld. To this extent, argues Honneth, 'Actions 
produced in organizations such as management and administration not only 
remain dependent upon practices of social understanding ... they are also bound 
to a process of normative consensus formation ... ' (ibid., p.299). 
According to Stephen Bronner (1994, p.304), Habermas's distinction between 
system and lifeworld rests on the 'quasi-ontological' distinction between 
'material' and 'symbolic' forms of reproduction. However, this assumes that a 
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clear division exists between the system's commodification of 'material' 
resources, and the lifeworld's protection of 'symbolic' ones. Whereas, In 
practice, as Habermas himself acknowledges, social life comprises an 
overlapping and inter-penetrating nexus of material and symbolic entities. To this 
extent, the division between non-normatively and normatively structured 
behaviour is often more complex than Habermas's 'uncoupling' model allows. 
Hence, Habermas' s own attempt to clarify the situation by arguing that non-
normativity increases the more the system transcends participants ends, while 
normativity increases the more the lifeworld is accountable to the ends of 
participants (Habermas 1991, p.2S3). 
However, if this is the case, then both system and lifeworld are combinations of 
normative and non-normative structures that intersect and dissect one another in a 
complex unity of commercial, administrative and ethical relations. In other 
words, while the system can be said to 'jut out' of the lifeworld, it is also the 
case, as Arato and Cohen argue, that it remains firmly 'embedded' within the 
lifeworld (Arato and Cohen, 1992, p.134). To this extent Habermas's assertion 
that the normative content of modernity is limited to communicative action 
appears unduly restrictive. Even in such strongly market-orientated societies as 
the United States, Michael Walzer (1983) argues that it is possible to identify at 
least fourteen forms of 'blocked exchanges' which serve to restrict the system's 
capacity to commodify social activities (ibid., p.100). This includes legislation 
relating to 'The eight-hour day, minimum wage laws, health and safety 
regulations ... ' all of which serve to '... establish basic standards, below which 
workers cannot bid against one another for employment' (ibid., p.1 02). 
By the same token, Claus Offe (1992) provides an empirically sensitive account 
of the way economic systems rely for their day to day operations on normatively 
charged 'associative relations' (ibid., p.76) which serve to '... constitute 
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environments of action that, on the one hand, allow questions of fairness and 
mutual obligation to be raised, if only among the members of narrow 
communities, while, on the other hand, they allow participants to be shielded 
from unresolvable expectations and the risk of standing alone with the "right" 
kind of action' (Offe 1992, p.83). If this is the case than not only are putatively 
'non-normative' systems reliant on 'normative' networks to integrate and protect 
their members, but also intersubjectively constituted forms of normativity extend 
far beyond symbolic attempts to achieve mutual understanding. Unfortunately, 
Habermas's norm-free conception of social labour overlooks the degree to which 
participants are imbedded within normative structures during their working lives. 
Although Habermas continues to draw on Weber's economistic contention that 
labour comprises a technical resource equivalent to all other 'factors of 
production', organizational theory has long since recognized the normative 
content of 'human capital'. This is reflected in the literature of what was once 
referred to as 'personnel management' and is now indicatively called 'human 
resources'. The plethora of books on 'ethical business practices' demonstrate that 
even the managers of commercial organizations recognize the need to treat labour 
in a normatively informed manner - if only to fulfil their corporate ends. To this 
extent, there has been a move from away from 'neo-classical' accounts of labour 
toward 'social-economic' accounts that emphasize the uniquely ethical aspects of 
'human labour' (Ray and Reed 1994). It would therefore appear that modem 
management possesses a more 'enlightened' view of the normative claims of 
their workforce than the instrumental one Habermas takes from Weber, although 
even Habermas acknowledges that 'The lifeworlds of members, never completely 
husked away, penetrate here into the reality of organizations' (Habermas 1987a, 
p.311). 
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Although there is undoubtedly some truth in Habermas' s suggestion that the 
system transcends the normative obligations of the lifeworld, this applies more to 
the objective steering mechanisms which regulate the economy as a whole, than 
the internal life of firms. On the contrary, each firm can be said to comprise a 
quasi-lifeworld in its own right mediating between the normative claims of its 
personnel and the impersonal imperatives of the economy. Unfortunately, 
because Habermas relies on an etiolated conception of normativity as 
'communicative action' orientated to 'mutual understanding', this leaves little 
room for a more substantive account of intersubjectivity embodied in the 
institutional structures of organizations. 
This, however, is a two-edged sword insofar as the normative incorporation of 
labour into the mission statement of the firm generates a corresponding set of 
moral obligations designed to bind the former into the latter. The recognition that 
labour is more than a mere 'factor of production' then creates a normative basis 
from which workers can oppose forms of regulation that run contrary to their 
claims to participation. However, before taking up the question of worker's 
struggles in the next chapter, we shall examine the problems generated for 
Habermas's theory of discourse ethics by his attempt to exempt labour from the 
normative content of modernity. 
THE LIMITS OF DISCOURSE ETHICS 
As we have seen, Habermas is just as concerned to protect the system from the 
lifeworld as he is to protect the lifeworld from the system. However, the 
difficulty arises in determining where the legitimate reach of one ends and the 
other begins. 12 According to Habermas, each is organized on the basis of an 
12 According to Sitton, the persuaviness of Habennas' s theory: ' ... depends on whether this specific 
compartmentalization of instrumental action and the communicative action which produces 
solidarity can be sustained' (Sitton 1996, p.189). 
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opposed form of reason. Consequently, in the absence of a more comprehensive 
conception of rationality, we must either deploy functional reason to determine 
the limits of practical reason, or vice versa. However, whereas the discussion on 
Marx would indicate that Habermas employs the system-theoretic standpoint of 
functional reason to determine the legitimate limits of practical reason, this 
contradicts his own contention that 'Ultimately, there is only one criterion by 
which beliefs can be judged valid, and that is that they are based on agreement 
reached by argumentation' (Habermas 1990, p.l4). In which case, even the 
etiolated conception of normativity enshrined in Habennas' s procedural account 
of discourse ethics, remains committed to an 'ethical totality' grounded in right of 
participants to constitute their own sociality. This is borne out by the social 
conditions which make discourse ethics possible, namely '... the complete 
inclusion of all parties that might be affected, their equality, free and easy 
interaction, no restrictions of topics and topical contributions, the possibility of 
revising the outcomes etc.' (Habennas 1992b, p.449). Nevertheless, despite 
affirming a set of principles which allows for no prior restrictions on topics, 
topical contributions or revising of outcomes (op. cit.), Habennas continues to 
assert that the economy and its state apparatus comprise ' ... systemically 
integrated action fields that can no longer be transfonned democratically from 
within ... without damage to their proper systemic logic and therewith their ability 
to function' (Habermas 1992b, p.449). 
At one level the tension between these two formulations arises from Habermas' s , 
contention that, having slipped out of the nonnative content of modernity, the 
system must be judged on the basis of epistemological as opposed to nonnative 
validity claims. However, this not only assumes that the system's 'ability to 
function' is damaged by greater democracy from within but we should also 
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choose the former over the latter.I3 It is, of course, always possible to argue, as 
Bowles and Gintis (1986) do, that enhanced democracy brings with it enhanced 
efficiency, but even if this were not the case, any trade off that might exist 
between the two remains a normative question for discourse ethics to deliberate 
upon. 
To this extent, Habermas's claim that the system's lack of normative content is a 
function of its concern with efficiency ignores the fact that questions of efficiency 
retain a normative content. As we shall see when we come to consider 'welfare 
economics' in chapter eight, efficiency is a key criterion for judging the degree to 
which the system fulfils the ends of its participants. How then can we account for 
Habermas's contention that efficiency is a non-normative criterion best suited to 
'cognitive' validity claims? One explanation for this concerns the way in which 
the system itself tends to privilege efficiency over autonomy. Thus, while there is 
nothing intrinsic to the criterion of efficiency, there is something inherent to the 
autopoietic system which by-passes normative validity claims. In particular, the 
imperative to subordinate the autonomy of workers to the efficient use of labour 
arises from the competitive nature of the system. This then forces all other firms 
in the same sector to follow suit or find alternative means to increase profitability. 
Consequently while we would agree with Eva Knodt that Habermas's ' ... choice 
of system's theoretical framework precludes the idea of a normative centre that 
would allow modem society to form a critical consciousness of itself as a whole 
and thus take control of its own evolution' (Knodt 1994, p.98). We would add 
that it is not Habermas's choice of a systems-theoretic framework which 
'precludes' democratic participation, but rather the system itself; that Habermas 
then seeks to legitimate on the basis of a systems-theoretic framework. 
13 As LeGrand and Robinson note, it is relatively easy to increase the efficacy of the criminal 
justice system by compromising the liberties of citizens (LeGrand and Robinson 1984). 
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Habermas's recent account of law in Between Facts and Nonns (more accurately 
translated as Facticity and Validity), concerns the relationship between social 
facts and social validity. To this extent Habennas seeks to justify the application 
of functional reason to the system on the grounds that 'in reality' it eschews 
normative regulation. However, the mere fact that the system excludes 
participation (and as we have seen this is less clear cut than Habennas contends), 
does not mean that it is valid. On the contrary, in opposition to Durkheim's 
positivistic call to treat social facts as things, critical theory has responded with 
its own call to treat social facts as reified social relations. In the light of 
Habermas's re-formulation of critical theory along intersubjective lines, this can 
then be re-stated as 'treat social facts as reified fonns of nonnativity' .14 To this 
extent, Habermas' s own approach to nonnativity contains a more radical content 
than he is willing to acknowledge - as when he argues that 'Only in an 
emancipated society, whose members' autonomy and responsibility (Mundigkeit) 
have been realized, would communication have developed into the non-
authoritarian and universally practised dialogue from which both our model of 
reciprocally constituted ego-identity and our idea of true consensus are always 
implicitly derived' (Habermas 1972, p.314). 
Kant could escape the practical ramifications of his 'kingdom of ends' by calling 
on subjects to transcend the material interests which divided them. Habennas too, 
despite McCarthy's denial that he is attempting to renew 'transcendental 
philosophy' (McCarthy 1990, p.ix) , also affinns the existence of 'weak 
transcendental arguments' (Habennas 1990, p.32). Habennas's reasons for 
preserving the tradition of 'transcendental philosophy' are two-fold. On the one 
14 In a revealing passage from Between Facts and Norms, Habermas asserts that 'we' used to 
believe society could govern itself as a whole ' ... through the media of law and political power. 
Today we know better, now that sociological analyses have enlightened us about the actual 
circulation of power' (Habermas 1996, p.482). However, this not only assumes the existence of a 
sociological consensus on the question of power, but it also assumes 'the actual circulation of 
power' is immutable. 
153 
hand, it serves to confer unconditional status upon the underlying structures of 
discourse ethics while, on the other hand, it serves to lift the 'ideal speech 
situation' above the world from which it is practically absent. 
Nevertheless, Habermas's decision to ground the nonnative content of modernity 
in a transcendental ideal is 'janus-faced', insofar as it serves both to maintain the 
potential for critical theory in a world in which it is absent and to abstract the 
process of consensus formation from a world riven by social dissent. Thus, when 
Habermas informs us the 'ideal speech situation' is little more than a 
'methodological fiction' (Habennas 1996, p.323), whose 'ideal' consensus has 
only a 'virtual relation to action' (ibid., p.113), this serves to negate its practical 
affect and hence its critical content. The result is an extremely flexible theory 
which permits Habermas - in his more conservative moments - to retreat into a 
set of transcendental formulations which make few demands upon the autopoietic 
set up of the economy, while also sustaining a far more radical approach which 
calls on all rationally motivated individuals to generate a state of 'undamaged 
intersubjectivity' in which the ideal speech situation is realized. 
However, Habermas's discourse ethics is more than a set of fonnal principles by 
which individuals are called upon to mentally test their actions. On the contrary, 
unlike Kant's 'monological' account of nonnativity, Habennas's 'dialogical' 
account is intersubjectively institutionalized in the 'public sphere' (Offenlichkeit). 
For this reason, Habermas is concerned that his attempt to transfer nonnative 
content from labour to 'the transcending force of universalistic validity claims' 
does not '... reestablish an idealism that is incompatible with the naturalistic 
insights of historical materialism' (Habermas 1987b, p.321). To protect against 
this eventuality, Habermas grounds the transcendental-ideal of practical reason in 
an actual-empirical form of life which 'meets it halfway' (Habennas 1996, 
pp.113, 302 and 358). 'Naturally, even a proceduralized "popular sovereignty" ... 
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cannot operate without the support of an accommodating political culture, 
without the basic attitudes, mediated by tradition and socialization, of a 
population accustomed to political freedom: rational political will fonnation 
cannot occur unless a rationalized lifeworld meets it halfway' (Habennas 1996, 
p.487). 
To this extent, Habermas recognizes that if discourse ethics is to be effective in 
the face of the system's capacity to neutralize nonnative steering mechanisms, it 
must assume an institutional form capable of wielding the levers of power. 
However, the more discourse ethics assumes an historically grounded fonn, the 
more it must be in a position to give an account of the social conditions which 
make it possible. In other words if 'A communicative power of this kind can 
develop only in undeformed public spheres ... from structures of undamaged 
intersubjectivity found in non-distorted communication' (ibid., p.148), then it is 
incumbent on Habermas, according to Georgina Warkner (1995), to supplement 
his 'top down' with a 'bottom up' approach grounded in ' ... forms of life, cultural 
values, and tradition through which people find their lives meaningful' (ibid., 
p.133). 
However, while Warkner is concerned to explore the impact of this fonnulation 
on the Ii feworld, we are more interested in its implications for the system. A 
similar consideration prompts Nancy Fraser to ask Habermas 'Isn't economic 
equality - the end of class structure and the end of gender equality - the condition 
for the possibility of a public sphere, if we are talking about what makes it 
possible for people to participate. Is capitalism compatible with this? (Fraser 
1994, p.469). Habermas's response is to accuse Fraser of adopting a 'utopian 
socialist' standpoint. But this is to miss the point of Fraser's question, which calls 
on Habermas to acknowledge the extent to which his own conception of 
discourse ethics retains a 'utopian socialist' dimension, insofar as 'moral 
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consensus' is only possible in a fonn of society in which all can participate 
equally. 
To this extent, the scope of the charge of 'damaged intersubjectivity' remains 
deeply equivocal. On the one hand, Habennas limits it to the lifeworld, in order 
to legitimate the system's capacity to escape from nonnative content while, on 
the other hand, he expands it to include the right of all participants to participate 
in what Michael Oakeshott calls the 'conversation of humanity'. However, this 
equivocation cannot remain undecided insofar as it cuts across lines of class 
conflict. Thus, when Habennas employs functional reason to legitimate the 
economy's 'ethical neutralization' of labour, he aligns himselfwith the interest of 
capital. 15 Whereas when Habennas employs practical reason to legitimate the 
universal right of participants to detennine the nature of their own sociality, he 
aligns himself with Cohen and Arato' s claim that the system comprises a fonn of 
'reified' intersubjectivity which resists the setting up of 'democratic publics 
within the finn and the state ... ' (Cohen and Arato 1992, p.l37). 
To this extent, the struggle between functional and practical reason goes to the 
heart of modernity's attitude to labour. Or to put it another way, the 'labour 
question' continues to pose a real dilemma for the nonnative content of 
modernity. However, while Habennas's account can be read as providing this 
dilemma with a nonnative foundation, he is unable to resolve it. This is partly 
because Habennas refuses to view labour as a fonn of 'damaged 
intersubjectivity', and partly because labour remains alienated from the 
nonnative content of modernity. Nevertheless, Habennas's account raises the 
possibility of reconciling discourse ethics with labour in a mutually beneficial 
way. 
15 Hence, John Keane's assertion that when it comes to production for Habermas ' ... everything and 
everybody must fall silent. Work is that process through which those who labour are at most 
instrumentaum vocale, mere speaking tools .. .' (Keane 1984, p.205). 
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Thus, insofar as discourse ethics, in the absence of labour, lacks material 
'facticity', while labour in the absence of discourse ethics, lacks normative 
'validity', the inclusion of workers within the normative content of modernity 
goes some way to resolving both; (a) the lack of substance which Habermas's 
account inherits from Kant; and (b) the lack of ethical principles which Marx's 
account of labour evinces. However, this would be a purely 'academic' exercise 
if workers themselves did not experience their labour as a form of 'damaged 
intersubjectivity' which they then sought to repair. Hence the importance of 
Honneth's attempt to develop a more comprehensive conception of social 
solidarity, one based on workers' own struggles to gain inclusion within, and an 
expansion of, the normative content ofmodemity. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: 
STRUGGLES FOR MORAL REDEMPTION 
In contradistinction to Habermas, Axel Honneth seeks to extend the normative 
content of modernity to labour in relation to the former's own struggles for 
inclusion in the latter. Thus, much of Honneth's early work is concerned to 
expand Habermas' s theory of communicative reason to the struggles of workers 
for moral autonomy. Although Honneth' s more recent work on 'recognition' 
makes no direct reference to Habermas,16 it remains part of a continuing debate 
with, and an attempt to enlarge the parameters of, Habermas' s moral theory. We 
begin therefore by outlining Honneth's direct engagement with Habermas, before 
turning to his recent work on recognition. 
In an early essay entitled 'Work and Instrumental Action: On the Normative 
Basis of Critical Theory', Honneth criticizes Habermas for arguing, in support of 
Weber, that the 'de-moralization' (Entmoralisierung) of labour is a function of its 
'instrumental' character. 
A critical concept of work must grasp categorically the difference 
between an instrumental act in which the working subj ect structures 
and regulates his own activity on his own initiative, according to his 
own knowledge, in a self-contained process, and an instrumental act 
in which neither the accompanying controls nor the object-related 
structures of the activity is left to the initiative of the working 
subject. (Honneth 1995a, p.46) 
Against Habermas's claim that the 'de-normatization' of labour is an inevitable 
by-product of the instrumentalization of production, Honneth argues it is not the 
undertaking of instrumental acts per se which rob workers of their autonomy but 
the fact they are not under the control of the 'working subject'. Thus, against 
16 There is a single reference to Habennas in the Preface to Struggles for Recognition (1995b) 
thanking him for overseeing the fIrst half of the book which was submitted as a Habilitation. 
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Habennas, Honneth argues that it is possible to ' ... recognize the existence of a 
type of moral-practical knowledge which is based not upon the consciousness of 
systemically distorted relations of communication, but the experience of the 
destruction of true acts of work' (ibid., p.47). 
Honneth then criticizes Habennas for failing to recognize that moral damage is 
not restricted to impaired communication but extends to the 'destruction' of 
worker's right to control their own labour process. 'The valid nonnative claim 
which thus comes to expression results from a moral vulnerability which grows 
not from the suppression of communicative modes of mutual understanding but 
from the expropriation [En teign ung] of the workers' own [eigenes] work 
activity'17 (ibid., p.47). Nevertheless, Honneth's attempts to re-nonnatize labour 
are vulnerable to Habennas's critique of 'subject-centred thinking' insofar as 
'true acts of work' are viewed by Honneth as 'immanent' to the 'inner logic' of 
labour, rather than historically emergent consequences of workers' struggles to 
assert their autonomy. 
In a slightly later work, 'Moral Consciousness and Class Domination' (Honneth 
1995a), Honneth returns again to the theme of connecting labour and morality. 
This time, however, he explicitly combines it with a theory of social struggle that 
seeks to combine Marx's analysis of class with Habennas's analysis of 
nonnativity. Thus, according to Honneth, ' ... a social analysis derived from 
Marxism must see as its task today the identification of moral conflicts connected 
to the social class structure which are hidden behind late capitalism's facade of 
integration' (ibid., p.215). 
17 Echoes of Marcuse's early attempts to incorporate Heidegger's conception of 'authentic self-
possession' (Eigentlichkeit) into critical theory can be heard in Honneth's account. 
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Honneth's starting point is the post-war Frankfurt School's contention that ' ... 
late capitalist state interventionism dries up the political and practical interests of 
wage workers by means of a policy of material compensations and the 
institutional integration of the wage policy of the labour unions' (ibid., p.216). 
Having accepted this formulation, Honneth then argues that it has not brought an 
end to class injustices. On the contrary, it has merely changed their form from 
one based on 'the unequal distribution of material goods' to one based on 'the 
asymmetrical distribution of cultural and psychological life chances' (ibid., 
p.217).18 In particular, Honneth cites the' ... mal distribution of opportunities for 
cultural education, social honour, and identity-guaranteeing work. .. ' (ibid., 
p.218). 
Drawing on the work of Sennett and Cobb (1972), Honneth then seeks to expand 
the criteria of social injustice to include the 'hidden injuries' which arise from the 
'unequal distribution of social dignity' (ibid., p.218). In the process, Honneth 
focuses on 'lower, primarily manually employed occupational groups' insofar as 
they are motivated to struggle for 'recognition', 'esteem', 'honour', 'dignity' and 
'respect' (ibid., p.218). However, because these groups lack '... the identity 
supporting recognition structure of a collective social movement ... practical 
reactions to these daily experiences of injustice are limited to individual or group-
specific constructions of a 'counter culture of compensatory respect ... ' (ibid., 
p.218). 
Thus, despite experiencing a deficiency of 'social dignity', their lack of 'coherent 
linguistic expression ... ' (ibid., p.219) renders 'lower class workers' incapable of 
articulating their injuries in a politically recognizable form. Consequently, it falls 
to social scientists (such as Honneth) to recognize' ... labour struggles, which lie 
18 Although the two are not mutually exclusive insofar as 'The existence of class society based 
upon the unequal market chances of individual productive agents ... results in a lasting inequality 
in the distribution of chances or social recognition' (ibid., p.218). 
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below the threshold of publicly recognized nonnative conflict, as indicators of a 
consciousness of injustice which implicitly lays claim to the right to the 
autonomous organization of work' (ibid., p.219). However, it is unclear why 
Honneth restricts his account to the morally inspired struggles of 'lower class 
workers'. After all if, as he claims, increases in standards of living cause class 
struggle to be deflected from 'material' towards 'immaterial' goods, then this 
should primarily affect the pattern of struggles amongst 'higher' class workers 
who have less reason to struggle for material rewards. It is, therefore, difficult to 
understand why Honneth abstracts from the more highly paid and often better 
organized sections of the labour force in favour of its less well paid and often 
poorly organized sections. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to deduce the general trajectory of Honneth's work 
from these early attempts to re-combine labour and morality, insofar as workers 
not only continue to suffer from 'moral' injuries but also struggle against them. 
However, in order to provide this standpoint with a finner moral foundation, 
Honneth turns to Hegel's early writings in order to excavate those ' ... fonns of 
recognition that can be shown to serve as necessary preconditions for individual 
self-realization' (Honneth 1995b, p.173). 
STRUGGLES FOR RECOGNITION 
Honneth's account in Struggles for Recognition (1995b) continues to have much 
in common with Habennas' s, insofar as it is concerned to deduce from 
historically specific social practices a transcendental set of universal elements 
which make 'self-realization' possible. 
In contrast to those movements that distance themselves from Kant, 
this concept of the good should not be conceived as the expression of 
substantive values that constitute the ethos of a concrete tradition-
based community. Rather, it has to do with the structural elements of 
ethical life, which, from the general point of view of the 
communicative enabling of self-realization, can be normatively 
extracted from the plurality of all particular forms of life. (ibid., 
p.172) 
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Thus, while seeking to both broaden and deepen the normative ideals that 
underlie Habermas' s conception of communicative reason, Honneth retains the 
latter's commitment to a general account of morality common to and yet 
independent of 'all particular forms of life' (op. cit.). Honneth then turns to 
Hegel's early writings,19 on the grounds that they comprise an attempt to re-think 
social struggles along normative lines. 
In his early writings, Hegel begins a lifelong critique of Kant's attempt to oppose 
a transcendental form of morality to the material interests of empirical subjects. 
Against Kant, Hegel argues that the pursuit of material interests is imbedded 
within a deeper network of moral interests that arise from human beings' need for 
social validation. Thus, whereas Hobbes interprets property struggles as injurious 
to an individual's material well being, Hegel interprets them as injurious to their 
moral dignity. As evidence for this, Hegel cites the propensity for injured parties 
to engage in a life and death struggle that subordinates self-preservation to social-
recognition. From this, Hegel concludes that the resolution of these conflicts 
requires not a Leviathan state with the monopoly of violence, but a set of morally 
sanctioned property rights capable of determining the legitimacy of ownership 
claims (ibid., p.47). 
Honneth sees in Hegel's reinterpretation of Hobbes an ' ... epoch-making new 
version of the conception of social struggle, according to which practical conflict 
between subjects can be understood as an ethical moment in a movement 
19 Specifically System of Ethical Life (Sittlichkeit) 180211803, First Philosophy of Spirit 
180311804 (formally known as Realphilosophie), Jena Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit 
180511806 (previously known as Realphilosophie II) and Hegel's 'Natural Law' essay 
(1802/1803). See Honneth 1995b, page 183. 
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occumng within a collective social life' (ibid., p.17).20 However, because it 
remains grounded in a 'metaphysical' world view, Honneth turns to the social 
psychology of George Herbert Mead to provide a 'naturalistic' counterweight to 
the former's 'speculative' account of social recognition. Honneth is drawn to 
Mead's account because, like that of Hegel's, it is based on a prior conception of 
mutual dependence (Mead 1970) in which individual identity arises from 
intersubj ective processes of validation. Nevertheless, Honneth is also dissatisfied 
with the empirical and historical aspects of Meads approach, insofar as it lacks a 
'post-conventional' view of morality (Honneth 1995b, p.l09). To this extent, 
Honneth seeks to combine Mead's 'naturalization' of Hegel with an Hegelian 
'universalization' of Mead, in order to generate a general conception of 
recognition relations above and beyond their specific historical context (ibid., 
p.llO). This, however, creates a tension in Honneth's writings between (a) an 
intersubjective conception of recognition based on the standpoint of participants 
and (b) transsubjective conception of recognition based on a philosophy of 
history. Nevertheless, while Honneth is aware of the risks associated with the 
absolutizing of 'historical prejudices', he believes it is the only way to arrive at a 
general account of the intersubjective conditions which make human autonomy 
possible (ibid., p.176). 
To this end, Honneth adopts Hegel's early attempt to generate a philosophy of 
history based on the idea that just as unredeemed relationships of recognition 
spark social struggle, so social struggle serve to expand relationships of 
recognition. Honneth then seeks to extract from Hegel's writings a theory of 
moral development which progresses through 'three stages of social conflict' 
(ibid., p.23) beginning with the concrete-particular sphere of family-life, moving 
on to the abstract-universal sphere of law (recht) and culminating in the concrete-
20 One would think to read Honneth that Hobbes reduces all recognition claims to economic ones 
when in fact Hobbes also argues that "The public worth of a man, which is the Value set on him 
by the Common-wealth is that which men commonly call DIGNITY" (Hobbes 1968, p.lS2). 
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universal sphere of moral solidarity. To this extent, Honneth finds in Hegel's 
early writings a distinction between three fonns of recognition: 
... in th~ a.ff~ctive relationship of recognition found in the family, 
human IndIvIduals are recognized as concrete creatures of need' in 
the cogniza~t-formal relationship of recognition found in law, they 
are recognIzed as abstract legal persons; and finally, in the 
emotionally enlightened relationship of recognition found in the 
State, they are recognized as concrete universals, that is as subjects 
who are socialized in their particularity. (ibid., p.2S) 
Honneth then attempts to reconstruct Hegel's theory of 'moral development' in 
order to generate a conception of 'intersubjectivity in general'. 
THREE STEPS TO HEAVEN? 
Step One: Love 
According to Honneth, love represents for Hegel the ' ... first stage of reciprocal 
recognition, because in it subjects mutually confinn each other with regard to the 
concrete nature of their needs and thereby recognize each other as needy 
creatures' (ibid., p.95). To this extent it is restricted to the 'private sphere' of 
friendships, partnerships and parent-child relationships and is not amenable to 
moral development. To further illustrate this stage, Honneth turns to the writings 
of Donald Winnicott on the grounds that his 'object-relations' approach is well 
suited to a 'phenomenology of recognition' (ibid., p.98). In particular, Honneth is 
taken by Winnicott's suggestion that adult maturity is ' ... dependent on the 
capacity, acquired in early childhood, to strike a balance between symbiosis and 
self-assertion' (ibid.). Thus, according to Winnicott, at a certain stage in its 
development the child will act aggressively towards its 'mother' in order to test 
whether 'she' exists in 'her' own right (ibid., pp. 101-2). 'If the "mother" 
managed to pass the child's unconscious test by enduring the aggressive attacks 
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without withdrawing her (sic) love in revenge, she (sic) now belongs, from the 
perspective of the child, to a painfully accepted external world' (ibid., p.104). 
Through this process each comes to recognize the other as not only dependent on 
them for 'love' but also an independent being in their own right. Children who 
succeed in passing through this developmental stage then go on to become 
normal, healthy and autonomous adults.21 'This fundamental level of emotional 
confidence ... which the intersubjective experience of love helps to bring about, 
constitutes the psychological precondition for the development of all further 
attitudes of self-respect' (ibid., p.107). 
Nevertheless, the question remains as to whether Winnicott's approach can, as 
Honneth argues, be viewed as an 'ideal of interaction' (ibid.) or whether it 
comprises an historically specific 'idealization' of post-war family forms. 
Honneth himself is critical of Hegel's attempts to universalize the 'patriarchal 
model of bourgeois family relations' (ibid., p.176), but Winnicott can also be 
criticized for universalizing a specific white, middle class, patriarchal family 
form of 1950s' America, as expressed in his view that confident adult roles are 
the consequence of children's relationship with their 'mother's'. Thus, while 
Honneth's use of the term 'mother' (in inverted commas) is meant, according to 
his translator ' ... to designate a role that can be fulfilled by persons other than the 
biological mother' (ibid., p.xiii), this convention also serves to perpetuate the 
patriarchal assumption it is designed to subvert - as evidenced by the lack of scare 
quotes around female pronouns. At the same time, the focus on the maternal 
relationship abstracts from the child's wider relationships to the intersubjective 
world of parents, relatives, carers and siblings along with non-conventional 
family forms. 
21 According to Honneth, 'instrumentalism' only arises in 'pathological' cases in which 'egocentric 
independence' or 'symbiotic dependence' turn into 'disorders' such as 'masochism' and 
'sadism' (ibid., p.106). 
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However, what makes this particularly noteworthy is Honneth's attempt to 
deduce 'invariant basic structures' from Winnicott's writings on post-war family 
life, which can then function as objective yardsticks for the determination of 
family 'pathology', 'disorder' and 'deviation'22 (ibid., p.106). Not only does this 
assume that the creation of emotionally confident adults is the privilege of one 
specific model of family life, but it also assumes that experts, such as Winnicott 
and by extension Honneth, can then judge all others by this 'invariant' standard. 
In which case, questions of 'normalcy' and 'pathology' acquire an objective 
status that transcends the intersubjective evaluations of participants. 
This, in tum, is linked to Honneth's claim that the 'private sphere' does' ... not 
admit of the potential for normative development.' However, even a casual 
observer will have noted the radical changes family structures have undergone in 
recent years, changes that are due in no small part to the struggles of women to 
gain greater social recognition and autonomy. As a consequence of such 
struggles, feminine identities are no longer so rigidly constituted by domestic 
duties and nurturing roles, while masculine identities are no longer so rigidly 
constituted by the public sphere and the world of work. Thus, in their struggles to 
achieve a more symmetrical form of citizenship-identity with men feminists, 
armed with the slogan 'the personal is political', have not only succeeded in 
bringing about changes in their own social status but also that of men's. 
Unfortunately these changes find no expression in Honneth's timeless account of 
family life.23 Consequently, there is no sense of the way developments within the 
'private sphere' spill over into the 'public sphere' and vice versa. 
22 One is reminded that Winnicott viewed feminism as a form of 'abnormality' (Winnicott 1986, 
p.188). 
23 Although Honneth does argue that freedom is enhanced the 'more rights come to be shared by 
partners' (ibid., p.107). 
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Step Two: Rights 
When we come to the 'stage' of law or rights (Recht) we find ourselves already 
located within a public sphere which - unlike the private - is subject to the 
progressive dynamic of moral development. Herein Honneth stresses the role of 
the bourgeoisie in struggling to free themselves from the status-bound 
evaluations of feudalism. To this extent, the bourgeoisie playa key role in 
generating a universalistic conception of 'legality' which underlies the modem 
notion of autonomous individuality. However, against Mead's assertion that legal 
rights arise from a specific 'concrete-community' (ibid., p.l09), Honneth argues 
they possess a 'post-conventional' character in keeping with Hegel's philosophy 
of history. 'With the transition to modernity, the post-conventional principles of 
justification that had already been developed in philosophy and political theory 
made their way into established law ... ' (ibid.). 
With the advent of modernity, the legal system expresses the 'universal interests 
of all members of society' (ibid.) insofar as each agrees to recognize all others' ... 
as persons capable of autonomously making reasonable decisions about moral 
norms' (ibid., p.ll 0). However, while the recognition of individuals as 'ends in 
themselves', to use Kant's phrase, knows of no further development, the 
conditions under which individuals are free to exercise their autonomy can be 
expanded. Thus, the more individuals are enabled by social circumstances to act 
in an autonomous manner, the more relations of recognition are expanded 
throughout society. 
Having generated a 'post-conventional' conception of civil rights, the bourgeoisie 
finds itself under pressure 'from below' by 'disadvantaged groups' struggling to 
expand citizenship rights beyond the legal-sphere. Honneth then turns to I.H. 
Marshall's writings (1973) on citizenship to support the claim that workers could 
only avail themselves of 'bourgeois liberties' when 'the appropriate preconditions 
were present for equal participation in a rational agreement' (Honneth 1995b, 
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p.115). The importance of Marshall's work for Honneth lies in its progressive 
conception of citizenship rights beginning with (a) civil rights that guarantee 
individual liberty, to (b) political rights that guarantee participation, and 
culminating in (c) social rights that guarantee basic welfare needs (ibid.). In 
particular, Honneth is keen to stress the extent to which the expansion of 'rights' 
is a consequence of social struggle by disadvantaged groups, insofar as they can 
only fully take advantage of legal rights if they acquire political rights and only 
fully take advantage of political right if they acquire welfare rights. In other 
words, '... to be involved as morally responsible persons, individuals need not 
only legal protection from interference in their sphere of liberty, but also the 
legally assured opportunity for participation in the public process of will-
formation, an opportunity they can only actually take advantage of, however, if 
they also have a certain social standard of living' (ibid., p.117). 
However, it is symptomatic of Honneth's culturalist account of recognition that 
he says little about the connection between the extension of citizenship rights and 
the role of the welfare state in moderating market forces. Thus, rather than 
analyzing the third and final 'stage' of social solidarity as a further expression of 
worker's struggles to attain social recognition, above and beyond that allocated 
by the market, Honneth treats the former in abstraction from the latter. 
Step Three: Solidarity 
According to Honneth, the sphere of solidarity arises from the need to evaluate 
individuals as the bearers of particular skills in terms of their specific contribution 
to the life of the community. However, Honneth rejects Mead's assertion that it is 
possible to relate the determination of social worth to the division of labour. 'The 
solution which Mead envisions here involves linking self-realization to engaging 
in socially useful work. The degree of recognition accorded to persons who, 
within the context of the societal division of labour, fulfil their functions "well" is 
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enough to help them develop a consciousness of their individual particularity' 
(ibid., p.88). 
Against Mead, Honneth contends that ' ... the evaluation of the various functional 
jobs depends, for its part, on the over arching goals of the community' (ibid., 
p.90). In Habermasian terms this is equivalent to arguing that the social validity 
accorded different occupations arises not from the economic system but from the 
cultural lifeworld. Hence, Honneth's attempt to link social recognition to the 
abstract goals of society through a notion of 'value-community' 
(Wertgemeinschaft) in which '... "prestige" or "standing" signifies only the 
degree of social recognition ... the individual earns for his or her form of self-
realization by thus contributing, to a certain extent, to the practical realization of 
society's abstractly defined goals' (ibid., p.126). 
Nevertheless, Honneth's precipitous rejection of Mead's approach leaves the 
nature of the relationship between the value-community and the economic sphere 
of market-value largely untheorized. It remains unclear as to whether Honneth 
sees the relationship between social solidarity and economic forces as one in 
which (a) the former compliments the latter, as in Parsonian functionalism, where 
the 'common value system' reflects the values of industrial capitalism, or (b) 
social solidarity is designed to moderate and ameliorate the latter, as in the case 
of Marshall's approach to social citizenship? 
Although economIC relationships form an important backdrop to Honneth' s 
account of recognition, Honneth is content to view social value as a cultural form 
that compliments but does not coincide with economic forms of value.2~ 
24 Honneth defmes 'value' predominantly in cultural tenns, whether in the fonn of 'cultural self-
understandings' which function to 'realize culturally defmed goals' (ibid., p.122) or in the form 
of 'cultural conflict' between groups who deploy 'symbolic force' to control 'the cllIDate of 
public attention' (ibid., p.l27). 
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However, for such a close observer of Habermas's work, Honneth fails to 
respond to the former's all important attempt to 'uncouple' economic system and 
cultural lifeworld. This is responsible for generating a number of theoretical 
lacunae that call into question the comprehensiveness of Honneth' s approach to 
morality with regard to the role played by market-capitalism in underpinning 
modem forms of social recognition and individual autonomy. 
MONEY, MARKETS AND MORALITY 
As we have seen, Honneth develops a recognition-theoretic approach in order to 
reveal the neglected role of moral claims in motivating class struggle. 'The 
motives for rebellion, protest, and resistance have generally been transformed 
into categories of "interest" and these interests are supposed to emerge from the 
objective inequalities in the distribution of material opportunities without ever 
being linked, in any way, to the everyday web of moral feelings' (Honneth 
1995b, p.161), whereas Honneth is concerned to re-connect social struggle to 
profound moral motivations such as the need for recognition. 'Unlike all 
utilitarian models of explanation, it suggests the view that motives or social 
resistance and rebellion are formed in the context of moral experiences stemming 
from the violation of deeply rooted expectations regarding recognition' (Honneth 
1995b, p.163). 
However, in the very process of focusing attention on the moral sources of social 
conflict, Honneth also perpetuates the very distinction between 'material' and 
'moral struggles' that Hegel's early writings sought to overcome. Thus, rather 
than attempting to view material injustices as misrecognized forms of moral 
injustice, Honneth differentiates between them. 'In the first case, we are dealing 
with the analysis of competition for scarce goods, whereas in the second case we 
are dealing with the analysis of struggle over the intersubjective conditions for 
personal integrity' (Honneth 1995b, p.165). 
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Thus, while acknowledging that a recognition-theoretic model has a ' ... duty not 
only to extend but possibly to correct' an interest-based model of social conflict 
(Honneth 1995b, p.166) on the grounds that ' ... relations of social esteem are ... 
indirectly coupled with patterns of income distribution' (ibid.) this falls short of 
Nancy Fraser's claim that 'Honneth argues that recognition is the fundamental 
concept of justice and can encompass distribution' (Fraser 1997, p.74).25 On the 
contrary, Honneth's restriction of struggles over recognition to the 
'intersubjective conditions for personal integrity' (op. cit.) tends to focus on the 
cultural sphere (of the Habermasian lifeworld) to the detriment of the economic 
sphere (of the Habermasian system). 
Nevertheless, it is possible to argue that the economy remains not only a prime 
allocator of social recognition but also a fundamental pre-condition for modem 
forms of autonomy. This first proposition is articulated by Thorstein Veblen 
when he argues that with the establishment of capitalism: 'The possession of 
wealth ... becomes in popular apprehension, itself a meritorious act. Wealth is 
now itself intrinsically honourable and confers honour upon its possessor' 
(Veblen 1992, p.37).26 Thus, according to Veblen, with the dissolution of status-
based hierarchies social value becomes a matter of market-value. As such, money 
does not displace morality into the cultural sphere as Honneth (following 
Habermas) argues, so much as assume its role as the allocator of social 
validation. Hence the establishment of a relationship between the amount of 
income an individual receives and the amount of social status they are owed. To 
this extent, argues Veblen ' ... as soon as the possession of property becomes the 
25 Indeed, Honneth specifically states that' ... not all forms ofresistance have their ro~ts in ~juries 
to moral claims' as there are many instances in which: ' ... the securing of econonuc survIval ... 
motivated massive protest and revolt' (Honneth 1995b, p.166). 
26 It is interesting to note that while Hobbes argues that the value of a perso~ is co~e~urate with 
the price their capacities command in the market, he also recogniz~s an ~ters~bJectJ.\'e element 
to evaluation. 'The Value or WORTH of a man, is as of all other things, his Price; that IS to say, 
so much as would be given for the use of his Power: and therefore is not absolute; but a thmg 
dependent on the need and judgement of another' (Hobbes 1968, p.151-52) . 
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basis of popular esteem ... it becomes a requisite to that complacency which we 
call self-respect' (ibid., p.38).27 
Here Robert Merton's well known response to Parson's approach to 'deviance' is 
relevant, insofar as it reverses Honneth's suggestion that an overarching value-
community stamps its system of evaluation on the capitalist division of labour, 
rather than the other way round as Mead contends. Against Parson's suggestion 
that society generates an anti-Hobbesian 'value-system' which integrates 
strategic actors within its common set of moral beliefs, Merton argues that the 
key value promoted by capitalism is pecuniary success. Thus, rather than modern 
morality comprising an antidote to amoral selfishness, the former is a vehicle for 
the promotion of the latter. In other words, the capitalist accent on individual 
achievement, the ruthless pursuit of pecuniary goals and wealth-generation 
coupled with the notion that high income denotes high status, creates a 
corresponding value-community. It is not, therefore, merely a question of 
opposing morality to the amorality of strategic actions, but of opposing a 
collective morality that emphasizes co-operation, community and social justice to 
an individualistic ethos that emphasizes self-interest, success and technical 
efficiency. 
What is important here is the way in which money relations both displace moral 
ones and at the same time replicate them in an 'amoral' form. Hence the 
importance of Simmel' s contention that money not only plays a key role in 
allocating social worth but also in making possible modem forms of autonomy. 
Thus when the market transforms moral obligations into pecuniary ones, it , 
validates individuals on the basis of an income that renders them independent 
from anterior forms of social regulation. Herein lies the importance of Marx's 
27 Trade unionists often point out that insofar as money is a measure of social est~em under 
capitalism, it not only contributes to the 'material' well being of workers but also therr sense of 
social worth, morale and social identity. 
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observation that under capitalism 'we carry our social relations around with us in 
our pocket' (Marx 1973). Because individuals are directly validated by the 
market - without an intervening community of value - they are freed from 
previous moral dependencies. This new found freedom, which includes the 
freedom to 'starve' (Simmel 1978, pp.283-285), creates, in tum, a new form of 
independence which comprises the most important social pre-condition for the 
rise of modem individualism. 
Whereas in the period prior to the emergence of a money economy, 
the individual was directly dependent upon his group and the 
exchange of services united everyone closely with the whole of 
society, today everyone carries around with him, in a condensed 
latent form, his claim to the achievements of others. Everyone has the 
choice of deciding when and where he wants to assert this claim, and 
therefore loosen the direct relations of the earlier form of exchange. 
The extreme significant power of money to lend to the individual a 
new independence from group interests is manifested not only in the 
basic differences between a money and a barter economy but also 
within the money economy itself. (Simmel 1978, p.342) 
For Simmel, the atomization of individuals goes hand in hand with the 
abstraction of value. To this extent money fosters autonomy by fostering 
universalistic form of recognition freed from the particular status-groups of 
established value-communities. Consequently, the dissolution of moral-values by 
market-values brings with it the transformation of the former into the latter. 
Hence Simmel's claim that ' ... the honoury prize, which reflects the cooperation 
of the whole group, has to be replaced by the money prize, which reflects the 
ultimate recognition of the performance. The enlargement of the social group 
requires the transition to expressing merit in money terms because it means the 
inescapable atomization of such a group' (ibid., p.348). 
Consequently, argues Simmel, money has both a disintegrating and a unifying 
effect upon society. Thus, on the one hand, it brings about the privatization of 
family life, which underpin Honneth's writings on 'love' while, on the other 
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hand, it brings about new relations 'between elements that otherwise would have 
no connection whatsoever' (ibid., p.346). However, the very 'soulless' and 
'heartless' nature of this 'unifying social bond', argues Simmel, calls forth a 
reaction, in the form of socialism, which seeks to '... abolish the individual's 
isolation in relation to the group as embodied in the form of the purposive 
association' (ibid.). 
Unfortunately, because Honneth fails to acknowledge the role of 'money' in 
generating an abstract-universal form of social recognition and a commensurate 
concrete-particular form of individual autonomy, he fails to acknowledge the 
extent to which modem forms of social solidarity are a reaction to their 
diremption. It is this which leads Honneth to play down the extent to which 
Marshall's writings on social citizenship are concerned to generate an alternative 
form of 'value-community', one designed to 'tame' and 'civilize' the economy 
(to use Marshall's own terms).28 Thus, rather than viewing 'social solidarity' as 
something which emerges from and in opposition to market evaluation, Honneth 
abstracts the former from the latter and theorizes the value-community as a 
separate cultural sphere in its own right. He then misses the opportunity to argue 
that workers' struggles are not only motivated by non-material moral concerns 
but also playa key role in the 're-moralization' of the economy. Thus, while 
Honneth's attempt to extend normative motivations to workers' struggles is a 
useful counterweight to Habermas's de-moralization of labour, it fails to 
adequately theorize the extent to which 'working class' struggles serve not only 
to 're-moralize' labour but also 'de-reify' market forms of value. 
28 Honneth is agnostic on the question of whether his writings on 'substantive ."~lues' presu~po~e 
' ... changes in socio-economic circumstances or are compatible with the c.ondltlOnS of,a capItahst 
society ... '. These matters, he argues, can be left to 'the future of socIal struggles (Honneth 
1995b, p.179). 
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Above all, Honneth, like Habermas, lacks a sense in which market relations 
'reify' intersubjective ones by transforming moral obligations into pecuniary 
ones. Instead, Honneth views the economy in much the same way as Habermas 
does the system, as a 'non-normative' realm concerned only with the distribution 
of 'material' resources. Consequently, while Honneth extends our appreciation of 
morally motivated struggles within the cultural sphere, he fails to take this moral 
approach into the economic sphere; despite the fact that it is precisely this drive 
to 're-moralize' the economy that informs Hegel's writings both early and late. 
BEYOND HEGEL? 
According to Honneth, In Hegel's later writings - beginning with the 
Phenomenology of Spirit ' ... the programme of the philosophy of consciousness 
gained the upper hand ... over all intersubjectivist insights ... ' (ibid., p.62). This is 
a controversial claim that writers such as Robert Williams (1992) dispute. 
Nevertheless, even if were conceded that Hegel's earlier intersubjective emphasis 
is subordinated to a subject-centred philosophy of history, this still needs 
explaining. The only clue that Honneth gives to this concerns his comment on 
Hegel's transition from a theory of 'communicative action' to one concerned 
with 'the theoretical and practical confrontation of individuals with their 
environment' (ibid., p.29). This would suggest that the transition from an 
intersubjective to a subject-centred approach is coterminous with Hegel's attempt 
to incorporate an 'instrumental' relationship to nature within his conception of 
ethical solidarity. 
This accords with Benhabib's assertion that the subject-centred character of both 
Hegel and Marx's later writings arises from their common attempt to model 
human activity on human labour. In other words ' ... because the primary model 
of human activity to which both [Hegel and Marx] resort is, in the final analysis, 
work and not interaction, the discourse of transsubjectivity comes to dominate' 
1 -: 5 
(Benhabib 1986, p.68). To this extent the paradigm of self-objectifying 
sUbjectivity owes its aetiology to the 'model of labour' . 
However, rather than arguing that this reflects the effect of labour per se upon 
social theory, it is possible to argue that it represents the effect of an historically 
specific form of capitalist labour - one that lends itself to a 'transsubjective' 
interpretation. Herein lies the importance of Honneth's early attempts to 
differentiate between those 'instrumental acts' which are under workers' control 
and those which are not. There is nothing intrinsically 'non-normative' about the 
activity of labour, it all depends on whether labour constitutes its own ends or 
whether it comprises a mere means for the ends of another. If labour appears 
'ethically neutralized' (to repeat Habermas's felicitous phrase) it is not because it 
is stripped down to its pure subject-object form, but because it is transformed into 
an instrument for the social reproduction of capital. 
Insofar as Hegel can be said to subordinate an intersubjective to a subject-centred 
approach, this is because his version of ethical solidarity mirrors too closely the 
form of sociality it is designed to sublate. As Honneth himself notes for Hegel, 
' ... individuals' market-mediated activities and interests - which later come to be 
gathered under the title "civil society" - comprise a "negative" though still 
constitutive "zone" of the "ethical" [Sittlich] whole' (Honneth 1995b, p.13). 
Although it is not clear what Honneth means by the phrase ' "negative" but still 
constitutive "zone" of the "ethical" ... ', it is clear that Hegel saw civil society as 
an alienated form of ethical life which he believed only the state, as the bearer of 
World Spirit, was capable of re-normatizing. 
It is, therefore, no coincidence that Hegel's break with his earlier intersubjective 
writings is coterminous with his attempt to assimilate political economy into his 
schema of moral redemption. Because Hegel uncritically assimilates political 
176 
economy's naturalistic conception of labour, as a purely technical mediator 
between 'man and nature', he takes the non-normative structure of labour as a 
given and then attempts to re-moralize it from the outside via the state. Thus. 
rather than viewing the non-normative status of labour as a consequence of its 
organizational form, Hegel accepts it at face value and views 'civil society' as an 
expression of its instrumental nature. 
Evidence that Hegel viewed the 'objectivity' of the economy as a natural 
expression of the self-objectifying properties of labour can be found in his 
assertion that the more labour internalizes the causality of nature, the more 
society assumes a naturalistic form. To this extent the 'self-propelling' nature of 
money is associated with labour per se rather than the autopoietic system that 
regulates it. 'Money is that materially existing concept, the unitary form or the 
possibility of all objects of need. By elevating need and work to this level of 
generality a vast system of common interest and mutual dependence is formed 
among people, a self-propelling life of the dead ... ' (from Hegel's Lectures 1803-
4 in Lukacs 1971b, p.333). Consequently, the 'alienated' and 'externalized' 
character of modem sociality is a result of its 'internalization' of natural laws 
rather than its capacity to regulate itself in abstraction from the intersubjective 
ends of participants. 29 
By leaving the 'objective' structures of the economy unchanged, it is only 
possible to re-internalize the latter on the basis of a supra-human spirit that 
borrows its transsubjective character from the system it is designed to digest. As 
Benhabib argues, Hegel's ' ... model of crises integration and management does 
29 According to Lukacs, the German terms Entiiusserung and Entfremdung are simply translations 
of the English word 'alienation' that was used ' ... in works of economic theory. t~ betoken the 
sale of a commodity, and in works on natural law to refer to the loss of an abongmal freedom. 
the handing over or alienation of freedom to the society which came into being as a result of a 
social contract' (1971b, p.538). As such, the term Entiiusserung can be translated as both 
externalization and alienation. 
not alleviate the consequences for citizens of their loss of freedom but , 
encourages the emergence of a second sphere of social relations, which are as 
omnipresent vis-a-vis the citizens as the laws of the market are vis-a-vis the 
bourgeoisie. This second sphere is the bureaucratic system of justice and 
administration' (1986, p.100). 
If, however, we are concerned to re-moralize the system without objectifying 
morality, it is necessary to view the economic sphere as a form of reified 
normativity that can only be de-reified by forces acting from the inside. Thus, 
while Honneth has much to tell us about the moral motivations for workers' 
struggle that sit alongside the economic construction of labour, he has relatively 
little to tell us about the way in which workers' struggles are also responsible for 
sublating the economic structures that de-normatize labour in the first place. It is 
to this form of struggle we shall now tum by way of a redemptive critique of 
Marx's theory of commodity fetishism. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: 
SOCIAL WELFARE AND CLASS STRUGGLE 
The principle of self-constitution is central to critical theory, as it is on the basis 
of the former that the latter seeks to condemn capitalist sociality as reificatory. 
We have traced the genealogy of this approach from Kant's view that the 
'heteronomy' of the material world arises from the self-activity of the 
'autonomous' subject. We have seen that with Fichte and Hegel self-constitution 
is transformed into self-objectification, and self-objectification is understood as a 
form of self-alienation. However, unlike Fichte and Hegel, who seek to abolish 
alienation by 're-internalizing' the process of self-objectification, Marx 
distinguishes between the natural form of self-objectification - arising from 
labour's purposive transformation of nature - which is beyond re-internalization, 
and the historical form of self-alienation - arising from labour's production of 
capital - which is re-internalized under socialism. Unfortunately, Marx's 
naturalization of self-objectification lends itself to a reified conception of 
sociality which Weber then makes a permanent function of 'instrumental reason'. 
Although Lukacs seeks to reverse this process by reformulating self-
objectification as an historically contingent form of self-alienation, his reliance 
on a subject-centred conception of self-constitution leads to an idealist form of re-
internalization. 
In recent years, the notion of self-originating subjectivity, upon which this whole 
tradition is predicated, has been criticized following the 'linguistic tum' in 
philosophy. In its Foucauldian version, subjectivity often appears as the effect of 
a transhuman discourse which transforms the humanist notion of agency into an 
unnecessary and untenable fiction. In order to rescue the possibility of self-
constitution from the 'death of man', Habermas seeks to reformulate praxis 
philosophy along intersubjective lines. By re-Iocating the enlightenment ethic of 
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self-constitution within a contemporary account of communicative action 
, 
Habermas seeks to retain the notion that participants are only obliged to obey 
rules they have played a part in constructing. However, Habermas stops short of 
applying these normative principles to the capitalist economy. Thus, rather than 
viewing the latter as a reified expression of the former, Habermas argues that the 
objective 'non-normative' form of the economy is an inevitable consequence of 
modem technical progress. Habermas then adopts Luhmann's systems-theoretic 
approach to the economy in order to dissolve the last vestiges of normativity 
which cling to Marx's labour theory of value. 'By radicalizing Marxian systems 
analysis ... the new type of objectivistic social theories avoid the narrowness and 
the normative ballast associated with the holistic concepts of a philosophy of 
history' (Habermas 1996, p.47). Having robbed Marxism of its 'critical sting', 
systems theory then allows Habermas to produce an 'affirmative' account of the 
economy (ibid.) which ' ... wipes out all the hermeneutic tracks that point the way 
into society for an action theory starting from the actor's own self-understanding' 
(ibid.). 
However, while endorsing Luhmann's 'objectivistic' approach to the economy, 
Habermas draws a line at the former's attempt to analyze law, politics and 
communicative action from a functionalist standpoint (Habermas 1996, p.SO). On 
the contrary, argues Habermas, critical theory has a duty to show' ... how the old 
promise of a self-organizing community of free and equal citizens can be re-
conceived under the conditions of complex societies' (Habermas 1996, p.7). He 
then sets critical theory the task of bringing the 'non-normative' system back 
within the ambit of ethical solidarity, without undermining the uncoupling of 
lifeworld and system which he sees as so essential to the maintenance of modem 
rationality (Rasmussen 1996, p.25). 
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Nevertheless, this task is fraught with difficulties ansIng from the equivocal 
stance it reflects towards the system. Thus, while Habermas employs 'functional 
reason' to protect the system from the democratic demands of the lifeworld he , 
employs 'practical reason' to provide a universalistic account of the lifeworld. He 
then attempts to strike a balance between the two by limiting; (a) functional 
reason to the 'material' system; and (b) practical reason to the 'symbolic' 
lifeworld. However, this not only results in an unstable compromise it also, 
despite protestations to the contrary (Habermas 1990, pp.l95-211), renders 
Habermas vulnerable to Hegel's critique of Kant. 
Although Habermas' s verSIon of practical reason is dialogical rather than 
monological in form it, nevertheless, retains many of the abstract, formalistic and 
procedural aspects of Kant's account of morality. However, the main problem is 
that Habermas confines the operations of self-constitution to a restrictive form of 
communicative action which closes the former off from the larger social realm it 
is designed to morally regulate. Habermas must then explain; (a) what motivates 
economically orientated individuals to transcend their narrow self-interest in 
search of the general interest; and (b) how the moral rules which reflect the 
general interest can be made effective enough to regulate the economic system. 
As Habermas acknowledges, the rules of language which motivate individuals to 
generate a moral consensus have an 'improbable' and 'counterfactual' character. 
And yet it is only insofar as economically orientated individuals adopt an 
'hypothetical attitude' towards them that they can free themselves' ... from the 
heterogeneous features of contingent interests and value orientations, particular 
sociocultural forms of life, and identity shaping traditions ... ' (Habermas 1996, 
p.164) that stands between them and a truly universalistic form of 'practical 
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reason' (ibid.).1 As David Ingram argues, 'Only a concept of practical reason that 
can be fully articulated independently of action, with its inevitable strategic 
constraints, and aesthetic intuition, with its quasi-speculative, contemplative 
preunderstanding of totality, suffices for him as a possible basis for critical 
theory' (Ingram 1987, p.74). 
Having transcended not only their material interests, but also the ethical 
community which regulates them, individuals are then capable of participating in 
the argumentative redemption of normative validity claims from which moral 
rules emerge. However, because individuals are required to transcend their 
empirical selves to form these 'impartial' rules they, in tum, are 'purified of all 
substantive elements' (Habermas 1996, p.228). Consequently, Habermas then 
finds himself faced with the problem of how to render them effective. 'When a 
theory of justice takes a directly normative approach and attempts to justify the 
principles of a well-ordered society by operating beyond existing institutions and 
traditions, it faces the problem of how its abstract idea of justice can be brought 
back into contact with reality' (Habermas 1996, pp.197-198, my emphasis). 
Much of Between Facts and Norms (1996) IS taken up with Habermas's 
contention that the legal sphere provides the best means to convert 
'communicative power' into an effective form of 'administrative power' 
(Habermas 1996, p.150). In this way 'Law ... functions as the "transformer" that 
first guarantees that the socially integrating network of communication stretched 
across society as a whole holds together' (Habermas 1996, p.56). 
According to Habermas, 'The counterfactual presuppositions assumed by particip~ts in 
argumentation ... open up a perspective allowing the~ to g~ beyond local practIces of 
justification and to transcend the provinciality of thelf spatIotemporal contexts that are 
inescapable in action and experience' (Habermas 1996, p.323). 
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However, insofar as the democratic ideals of 'popular sovereignty' are restricted 
to communicative action, the former acquires a 'desubstantialized', 'subjectless' 
and 'anonymous' form which, according to Habermas, can only lay 'siege' to the 
system from without, rather than 'conquer' it from within. If the impotence of 
this etiolated form of democratic practice does not appear to worry Habermas it is 
because he views the system as a relatively benign form of social regulation, 
whose suppression of normativity is more than compensated for by its 
encouragement of technical progress. At the end of the day this is a matter of 
personal judgement - nevertheless his accommodation to the capitalist system sits 
uneasily with his claim to be engaged in a redemptive critique of Marxism. To 
this extent, not everyone is convinced that the system is as benign or moral 
regulation as impotent as Habermas. On the contrary, Iris Marion Young argues 
that the weakness of the latter is a function of the strength he accords the fonner. 
To this extent Habermas shares with Kant a dirempted notion of the individual 
who is either material and amoral, or moral and immaterial, but never moral and 
material. 'Either an agent reasons only selfishly, considering only what will best 
promote his or her own selfish desires and goals, or he or she will reason from an 
impartial general point of view that has no particular desires or interests in view' 
(Young 1990, p.106).2 
Against this dualistic standpoint, Young argues that' a moral point' of view arises 
not from 'lonely, self-legislating reason' but' ... from the concrete encounter with 
others who demand that their needs, desires, and perspectives be recognized' 
(ibid.). Young then calls for a more substantive form of 'popular sovereignty', 
one capable of democratizing the system from within. 
2 In the same way, Adam Smith sought to offset self-interested individualism with an 'impartial 
spectator' who embodies the moral interests of humanity (Smith 1976). 
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In response to such criticisms, Habermas has sought to supplement his 'anterior' 
approach to the legal regulation of the system, with an 'interior' one that grounds 
his communicative conception of 'popular sovereignty' in a 'fonn of life that 
meets it halfway' (ibid., p.207). To this extent, Habennas acknowledges that the 
law's capacity to lay 'siege' to the system from without, depends on citizen's 
capacity to subject the system to a degree of 'conquest' from within. In other 
words, at the risk of generating a conception of democracy that falls a long way 
short of its actual achievement, Habennas attempts to locate 'popular 
sovereignty' in the institutional matrix of modem life. However, what is missing 
from this account is any sense of the conflict that exists between 'system' and 
'lifeworld' over the scope of their respective terrains. 
VALIDATING AND INVALIDATING THE SYSTEM 
Honneth criticizes Habennas for overestimating the non-nonnative character of 
the system and underestimating the normative power of the lifeworld. Thus, 
according to Honneth, there is far more interpenetration of the two spheres than 
Habermas's account acknowledges. In particular, Honneth seeks to highlight the 
fact that workers have fought back against their expulsion from the nonnative 
content of modernity, by demanding a basic degree of recognition in order to live 
in an autonomous and dignified fashion. Nevertheless, insofar as Honneth 
restricts the normative struggles of workers to non-material ends he, like 
Habermas, abstracts from the economy's capacity to reify nonnativity. To this 
extent he shares with Habermas a tendency to view the non-nonnative content of 
the system as arising from its material form. 
Thus, while Habermas's halfway house formulation and Honneth's account of 
struggles for recognition take us some way towards a more integrated approach to 
the normative content of modernity, their tendency to restrict intersubjectivity to 
the cultural sphere renders the system beyond the bounds of normativity. 
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Nevertheless, the suggestion that 'normative' validity claims must give way to 
'cognitive' ones in the face of the system's jacticity, has traditionally been 
countered by critical theory's insistence that any system which, in Habermas's 
words ' ... wipes out all the hermeneutic tracks that point the way into society for 
an action theory starting from the actor's own self-understanding ... ' (op. cit.) is 
invalid. In other words, faced with a choice between the 'objective' gaze of 
functional reason and the 'agentive' perspective of practical reason, critical 
theory has tended to privilege the latter over the former in solidarity with the ends 
of participants. 
Habermas has sought to block this move by viewing any attempt to re-normatize 
the system as grounded in an 'exhausted' philosophy of consciousness (and an 
equally tired philosophy of history). To this end, Habermas argues that Marx's 
critique of capitalism is grounded in a conception of self-originating subjectivity 
that is neither workable or plausible. However, as Benhabib (1986) demonstrates, 
Habermas's own attempt to defend the system on the basis of functional reason is 
itself grounded in a subject-centred approach to sociality (and for that matter 
history), which views the system as a macro-subject whose 'developmental logic' 
objectively evolves in the rational interests of humanity as a whole. Leaving aside 
Habermas's attempt to legitimate the system in terms of the (obj ective) ends of 
the species, what this demonstrates is the extent to which the system's subject-
centred character is a function of its capacity to escape from the intersubjective 
lifeworld. 
To this extent, Habermas's contention that all attempts to re-normatize the system 
are based on an attempt to view society as a subject writ-large, abstracts from the 
system's capacity to engender a subject-centred standpoint. It will therefore prove 
impossible to overturn subject-centred thinking merely by advocating an 
intersubjective standpoint. On the contrary, subject-centred thinking is sustained 
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by the system's capacity to transform intersubjective relationships into an 
'autopoietic' system, on the one hand, and a set of 'strategic actors', on the other. 
The notion that there exists a dialectical relationship between the autopoietic 
character of the system and the atomization of strategic individuals was first 
formulated by Scottish enlightenment thinkers such as Adam Ferguson and 
Adam Smith. Smith's notion that the system regulates itself on the basis of an 
'invisible hand' which both aggregates and reconciles the interests of 'self-
regarding' individuals (Smith 1986), forms the centrepiece of Hegel's writings on 
'civil society'. It is Hegel who first argues that 'civil society's' diremption of 
abstract universality and concrete particularity can be reconciled though an 
ethical form of concrete universality (Sittlichkeit) located in the state. Similar 
formulation can also be found in Habermas' s writings, as when he argues that 
'An ego-instance shorn of all normative dimensions and reduced to cognitive 
achievements of adaptation does indeed form a functional complement to the 
sub-systems that are steered by media ... ' (Habermas 1992a, p.197). 
To this extent Habermas recognIzes the existence of a complimentary 
relationship between the capacity of strategic individuals to 'slip out' of the 
lifeworld and the capacity of the system to 'mediatize' it. Thus, in a form of 
society in which 'The strategic actor no longer draws from an intersubjectively 
shared lifeworld; having himself become worldless, as it were, he stands over and 
against the objective world and makes decisions solely according to standards of 
subjective preference' (Habermas 1992a, p.197). 
While Habermas relied on a Weberian notion of 'instrumental' labour to account 
for the 'non-normative' character of the system, the latter's diremption of 
intersubjectivity could be explained in terms of the instrumental character of 
material production. However, with the adoption of Luhmann's systems theoretic 
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approach labour's lack of normative content becomes a function of the system's 
capacity to render the lifeworld autopoietic. This transition from a technical 
account of labour to a sOciological account of the system opens the way for a 
more contingent account of labour's loss of normative content, one grounded in 
the capacity of the system to alienate normative regulation.3 
In contradistinction to the system's capacity to dirempt intersubjectivity has gone 
the attempt to re-generate intersubjectivity as a bulwark against the system. Thus, 
as Habermas notes in his early account of The Structural Transformation of the 
Public Sphere: 'The political task of the bourgeois public sphere was the 
regulation of civil society .. .' (Habermas 1989b, p.52). Unfortunately, the more 
Habermas has come to ground his account of intersubjectivity in the 
transhistorical structure of language, the more he has come to abstract from the 
historically contingent emergence of democratic governance (Calhoun 1992, 
p.31). As a consequence, Habermas's not only fails to take account of the degree 
of institutional overlap between system and lifeworld, but also the extent to 
which the border between them is determined by social struggle. More 
specifically, Habermas's one-dimensional approach to the system obscures the 
extent to which the realm of production itself comprises an intersubjective 
lifeworld from which struggles emerge, between systematizing and 
democratizing forces, that assume the form of a 'class' conflict between capital 
and labour. In the following section we shall outline the way in which workers 
have sought to constitute themselves in opposition to capital, in order to subject 
the system to a degree of popular sovereignty from within. 
3 Alienation in this context refers not to an epistemologically verifiable 'state of affairs', such as 
the non-correspondence between essence and appearance, but a normatively grounded critique of 
the system, which is dependent upon participants O\\TI sense of moral injury. 
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STRUGGLES FOR WELFARE 
The contention that the labour movement plays a central role in re-nonnatizing 
the system not only has repercussions for Habennas's but also Marx's non-
nonnative account of the system. In the absence of a self-objectifying subject 
which comprises the alienated ground of self-valorizing value, we are left to trace 
the way in which social participants have historically sought to render the system 
accountable to their ends in practice. To this extent, argue Bowles and Gintis's 
(1986), contradictions in the wage-labour relation arises, not from any inherent 
conflict between self-objectifying subjects and self-valorizing systems, but rather 
from an historically 'clash of rights' between the autonomy of individuals and the 
ownership of property.4 Thus, according to Bowles and Gintis, this conflict arises 
between workers who 'alienate' their right to autonomy in exchange for a wage, 
and capital which having purchased the use of labour-time sets it to work as its 
own private property (ibid., p.37). 
If we then revisit the transition from the fonnal to the real subordination (Marx 
1976) in the light of this 'clash of rights', we find that capital's fonnation of 
labour is accompanied, as E.P. Thompson argues, by workers' fonnation of itself 
in antagonism to capital (Thompson 1968). Thus, while capital seeks to bend the 
'intersubjective' relations of production to the imperatives of the system, workers 
seek to render them more amenable to their own social welfare. At first, workers 
struggle against their 'proletarianization' on the basis of pre-capitalist fonns of 
community life, however, once proletarianized workers forge new organizations 
to resist their 'capitalization'.5 
4 In many respects the autonomy of individuals is itself a functio~ of private property relations, in 
which case the conflict is a conflict over two forms of property nght. 
5 As Marx notes, 'Capital ... takes no account of the health and the length of life of the worker, 
unless society forces it to do so' (Marx 1976, p.381). 
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The fashioning of trade unions is a widespread response by workers to their 
capitalization. Having been brought together by capital and interpellated into its 
division of labour, workers find it in their interest to sublate their 'self-regarding' 
market-based interests in favour of a set of intersubjectively constituted ones. 
Thus, whereas Habermas views social solidarity as primarily a linguistic affair, 
grounded in a common interest in mutual understanding, the formation of trade 
unions emerges from a shared set of 'material' interests forged in production. 
Central to the concerns of trade unions is the commodity status of labour. It is this 
which divides workers from one another, makes them dependent on the market 
and causes them to alienate their labour-time to capital. To this extent, workers 
seek to simultaneously enhance their value and subvert their commodity status. 
'As commodities, workers are replaceable, easily redundant, and atomized. De-
commodification is therefore a process with multiple roots ... It is ... a 
precondition for a tolerable level of individual welfare and security. Finally, 
without de-commodification, workers are incapable of collective action; it is 
accordingly, the alpha and omega of the unity and solidarity required for labor-
movement development' (Esping-Andersen 1990, p.37). Thus, one of the primary 
tasks of the labour movement is to establish itself as a social force within the 
production process, and this depends on its capacity to de-commodify, de-
marketize and de-capitalize labour. To this extent, workers build on capital's own 
partial suspension of the dialectic of objective system and subjective agency, in 
order to generate an intersubjectively constituted site of 'popular sovereignty' at 
the heart of the production process. 
However, while trade unions are formed to concentrate on immediate concerns at 
the point of production, they find they have little influence over the economic 
environment in which labour is bought and sold. Consequently, they have 
generally sought (not always successfully) to expand beyond the limits of 
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production, in order to bring about a more comprehensive 'de-commodification' 
of labour. It is at this point that the labour movement seeks to directly influence 
and expand the scope of what Habermas refers to as the 'bourgeois public 
sphere' . 
The combination of a widened franchise and the struggles of New Unionism, at 
the end of the Nineteenth Century, precipitated the formation in Britain of a 
Labour Party, concerned to enhance welfare of the working class by 'socializing' 
market-capitalism. Thus, while the emergent socialist movement shared concerns 
with both the atavistic principles of 'conservative paternalism' and the economic 
interests of 'liberal reformism', it supplied the main impetus for 'socializing' the 
market (Esping-Andersen 1990). In particular, the trade unions looked to the 
Labour Party to attenuate the commodification of labour, the marketization of 
sociality and the capitalization of production, in order to mitigate the private right 
of capital to treat labour as a commodity, a thing, a possession, to be bought and 
sold, owned and controlled, used and discarded like any other irrespective of its 
effect on the welfare of workers (ibid.). 
Habermas's own account of this process is extremely ambivalent. In The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Habermas argues that the 
emergence of the welfare state is coterminous with the 'degeneration' of rational 
discourse (Habermas 1989b, pp.232-235).6 Thus, rather than viewing the 
emergence of the welfare state as an attempt to strengthen the intersubjective 
spheres capacity to regulate the system, Habermas associates it with capacity of 
the system to 'mediatize' the lifeworld. Although Habermas now claims to have 
changed his mind about the relative importance of the 'plebeian public sphere' 
6 Calhoun criticizes Habennas for neglecting the importance of working class struggle on the 
grounds that' ... throughout its existence the bourgeois public sphere was permeated by deman~ 
from below. These took the fonn not only of calls for broader inclusivity but also more baslc 
challenges and the pushing of new issues forward on the agenda' (Calhoun 1992, p.32). 
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(Habennas 1992b, pp.426-7), his association of welfare reforms with the 
'bureaucratization' of the lifeworld has, if anything, grown stronger (ibid., p.436). 
Consequently, Habennas calls on critical theory to abandon a substantive fonn of 
'utopia' based on a labouring society in favour of a formal one based on 
communicative action (Habermas 1989a, p.64). This call stems in part from 
Habennas's refusal to acknowledge that the capitalization of production results in 
a fonn of 'damaged intersubjectivity' . On the contrary, Habermas has 
consistently argued that not only can labour be subordinated to capital without 
'pain', 'damage' or 'pathological consequences' (Habermas 1987a, p.375), but 
also failure to do so threatens the rationality of the system. 
This lack of concern for the ends of workers in comparison to the imperatives of 
the system is manifest in Habermas' s view that capital's adoption of 'scientific 
management' techniques goes hand in hand with the system's 'mediatization' of 
the lifeworld. Thus, adopting the standpoint of the system, Habermas argues that 
'Taylorist' and 'Fordist' forms of organization bring about a more 'rational' fonn 
of social labour (Habermas 1987a). In this way, Habermas not only employs 
'functionalist reason' to validate management practices, but also to invalidate 
workers' attempts to exercise 'practical reason'. To this extent, Habermas offers 
us an account of critical theory that has strayed a long way from its origins in the 
standpoint of labour against capital. One that views capital's failure to suppress 
labour as a victory for atavistic sentiments over the developmental logic of the 
system. Nevertheless, workers refused to succumb to the latter but sought to built 
new forms of union organization through which to pursue their claims to welfare. 
On the material foundations reorganized a decade earlier by 
Frederick Taylor and Henry Ford ... arose a wholly new structure of 
working class power: that of the factory mass workers to impose 
collective bargaining and a new kind of unionism at the industrial 
level coupled with the social power to impose full employment, 
ri.sing wages, social security. unemployment compensation and other 
pIllars of a new 'welfare' state. (Cleaver 1995, p.149)7 
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Thus, while Taylorism and Fordism were responsible for undermining craftwork-
based forms of normative-resistance, this was replaced by new forms of 
collective resistance which during the deep recession of the 1930s, underscored 
the large scale industrial actions which fostered Roosevelt's New Deal in the 
USA.8 'Under immense social pressure and against often strong resistance from 
important sections of capital, a new relationship between capital and labour was 
forged in the United States in the 1930s, focused on the recognition and 
attempted integration of the power of labour' (Holloway 1995, p.l9).9 
Thus, rather than scientific management serving to 'ethically-neutralize' labour it 
precipitated new forms of working class opposition, which in the context of the 
1930s Depression, came to imbed the economic system within a set of moral 
obligations to the welfare of workers. This resulted in the partial suspension of 
the market-based form of money-value in favour of an institutionally-based form 
of social value that served to 're-normatize' value-relations. However, according 
to Simon Clarke, the influence of class struggle on economic theory dates back to 
the rise of neo-classical economics. 
7 Holloway argues that 'The new industrial unionism grew out of the new relations a~ wo~k. The 
spread of Fordism meant the spread of a new type of mass, unskilled workers working ill large 
factories' (Holloway 1995, p.19). 
8 According to the French Regulation School, the higher levels of productivity which followed 
from F ordism introduced a new tension into the production process between, on the. one hand, 
the higher (pecuniary and social) wages needed to compensate workers for therr sou~less 
activities, and on the other, workers' organized resistance to the monotony of labour (Aghetta 
1979). . . . 
9 'New Deal politics would have been impossible without .an enfranc~sed, mobIhzed working 
class which, though it never seized state power on the MarxIst model, did use the state to alter the 
pattern of social relations across several of the spheres of justice , (Walzer 1995, p.286). 
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THE RE-NORMATIZATION OF VALUE 
According to Clarke (1982), the wholesale refonnulation of economic theory that 
took place in the late nineteenth century was in response to the challenge of the 
labour movement. 'The more general context of the marginalist revolution was a 
concern with understanding the possibilities and limits of State intervention in the 
regulation of economic relations, including in particular the resolution of the 
labour question. The general background of the concern was the increasing role 
of the state in economic and social life' (Clarke 1982, p.149). 
In particular marginalism, or more generically, neo-classical economics, sought 
to set limits to social reform by demonstrating the beneficial and advantageous 
effects of free competition (ibid., p.150). Its starting point was Pareto's 
contention that '... in the absence of any distortions a freely competitive 
equilibrium would ensure allocative efficiency' (Begg et al. 1984, p.322). On the 
basis of this maxim, it is then argued that state intervention is only justified in the 
event of 'market failures' such as 'public goods', 'externalities', 'imperfect 
competition' etc. 
At first sight there would appear to be a great deal of overlap between 
Habermas's use of functionalism to justify capitalism's powers of co-ordination 
and efficacy, and the neo-classical view that market-forces can ensure the most 
rational allocation of economic resources. However, whereas Habennas, 
following Luhmann, tends to ground the rationality of capitalism in an objective 
standpoint (Habermas 1996, pA 7), neo-classical economics is concerned to 
ground the rationality of the market in the fact that it offers ' ... the most perfect 
expression of the preferences of the members of the society'lo (Clarke 1982, 
lOIn Habennas' s later writings there is a suggestion that the system's generation of strategic action 
has moral consequences insofar as it enhances the 'negative freedom' of individuals to act m an 
autonomous fashion. However, this is undeveloped due to Habermas's tendency to follow 
Luhmann's attempt to 'wipe out' an action theory starting point \\ith regard to the economy 
(Habennas 1996, p.47). 
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p.164). Thus, unlike the former, the latter's defence of capitalism is nonnatively 
predicated on the subjective preferences of individuals. 
Unfortunately, Clarke's commitment to orthodox Marxism prevents him from 
pursuing an immanent critique of neo-classical economics, based on the alienated 
normativity of 'market-value'. Thus, despite claiming that neo-classical 
economics is a response to calls '... for the moral and political regulation of 
capitalist social relations to moderate the conflicts that arose out of the unfettered 
pursuit of economic interest ... ' (ibid., p.l38); Clarke argues that it completes the 
'naturalization' of capitalist social relations began by political economy (ibid., 
p.186). This, however, misses the significance not only of neo-classical 
economics' attempt to locate the welfare of participants at the centre of its 
legitimating strategy, but also the capacity of 'welfare economics' to subject the 
market to normative criteria (Begg et al. 1984, p.312). A standpoint which, 
according to Pareto, is synonymous with the standpoint of 'sociology' (cited in 
Parsons 1968). 
Although welfare economICS In its original Pareto optimal fonn privileges 
efficiency over other normative criteria, such as equity and autonomy, while only 
allowing you to make someone better off if it does not make someone else worse 
off, this has certain advantages over both; ( a) Marx's refusal to engage in an 
openly normative critique of capitalism; and (b) Habermas's attempt to grant 
efficiency criteria a non-normative status. Thus, even if we restrict ourselves to 
efficiency criteria, there remains sufficient disagreement between 'market 
optimists' and 'market-pessimists' to expand the notion of 'market failure' in a 
radical direction. If we then include questions of equity and autonomy, the scope 
for identifying 'market failure' increases enormously in line with the justification 
for social intervention. 
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Once economics is placed on a nonnative foundation there is no reason to be 
bound by the original criteria of Pareto optimality. On the contrary, notions such 
as the marginal productivity of labour are as 'metaphysical' as Marx's labour 
theory of value, insofar as there exists no independent' empirical' means to assess 
its validity (Berch 1977). In which case, the assertion that each factor of 
production receives its 'just reward' for what it contributes to the system, is as 
unverifiable as Marx's notion that labour is robbed of its 'just reward' by the 
system. Both are guilty of attempting to deduce a nonnative content from a non-
normative system in order to provide an 'objective' justification for the 
standpoint in question. However, the system's only 'moral' concern is its own 
self-preservation. Consequently, any attempt to draw moral principles from the 
system's reification of intersubjectivity only creates a reified form of 'objective' 
morality. Thus, on the grounds that normativity is solely a property of other-
regarding subjects, it is only possible to submit the market to normative 
evaluation from an intersubjective perspective. 
However, while the market may compnse a self-regulating entity it is not 
necessarily a self-equilibrating one. This was dramatically demonstrated by the 
long and deep depression of the 1930s, in response to which John Maynard 
Keynes argued that 'market failures' were so extensive and intractable that the 
'comprehensive socialisation of investment' may be required to restore full 
employment (Keynes 1936, p.378). In many respects Keynes was only applying 
the lessons of the Nazi Government in Germany and the New Deal in America to 
Britain. But it was not until the Second World War that 'Keynesian economics' 
was accepted in Britain. 
Afterwards, the memory of the 1930s depression, coupled with the success of 
state intervention in creating full-employment, generated a widespread consensus 
for the adoption of Keynesian policies. These sought to intervene in the economy 
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in order to steer it towards a set of macro-economic objectives of which full-
employment was a priority. The depth and duration of the post-war 'boom' which 
then followed only seemed to prove Keynes right and therefore rule out any 
return to free-market policies. At the heart of this consensus lay a unique and 
(with hindsight) fragile confluence between the interests of the business 
community in long-term economic stability, and the interests of trade union's in 
the de-commodification of labour. The resulting social democratic compromise 
then sought to equate the welfare of labour with the welfare of the economic 
system in general. 
From this temporary consensus emerged a new conception of 'social citizenship', 
one that T .R. Marshall was mainly responsible for explicating. As we have seen, 
Marshall argues that citizenship passes through three stages of development. The 
first brings the 'civil rights' of liberal individualism, the second the 'political 
rights' of democratic participation, and the third ' ... the right to share to the full in 
the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the 
standards prevailing in the society' (Marsha111973, p.72). Like Esping-Andersen, 
Marshall explicitly grounds this new form of social citizenship in the rise of 
'collective bargaining' and hence the capacity of trade unions and their political 
representatives to sublate a market-based approach to 'value' (ibid., p.96).11 
'Social rights in their modem form imply an invasion of contract by status, the 
subordination of market price to social justice, the replacement of the free bargain 
by the declaration of rights' (ibid., p.111). 
To this extent, trade unIons not only help create a new form of 'industrial 
citizenship' (ibid.), but also a new form of social 'status' that subordinates the 
'market-values' of the economic system to the 'social values' of democratic 
11 Hence the importance to Marshall of the labour movement's capacity to civilize: 'The anti-social 
elements in the capitalist market system ... ' (ibid., p.135). 
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participants. Marshall makes this explicit in his concept of 'welfare value' insofar 
as it is '... estimated, not objectively as a commodity in the market nor 
subjectively as a [thing] in use, but as a thingfor use, which can be classified and 
valued in relation to others of its kind' (ibid., p.116). The key to this new fonn of 
'value' is, according to Marshall, the historically emergent institutions of the 
welfare state insofar as they bring about a democratic allocation of 'economic' 
resources (ibid., p.l07).12 As such, 'welfare value' helps render the 'private' 
realm of capitalist 'property rights' accountable to the 'public' world of 
'citizenship rights' . 
Marshall's writings on value arise out of his attempt to rethink value-relations in 
the context of state intervention. In the process, he arrives at a position similar to 
Simmel in which market-value is viewed as emerging from a dialectical relation 
between the objective value of the system and subjective utility of consumers. 
Thus, rather than attempting to view market-value as an alienated expression of 
self-objectifying subjectivity, Marshall argues that it comprises a combination of 
objective and subjective factors which are then reconciled in the democratic fonn 
of 'welfare value'. 
Nevertheless, Barry Hindess (1993) argues that Marshall provides an overly 
benign picture of the welfare state that ignores the degree to which the notion of 
'social citizenship' serves to legitimate the system, whether this is understood in 
Marxist terms as masking the domination of capital over labour, or in Web eri an 
terms as masking the bureaucratic domination of modernity (ibid.). Hence the 
importance of Habermas' s contention that the welfare state serves to both 
'pacify' the working class and 'bureaucratize' modernity. 
12 Although it is true that Marshall continues to describe welfare decisions as . essentially altruistic' 
thereby abstracting from the very real 'material' interests they serve. 
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REDISTRIBUTION YERSUS SELF-CONSTITUTION 
According to Habermas, the welfare state is a 'dilemmatic' structure which both 
secures freedom and takes it away (Habermas 1987a, p.361). Habermas theorizes 
this 'ambivalence' in terms of the process of 'juridification' (Verrechtlichung) 
which while it cushions citizens from the vagaries of market-forces also turns 
them into 'clients of welfare-state bureaucracies' (ibid.). To this extent, the 
welfare state takes the form of a switching station on the border between the 
system and lifeworld. As the regulator of private capital's use of labour, the 
welfare state functions to strengthen the lifeworld's capacity to 'tame' the system. 
However, the more the welfare state spreads ' ... a net of client relationships over 
private spheres of life, the stronger are the anticipated pathological side-effects of 
a juridification that entails both a bureaucratization and a monetarization of core 
areas of the lifeworld' (ibid., p.364). Thus, while acknowledging the role played 
by the welfare state in reducing the dependency of workers on the private sphere 
of capital, the tasks Habermas sets critical theory in the concluding chapter of 
The Theory of Communicative Action Vol. II, are concerned with resisting the 
bureaucratization of personal life. 
More recently, Habermas has sought to codify his approach by arguing that state 
intervention is legitimate if it satisfies the ' ... material preconditions for an equal 
opportunity to exercise individual liberties ... ' (Habermas 1996, p.416), and 
illegitimate if it suppresses the 'private autonomy' of individuals within civil 
society.13 Thus, unlike Marshall, who sees the welfare state as facilitating a 
collective form of self-constitution dedicated to democratizing the economic 
system, Habermas views the 'welfare paradigm of law' as primarily concerned 
with the 'just distribution of socially produced life opportunities' (ibid., p.417).14 
13 These take the form of ' ... statutory regulations on work and family life' which serve to ..... force 
employees or family members to conform their behaviour to a "normal" work relatlOn or a 
standard pattern of socialization ... ' (ibid., p.416). " , . . . 
14 According to Habermas, the impact of the welfare state on publIc autonom~ IS mediated b) and 
limited to its effects on 'personal autonomy', on the grounds that the exerCIse of communIcatIve 
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Habennas then draws on the work of Iris Marion Young to contrast the welfare 
state's concern with 'dl·stri·b t· I· ., h u lona JustIce to t e neglect of its concern for 
'procedural justice'. 
According to Young, the over-concentration on distributive conceptions of justice 
has served to ' ... block the political imagination from envisioning more 
emancipatory institutions and practices' (Young 1990, p.75). Unfortunately 
Young, like Habennas, takes a reified approach to the economy which serves to 
block the political imagination by failing to acknowledge the sociality of money. 
Thus according to Young 'Theorizing about justice should explicitly limit the 
concept of distribution to material goods like things, natural resources or money' 
(ibid., p.33). This, however, is not an uncommon view. As Winfield notes' ... the 
premise that economic relations are normative social structures to which citizens 
must attend if they are to live in justice has not found general acceptance in 
modem theory. On the contrary, a great many modem thinkers have rejected the 
idea that economic relations are social in character and denied that they have any 
nonnative content at all' (Winfield 1991, p.228). Nevertheless, it is this view 
which Marx's theory of value seeks to retain, albeit on a subject-centred 
foundation, and which we have sought to intersubjectively redeem. 
Nevertheless, Young's work does not conform to Habermas's description of it as 
' ... a feminist theory of law that rejects the welfare paradigm' (Habermas 1996, 
p.419). On the contrary, while claims that the welfare state' ... depoliticizes public 
life by restricting discussions to distributive issues ' (Young 1990, p.98, my 
emphasis), she also claims that the welfare state has ' ... helped create the 
possibility of a more politicized approach to meeting needs' (ibid., pp.86-87, my 
emphasis). In other words, while Young endorses Habermas's view that the 
action .... depends on the spontaneous inputs from a lifeworld whose core private domains are 
intact' (Habermas 1996, p.4l7). 
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welfare state merely promotes a distributive conception of justice, she also argues 
that it politicizes economic decision making insofar as it seeks to obtain ' ... the 
morally proper distribution of social benefits and burdens among society's 
members' not only in terms of 'wealth, income and other material resources' but 
also in terms of 'non-material goods such as rights, opportunity, power, and self-
respect' (Young 1990, p.16). 
Thus, unlike Habermas who attempts to limit the notion of 'popular sovereignty' 
to the field of communicative action, Young seeks to extend it into the economic 
realm on the grounds that 'Economic equalization and democratization .. , foster 
one another and should occur together to promote social justice' (Young 1990, 
p.94).15 Young is therefore opposed to Habermas's attempt to restrict 'public 
autonomy' to communicative action, as she believes that 'social justice requires 
democracy in the workplace .. .' (ibid., 222). In other words, if Habermas is more 
concerned with the 'juridifying' effects of the state on 'private autonomy', Young 
is more concerned with the undemocratic effects of the economic system on 
'public autonomy'. Hence Young's distinctly un-Habermasian conclusion that' ... 
democratic workplaces and democratic governments are mutually enforcing' 
(ibid., p.223). 
This, however, suggests a further sense in which the welfare state is 'dilemmatic'. 
Thus, on the one hand, the welfare state's 'politicization' of the economy serves 
to integrate workers into the system while, on the other hand, it serves to generate 
new social spaces in which oppositional movements can grow. This is similar to 
how Benhabib interprets Habermas's earlier (and in many ways more radical) 
theory of legitimation crisis. 
15 Habennas specifically argues that democratic movements ' ... must give up holistic aspirations to 
a self-organizing society .. .' (Habermas 1996, p.372). 
The di~emma is that in ~rd~r to compensate for the steering problems 
that anse from the con.tmumg capitalist control of the economy, the 
state has to assume an mcreasingly active role. Yet this active role of 
the state. can lead to an increased demand for legitimation, thereby 
au~entmg the pressure on the state and its agencies to justify 
publIcly the reasons and rational behind their actions· these 
. , 
processes, m tum, may result in demystifying capital. (Benhabib 
1986, p.235) 
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In other words, by 'politicizing' monetary steering mechanisms in pursuit of 
economic stability, the state serves to 'de-naturalize' the market and thereby open 
it up to oppositional social demands. However, with the growth of the welfare 
state, this 'dilemma' cannot be confined to questions of legitimation but threatens 
to become a crisis of social regulation. 
NORMATIZATION VERSUS DE-NORMATIZATION 
The more the state intervened to fulfil its obligations to maintain full 
employment, enhance social citizenship and increase higher education, the more 
it helped create the preconditions for trade union militancy, New Social 
Movements and student radicalism (Scott 1992).16 By undermining atomized 
individuals reliance on the disciplinary matrix of market forces, the welfare state 
helps facilitate dissenting social practices. 
It is arguable that it was this relationship that lay behind the New Right's critique 
of the welfare state. In other words, one of the reasons the New Right attacked 
the re-distributive aspects of the welfare state was the realization that it 
encouraged the existence of an intersubjective realm beyond the regulatory reach 
of the market's hidden hand. Thus, according to Milton Friedman (1962), all 
collective forms of self-constitution are 'juridifying' insofar as they impinge upon 
16 Thus, while New Social Movements represent an alternative to traditional forms of working class 
politics, the institutional gains of the latter served to provide the institutional basis for the 
development of the former. 
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the sovereignty of strategic actors. The New Right then sought to portray the 
welfare state and the trade union movement as enemies of personal freedom, in 
order to unravel the intersubjective matrix which had been spun around the 
market in the wake of World War II. At the heart of this strategy lay the promise 
to reduce income tax. Thus, under the guise of increasing consumer sovereignty 
(Saunders 1993), the New Right sought to translate public into private forms of 
provision often - as in the case of pensions - at greater cost to the individual. This 
had the effect of undermining the support networks upon which 'citizens', 
'clients', 'students', 'patients' and 'passengers' relied in favour of allocating 
goods and services through the market to 'customers'. 
The context for this political shift was the re-emergence of economic instability 
and union militancy in the 1970s. This led influential sections of the business 
class to tum away from state interventionist towards neo-liberal policies designed 
to re-monetarize the market, re-commodify labour and re-capitalize production. 17 
The strategy pursued was one of subsuming labour beneath capital and the state 
beneath the market in order to disperse popular sovereignty 'up' into the self-
regulating system and 'down' into self-regarding individuals. It was most 
ruthlessly pursued in the advanced capitalist economies of the English speaking 
world such as America, Britain, Australia, New Zealand and Canada during the 
1980s (Hutton 1996).18 In each case, the government sought to tum on its head 
the Keynesian justification for state intervention by arguing that 'state failure' 
justified the 'marketization' of the economy. Consequently, as unemployment 
swept towards three million in Britain, the combination of free-market policies, 
anti-trade union laws and union defeats (most notably the miners in 1985), 
17 Although as Andrew Gamble (1994) reminds us, marketizing so~iality in this fashion requires .a 
strong state apparatus capable of suppressing dissent and the SOCIal problems engendered by this 
strategy. 
18 In Gennany, influential sections of the business community are only now coming to favour an 
American free-market model and the benefits of 'share-holder value' over the SOCIal-wage 
(Wirtchafts Woche No. 20). 
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undermined the capacity of the labour movement to defend its members and the 
welfare entitlements it had participated in creating. 
Under the rubric of 'monetarism', the Thatcher government openly sought to 
restore the capacity of money to steer the economy in a 'non-nonnative' fashion 
so as to 'de-politicize' decision making and release the state from its moral 
obligations. To this extent, almost every policy of the Conservative Government 
between 1979 and 1997 from Privatization to the Poll Tax was concerned to 
Increase the independence of the market system from state regulation and 
decrease the dependence of its strategically orientated agents upon state support. 
The result has been a weakening of the public sector and a strengthening of the 
degree to which the system and its strategic actors 'jut out' of the lifeworld. In the 
process, labour has become more 'flexible'; more amenable to its purchasers 
who's freedom to treat labour as a 'thing' to be hired and fired at will has been 
restored. 
In short, Thatcherism sought to bring about the independence of the system from 
democratic regulation by defending the independence of strategic actors from 
bureaucratic regulation. As capital gained greater hegemony over its workforce, 
so it became more dependent on the competitive pressures of the market. It then 
sought to translate the insecurities of the market down to its ('flexible') 
workforce via such innovations as 'zero-hour contracts' (Hutton 1996). However, 
the more the system and its strategic actors have acquired independence from the 
social state, the more the solidaristic elements of both the public and private 
lifeworld have weakened. If society appears less 'moral' than before this 
experiment in social policy, it is because neither system nor its strategic actors are 
as trammelled as before by collective forms of social obligation. 
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As a consequence of the long Conservative governance of Britain, the naiye 
optimism of the 1960s has given way to the cynical pessimism of the 1990s, as 
people seek to find solace in personal hedonism from the globalizing forces 
beyond their control. On the left, collective utopias have been displaced by 
market dystopias, 'grand narratives' have been abandoned in favour of local ones, 
and economic discourses have been replaced by cultural ones. Nevertheless, the 
capacity of atomized individuals to forge intersubjective alliances in opposition to 
the system's 'de-normatization' of social justice remains viable. In which case it 
is incumbent on critical theory to keep open this possibility by refusing to treat 
the facticity of the system as an expression of its validity. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In response to these developments we have sought to rethink critical theory along 
normative lines in opposition to both; (a) Marx's reliance on an essentialist 
conception of self-objectifying labour as the 'substance' of value; and (b) 
Habermas's reliance of an equally essentialist conception of communicative 
action as the last bastion of popular sovereignty. We have then argued that 
'market value' is neither an objective expression of purposive labour, nor a non-
normative expression of functional reason, but a form of alienated 
intersubjectivity whose 'technicization of the lifeworld' is predicated on the 
'capitalization' of labour. We have then sought to (theoretically) extend 
Habermas's conception of intersubjectivity to include labour, in keeping with the 
(practical) struggles of workers to 're-normatize' the economic system. Thus, 
rather than contrasting economic and moral struggles to one another, we have 
argued that the struggles of workers to increase their share of value is 
accompanied by attempts to de-commodify labour and thereby 're-normatize' the 
reified world of money. 
Consequently, while we have nothing but praise for Habermas's attempt to 
overcome the subject-centred failings of Marxism and place critical theory on a 
normative base, his etiolated conception of normativity abstracts from the efforts 
of democratic forces to bring about the 're-moralization' of the material system 
and 'materialization' of the moral system 'from the bottom up'. Indeed, by 
dirempting system and lifeworld in this fashion, Habermas reduces critical theory 
to a pale shadow of its former self that is not only insouciant to the 'damage' 
done to workers by withdrawing normative content from them, but also to the 
dangers faced by an increasingly unstable economic system. 
By VIeWIng the 'de-normatization' of labour as a 'rational' consequence of 
modernity, Habermas obscures the extent to which the 'uncoupling' of the system 
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from normative regulation is a matter of social struggle that finds him on the side 
of capital against labour. There is consequently little sense in Habermas' s work 
of the way worker's organizations struggle against the economy's capacity to 
dirempt intersubjectivity in order to establish zones of 'popular sovereignty' 
within the system. To this extent, Habermas's limited conception of 
intersubjectivity ontologically denies to labour what workers have sought to win 
through struggle against the system: namely a measure of control over the 
objective forces that regulate their working lives. 
In contrast to Habermas, we have sought to view value-relations as an alienated 
form of intersubjectivity capable of providing Habermas' s account of normativity 
with greater substance and Marx's account of commodity fetishism a normative 
content. Rather than accepting the objectivity of the system is either an inevitable 
consequence of functional reason, or a naturalistic consequence self-objectifying 
labour, we have sought to view it as an historical consequence of the capitalist 
system's capacity to regulate itself. It then follows that the more powerful 
intersubjective institutions become, the less the system can escape the normative 
claims of participants. In other words as normatively-regulated operations, run 
for the intersubjectively assessed benefit of participants strengthen, then market-
regulated ones, run for the objective benefit of the system and the subjective 
benefit of strategic actors, weaken. 
Like Habermas we share the conviction that neither the system nor its 
strategically motivated actors can fully escape the demands of normativity, all 
they can seek to do is prevent the development of intersubjective forces 
concerned to democratically affirm the welfare of participants above the pursuit 
of their own self-preservation. This, however, is contingent upon the system's 
pursuit of profit being able to fulfil consumer's demand for utility. In other 
words, on the system being able to 'deliver the goods'. However, this becomes 
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less assured the more the system struggles free of the stabilizing structures 
erected after W orId War II to avoid a repeat of financial meltdown. As such, 
capitalism remains a dilemmatic Structure caught between; (a) lessening its 
reliance on intersubjective forms of normative regulation at the risk of increased 
instability; and (b) increasing its reliance on the former at the risk of encouraging 
democratic forces to grow up in their interstices. 
The future of critical theory remains uncertain. In the wake of the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, writers such as Nancy Fraser (1997) argue we are now in a 
"'postsocialist" condition' (sic). In part this is a consequence of the 'realism' of a 
normatively grounded standpoint which, in the absence of traditional Marxist 
guarantees, now openly acknowledges that the viability of critical social theory is 
contingent upon the viability of oppositional social forces. We have therefore 
sought to ensure that our own normative reformulation of Marxism remains in 
step with the social context in which it is written. At the same time, we have 
endeavoured to generate a comprehensive account ofmodemity's ethical content, 
capable of accounting for the system's facti city in terms of its reification of 
morality. If it seems impossible to imagine a time when we might redeem the 
normative promise of self-constitution, immured in the economic forces of self-
regulation, we hope this in no way prevents our account from illuminating the 
form of contemporary social structures or the role played by social agents in 
reproducing them. 
207 
REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 
ADORNO, Theodor and HORKHEIMER, Max. Dialectic of Enlightenment 
(London, Verso, 1972). ' 
AGLIETT A, Michel. A Theory of Capitalist Regulation, (London, New Left 
Books, 1979). 
AL THUSSER, Louis. Lenin and Philosophy, (London, Monthly Review Press 
1971). ' 
ALTHUSSER, Louis. For Marx, (London, Verso, 1977). 
AL THUSSER, Louis and BALIBAR, Etienne. Reading Capital, (London, Verso, 
1979). 
APEL, Karl-Otto. 'The Problem of Philosophical Foundation', in After 
Philosophy, edited by Kenneth Baines, James Bohman & Thomas McCarthy 
(Cambridge Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1987). 
ARENDT, Hannah. The Human Condition, (London, Chicago Press, 1958). 
ARNOLD, N. Scott. Marx's Radical Critique of Capitalist Society, (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1990). 
ARTHUR, Chris. 'Objectification and Alienation in Marx and Hegel', Radical 
Philosophy, No. 30 (1982). 
ARTHUR, Chris. Dialectic of Labour, (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1986). 
BAUDRILLARD, Jean. The Mirror of Production, (St Louis, Telos, 1975). 
BAUDRILLARD, Jean. Selected Writings, edited by Mark Poster (Cambridge, 
Polity Press, 1988). 
BAUDRILLARD, Jean. Symbolic Exchange and Death, (London, Sage, 1993). 
BECK, Ulrich. Risk Society, (London, Sage, 1992). 
BEGG, David. Economics, (London, McGraw Hill Book Company, 1984). 
BEILHARZ, Peter. 'Negation and Ambivalence, Marx, Simmel and Bolshevism 
on Money', Thesis Eleven, No. 47 (1996). 
208 
BENHABIB, Seyla. Critique, Nonn and Utopia, (New York, Columbia 
University Press, 1986). 
BENHABIB, Seyla. Situating the Self, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1992). 
BERCH, Bettina. 'Wages and Labour' in Economics an Anti-Text, edited by 
Frances Green & Peter Nore (London, Macmillan, 1977). 
BERGER, Johannes. 'The Linguistification of the Sacred and the 
Delinguistification of the Economy" in Communicative Action, edited by Axel 
Honneth & Hans Joas (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1991). 
BERGER, Peter and PULBERG, Stanley. 'Reification and the Sociological 
Critique of Consciousness' , New Left Review, No. 35 (1966). 
BERMAN, Marshall. All That is Solid Melts into Air, (Verso, London, 1983). 
BERNSTEIN, Jay. Recovering Ethical Life, (London, Routledge, 1995). 
BOHM-BAWERK, Eugene von. Karl Marx and the Close of his System, (New 
York, 1949). 
BOOTH, William James. 'The Limits of Autonomy, Karl Marx's Kant Critique', 
in Kant and Political Philosophy, edited by Ronald Beiner et al. (New Haven, 
Yale University Press, 1993). 
BOWIE, Andrew. Aesthetics and Subjectivity, (Manchester, Manchester 
University Press, 1990). 
BOWLES, Samuel and GINTIS, Herbert. Democracy and Capitalism, (London, 
Routledge, 1986). 
BRAVERMAN, Harry. Labor and Monopoly Capitalism, (New York, Monthly 
Review Press, 1974). 
BREWSTER, Ben. 'Comment' on 'Reification and the Sociological Critique of 
Consciousness', New Left Review, No. 35 (1966). 
BROD, Harry. Hegel's Philosophy of Politics, (Oxford, Westview Press, 1992). 
BRONNER, Eric Stephen. Of Critical Theory and its Theorists, (Oxford, 
Blackwell, 1994). 
209 
BURA WOY, Michael. The Politics of Production, (London, Verso, 1985). 
CALHOUN, Craig. '~ntroduction, Habennas and the Public Sphere', in 
Habermas and the PublIc Sphere, edited by Craig Calhoun (London MIT Press 
1992). ' . 
CLARKE, Simon. Marx, Marginalism and Modem Sociology, (London, 
Macmillan, 1982). 
CLARKE, Simon, SEIDLER, Victor Jeleniewski, McDONNELL, Kevin, 
ROBINS, Kevin & LOVELL, Terry. One Dimensional Marxism, (London, 
Alison and Busby, 1980). 
CLEAVER, Harry. 'The Subversion of Money-as-Command in the Current 
Crisis', in Global Capital, National State and the Politics of Money, edited by 
Werner Bonefeld & John Holloway (London, Macmillan, 1995). 
COHEN, G.A. History, Labour and Freedom, (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1988a). 
COHEN, G.A. Self-Ownership, Freedom and Equality, (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1988b). 
COHEN, Jean and ARATO, Andrew. 'Politics and the Reconstruction of the 
Concept of Civil Society', in Cultural-Political Interventions in the Unfinished 
Project of Enlightenment, edited by Axel Honneth, Thomaas McCarthy, Claus 
Offe & Albrecht Wellmer (Cambridge Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1992). 
CROOK, Stephen. Modernist Radicalism and its Aftermath, (London, Routledge, 
1991). 
CROSSELY, Nick. Intersubjectivity, The Fabric of Social Becoming, (London, 
Sage, 1996). 
CUTLER Anthony, HINDESS, Barry, HIRST, Paul & HUSSAIN, Athar. Marx's 
Capital and Capitalism Today, (London, Routledge, 1977). 
DALLMA YR, Fred R. G.W.F. Hegel Modernity and Politics, (London, Sage, 
1993). 
DE VROEY. 'Marxian Value Theory', Capital and Class, No. 17 (1982). 
DERRIDA, Jacques. Of Grammatology, (London, John Hopkins University 
Press, 1974). 
210 
DERRIDA, Jacques. Spectres of Marx, (London, Routledge, 1994). 
DEUTSCHMANN, Christoph. 'Money as a Social Construction', Thesis Eleven, 
No. 47, (1996). 
DODD, Nigel. The Sociology of Money, (Oxford, Polity Press, 1994). 
DURKHEIM, Emile. The Division of Labour in Society, (New York, The Free 
Press, 1947). 
DURKHEIM, Emile. 'The Dualism of Human Nature and its Social Conditions' , 
in Essays on Sociology and Philosophy, (New York, Harper and Row, 1964). 
DURKHEIM, Emile The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, (New York, The 
Free Press, 1965). 
ELDRED, Michael. 'A Reply to Gleicher', in Debates in Value Theory edited by 
Simon Mohun (London, St. Martin's Press, 1994). 
ELDRED, Michael and HANLON, Mamie. 'Reconstructing Value-Fonn 
Analysis', Capital and Class, No. 13, (1981). 
ELSON, Diane. 'The Value Theory of Labour', in Value, edited by Diane Elson 
(London, CSE Books, 1979). 
ESPINO-ANDERSEN, Gosta. The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, 
(Cambridge, Polity Press, 1990). 
FICHTE, J.G. The Science of Knowledge, (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1970). 
FOUCAULT, Michel. The Order of Things, (London, Routledge, 1970). 
FOUCAULT, Michel. Discipline and Punish, (London, Routledge, 1977). 
FRASER, Nancy. Interview with Habermas. 'Concluding Remarks' , In 
Habermas and the Public Sphere, edited by Craig Calhoun (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, M.I.T. Press, 1994). 
FRASER, Nancy. Justice Interruptus, (London, Routledge, 1997). 
FRIEDMAN, Milton. Capitalism and Freedom, (Chicago, University of Chicago 
Press, 1962). 
211 
FRIEDMAN, Milton. Free to Choose, (London, Penguin, 1980). 
GAMBLE, Andrew. The Free Economy and the Strong State, (London, 
Macmillan, 1994). 
GERAS, Norman. Marx and Human Nature~ Refutation of a Legend, (London, 
Verso, 1983). 
GERAS, Norman. 'The Controversy About Marx and Justice', New Left Review, 
No. 150, (1985). 
GERAS, Norman. 'Bringing Marx to Justice', New Left Review, No. 195, 
(1992). 
GIDDENS, Anthony. 'Class Division, Class Conflict and Citizenship Rights', in 
Profiles and Critiques in Social Theory, (London, Macmillan, 1982). 
GLEICHER, David. 'A Historical Approach to the Question of Abstract Labour', 
in Debates in Value Theory, edited by Simon Mohun (London, St. Martin's 
Press, 1994a). 
GLEICHER, David. 'Abstract Labour, the Rubin School and the Marxist Theory 
of Value (Rejoinder to Eldred)', in Debates in Value Theory, edited by Simon 
Mohun (London, St. Martin's Press, 1994b). 
GORZ, Andre. The Critique of Economic Reason, (London, Verso, 1989). 
GOULD, Carol. Marx's Social Ontology, (London, MIT Press, 1978). 
GOULD, Stephen Jay. Life's Grandeur, (London, Jonathan Cape, 1996). 
GOULDNER, Alvin. The Two Marxisms, (London, Macmillan, 1980). 
HABERMAS, Jiirgen. 'Technology and Science as "Ideology" " in Towards a 
Rational Society, (Boston, Beacon Press, 1971). 
HABERMAS, Jiirgen. Knowledge and Human Interest, (London, Heinemann, 
1972). 
HABERMAS, Jiirgen. Theory and Practice, (Boston, Beacon Press, 1973). 
HABERMAS, Jiirgen. Legitimation Crisis, (London, Heinemann, 1976). 
212 
HAB ERMA S , Jurgen. Communication and the Evolution of Societ):, 
(Cambridge, Polity Press, 1984a). 
HABERMAS, Jurgen. The Theory of Communicative Action Vol. I, (Cambridge 
Polity Press, 1984b). ' 
HAB ERMA S , lurgen Der Philosophische Diskurs der Moderne, (Frankfurt am 
Main, Suhrkamp, 1985). 
HABERMAS, Jurgen. The Theory of Communicative Action Vol. II, 
(Cambridge, Polity Press, 1987a). 
HABERMAS, lurgen. The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, (Cambridge, 
Polity Press, 1987b). 
HABERMAS, Jurgen The New Conservatism, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1989a). 
HABERMAS, Jurgen. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 
(Cambridge, Polity Press, 1989b). 
HABERMAS, Jurgen Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 
(Cambridge, Polity Press, 1990). 
HABERMAS, Jurgen. 'A Reply', in Communicative Action, edited by Axel 
Honneth et al. (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1991). 
HABERMAS, Jurgen. Postmetaphysical Thinking, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 
1992a). 
HABERMAS, lurgen. 'Further Reflections on the Public Sphere', in Habermas 
and the Public Sphere, edited by Craig Calhoun (Cambridge Massachusetts, MIT 
Press, 1992b). 
HABERMAS, lurgen Justification and Application, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 
1993). 
HABERMAS, lurgen. 'Rawl's Political Liberalism', The Journal of Philosophy, 
Volume XCII, No.3, March (1995). 
HABERMAS, lurgen. Between Facts and Nonns, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 
1996). 
213 
HEGEL, Frederick. Phenomenology of Spirit, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1977). 
HEGEL, Frederic. System of Ethical Life, and First Philosophy of Spirit, (New 
York, SUNY Press, 1979). 
HEGEL, Georg. Reason in History, (Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merill Educational 
Publishing, 1953). 
HEGEL, Georg. Elements of the Philosophy of Right, (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1991). 
HENRY, Michel. Marx, A Philosophy of Human Reality, (Indiana, Indiana 
University Press, 1983). 
HEWITT, Martin. Welfare, Ideology and Need, (Hemel Hempstead, Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1992). 
HILTON, Rodney. Bond Men Made Free, (London, Methuen, 1973). 
HIMMELWEIT, Susan and MOHUN, Simon. 'The Anomalies of Capital', in 
Capital and Class, No.6, (1978). 
HINDESS, Barry. 'Citizenship in the Modem West', in Citizenship and Social 
Theory, edited by Bryan S. Turner (London, Sage, 1993). 
HOBBES, Thomas. Leviathan, (London, Penguin, 1968). 
HOLLOWAY, John. 'The Abyss Opens', in Global Capital, National State and 
the Politics of Money, edited by Werner Bonefeld & John Holloway (London, 
Macmillan, 1995). 
HOMER. The Odyssey, (Ware, Wordsworth Classics, 1992). 
HONNETH, Axel. The Critique of Power, (Cambridge Massachusetts, MIT 
Press, 1991). 
HONNETH, Axel. 'An Interview', Radical Philosophy, No. 65, (1993). 
HONNETH, Axel. The Fragmented World of the Social, (New York, New York 
Press, 1995a). 
214 
HONNETH, Axel. The Struggle for Recognition, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 
1995b). 
HUME, David. A Treatise of Human Nature, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978). 
HUTCHINSON, Kimberly. Kant, Critique and Politics, (London, Routledge, 
1996). 
HUTTON, Will. The State We're In, (London, Vintage, 1996). 
IL YENKOV, E.V. The Dialectics of the Abstract and the Concrete in Marx's 
Capital, (Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1982). 
INGRAM, David. Habermas and the Dialectic of Reason, (New Haven, Yale 
University Press, 1987). 
KANT, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason, (London, Macmillan, 1929). 
KANT, Immanuel. Critique of Practical Reason, (London, Macmillan, 1956). 
KANT, Immanuel. Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, (New 
York, Prometheus Books, 1987a). 
KANT, Immanuel. Critique of Judgement, (Indianapolis, Hacket Publishing 
Company, 1987b). 
KANT, Immanuel. Political Writings, edited by Hans Reiss (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1987c). 
KAY, Geoffrey. 'Why Labour is the Starting Point of Capital', in Value, edited 
by Diane Elson (London, CSE Books, 1979). 
KEANE, John. Public Life and Late Capitalism, (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1984). 
KELLNER, Douglas. Jean Baudrillard, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1989). 
KEYNES, John Maynard. The General Theory, (London, Macmillan, 1936). 
KILMINSTER, Richard. Praxis and Method, (London, Routledge, 1979). 
KING, Desmond S. The New Right, (London, Macmillan, 1987). 
215 
KITCHING, Gavin. Karl Marx and the Philosophy of Praxis, (Routledge, 
London, 1988). 
KNODT, Eva. 'Towards a Non-Foundationalist Epistemology: The Habennasl 
Luhmann Controversy Revisited', New German Critique, No. 61, (1994) 
LACLAU, Ernesto and MOUFFE, Chantal. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, 
(Verso, London, 1985). 
LEGRAND, J. & ROBINSON, R. The Economics of Social Problems, (London, 
Macmillan, 1984). 
LEYSHON, Andrew and THRIFT, Nigel. Money Space, (London, Routledge, 
1997). 
LIPPI, Marco. Value and Naturalism in Marx, (London, New Left Books, 1979). 
LUHMANN, Niklas. Social Systems, (California, Stanford University Press, 
1995). 
LUKACS, Georg. 'Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat', in 
History and Class Consciousness, (London, Merlin Press, 1971a). 
LUKACS, Georg. The Young Hegel, (London, Merlin Press, 1971b). 
LUKACS, Georg. The Ontology of Social Being 3: Labour, (London, Merlin 
Press, 1980). 
LUKES, Stephen. Marxism and Morali~, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1985). 
MANDEL, Ernest. 'Introduction' to Capital Vol. I, (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 
1976). 
MARCUSE, Herbert. Negations, Essays III Critical Theory, (London, Free 
Association Books, 1988). 
MARSHALL, T. H. Class Citizenship and Social Development, (Connecticut, 
Greenwood Press, 1973). 
MARX, Karl. Capital volume I, (London, Lawrence & Wishart, 195.+). 
MARX, Karl. Das Kapital volume I, (Berlin, Dietz \'erlag, 1962). 
216 
MARX, Karl. Theories of Surplus Value Volume I, (London, Lawrence and 
Wishart, 1967). 
MARX, Karl. 'Critique of the Gotha Programme', in Marx & Engels Selected 
Works in One Volume, (London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1968). 
MARX, Karl. Theories of Surplus Value V olume II, (London, Lawrence and 
Wishart, 1970a). 
MARX, Karl. A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, (London, 
Lawrence and Wishart, 1970b). 
MARX, Karl. Theories of Surplus Value Volume III, (London, Lawrence and 
Wishart, 1972). 
MARX, Karl. Grundrisse, (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1973). 
MARX, Karl. The First International and After, (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 
1974). 
MARX, Karl. Early Writings, (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1975). 
MARX, Karl. Capital Volume I, (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1976). 
MARX, Karl. Capital Volume II, (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1978). 
MARX, Karl. Capital Volume III, (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1981). 
MARX, Karl and ENGELS, Frederick. The Manifesto of the Communist Party, 
(London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1952). 
MARX, Karl and ENGELS, Frederick. The German Ideology, (London, 
Lawrence and Wishart, 1970). 
McCARNEY, Joseph. 'Marx and Justice Again', New Left Review, No. 195. 
(1992) . 
ARTHY Th 
The Critical Theon' of Jurgen Habermas, (Cambridge. 
McC ,omas. -
Polity Press, 1978). 
M CARTHY Thomas. 'Introduction' to 1YMllOllira~l_C~on!.!.!>iS~cl~·o~us.u..n~e~ssl.----,,",an......,.,d 
c~mmunicati~e Action, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1990). 
Ll/ 
McCARTHY, Thomas. 'Systems Theory, Complexity and Democracy', in 
Communicative Action, edited by Honneth and Joas (Cambridge, Polity Press, 
1991). 
McNALLY, David. Political Economy and the Rise of Capitalism, (Berkeley, 
University of California Press, 1988). 
MEAD, George H. Mind Self and Society, (Chicago, University of Chicago 
Press, 1970). 
MEEHAN, Johanna (ed.). Feminists Read Habermas, (London, Routledge, 
1995). 
MEEK, Ronald. Studies in the Labour Theory of Value, (London, Lawrence and 
Wishart, 1956). 
MEIKLE, Scott. Essentialism in the Thought of Karl Marx, (London, Duckworth, 
1985). 
MEIKSINS WOOD, Ellen. The Retreat from Class, (London, Verso, 1986). 
MESZAROS, Istvan. Marx's Theory of Alienation, (London, Merlin, 1970). 
MILLER, Daniel. Material Culture and Mass Consumption, (Oxford, Blackwell, 
1987). 
MURRAY, Patrick. Marx's Theory of Scientific Knowledge, (London, 
Humanities Press International, 1988). 
NEGRI, Toni. Selected Writings, edited by John Merrington (London, Red 
Notes, 1988). 
NORRIS, Christopher. What's Wrong with postmodemism, (London, Harvester, 
1990). 
klO 
PARSONS, Talcott. The structure of Social Action, (New York, The Free Press, 
1968). 
PIERSON, Christopher. Beyond the Welfare State?, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 
1991). 
PIETZ, William. 'Fetishism and Materialism: The Limits of Theory in Marx', in 
Fetishism as Cultural Discourse, edited by Emily Apter and William Pietz 
(Cornell University Press, London, 1993). 
PILLING, Geoffrey. Marx's Capital, Philosophy and Political Economy, 
(London, Routledge, 1980). 
POSTONE, Moishe. Time, Labour and Social Domination, (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
POSTONE, Moishe and BRICK, Barbara. 'Critical Theory and Political 
Economy', in On Max Horkheimer, edited by Seyla Benhabib et al. (Cambridge 
Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1993). 
RASMUSSEN, M. David. 'How is Valid Law Possible?', in Habermas, 
Modernity and Law, edited by Mathieu Deflem (London, Sage, 1996). 
RAY, Larry J. & REED, Michael. Introduction to Organizing Modernity, 
(London, Routledge, 1994). 
RORTY, Richard. Contingency, Solidarity and Irony, (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1989). 
ROSDOLSKY, Roman. The Making of Marx's Capital, (London, Pluto, 1977). 
ROSE, Gillian. Hegel Contra Sociology, (London, Athlone, 1981). 
ROUSSEAU, Jean-Jacques. The Social Contract, (London, Everyman. 1973). 
M 'Theorv of Value (Quebec, Black Rose Books. RUBIN, Isaak. Essays on arx s ~ , 
1973). 
. fE onomic Thinking (London. Ink Links, 1979). 
RUBIN, Isaak. A HISto~ 0 c ' 
RUNDEL, John F. Qrigins of Modem it.)::, (London, Polity Press, 1987). 
1 M demity' Radical Philosophy. '\0. 67. (l ()(J-l). RUSTIN, Michael. 'Incomp ete 0 , 
219 
SAHLINS, Marshal. Stone Age Economics, (London, Tavistock, 1974). 
SAUNDERS, Peter. 'Citizenship in a Liberal Society', in Citizenship and Social 
Theory, edited by Bryan S. Turner (London, Sage, 1993). 
SAYER, Derek. Marx's Method, (Sussex, Harvester, 1979). 
SCOTT, Alan. 'Popular Culture and Social Movements', in Political and 
Economic Forms of Modernity, edited by John Allen, Peter Braham & Paul 
Lewis (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1992). 
SENNETT, Richard and COBB, Jonathan. The Hidden Injuries of Class, 
(London, Faber and Faber, 1972). 
SIMMEL, Georg. The Philosophy of Money, (London, Routledge, 1978). 
SITTON, F. John. Recent Marxian Theory, (New York, SUNY Press, 1996). 
SMITH, Adam. The Theory of Moral Sentiments, (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1976). 
SMITH, Adam. The Wealth of Nations Books I-III, (London, Penguin, 1986). 
SOHN-RETHEL, Alfred. Intellectual and Manual Labour, (London, Macmillan, 
1978). 
TAYLOR, Charles. Hegel and Modem Society, (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1979). 
TAYLOR, Charles. Sources of the Self, (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1989). 
THERBORN, Goran. 'The Frankfurt School', New Left Review, No. 63, (1970). 
THOMPSON, E.P. 'Time, Work Discipline and Industrial Capitalism', Past and 
Present, No. 38, (1966). 
THOMPSON, E.P. The Making of the English Working Class, (London, 
Penguin, 1968). 
THOMPSON, E.P. The Poverty ofTheo~, (London, Merlin, 1978). 
220 
TONNIES, Ferdinand. Community and Society, (London, Transaction 
Publishers, 1993). 
TURNER, S. Bryan. 'Simmel, Rationalisation and the Sociology of Money', 
Socioloiical Reyjew, No. 36, (1986). 
TWINE, Fred. Citizenship and Social Rights, (London, Sage, 1994). 
VEBLEN, Thornstein. The Theory of the Leisure Class, (London, Transaction 
Publishers, 1992). 
W ALLIMANN, Isidor. Estraniement, (London, Greenwood Press, 1981). 
WALZER, Michael. Spheres of Justice, New York, Basic Books, 1983). 
WALZER, Michael. 'Response', in Pluralism. Justice and Equality, edited by 
David Miller et al. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995). 
WARNKE, Georgina. 'Communicative Rationality and Cultural Values', in ~ 
Cambridie Companion to Habermas, edited by Stephen K. White (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
WEBER, Max. Economy and Society, (Berkeley, University of California Press, 
1978). 
WEBER, Max. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, (London, 
Routledge, 1992). 
WEEKS, John. Capital and Exploitation, (London, Edward Arnold, 1981). 
WELLMER, Albrecht. The Persistence of Modernity, (Cambridge 
Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1991). 
WEST, Cornel. The Ethical Dimensions of Marxist Thought, (New York, 
Monthly Review Press, 1991). 
WHITE, Stephen K. The Recent Work of JUIien Habermas, (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1988). 
WHITE, Stephen K. (ed.). The Cambridge Companion to Habermas, 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
WILLIAMS, Robert R. Recognition, (New York, SUNY Press, 1992). 
221 
WINFIELD, Richard. Freedom and Modernity, (New York, SUNY, 1991). 
WINNICOTT, D.W. Home is Where we Start From, (London, Penguin, 1986). 
WINNICOTT, D.W. The Family and Individual Development, (London, 
Routledge, 1989). 
WIRTSCHAFTS WOCHE, 'Vorbild USA?' No. 20, (9/5/1996). 
YOUNG, Iris Marion. Justice and the Politics of Difference, (New Jersey, 
Princeton University Press, 1990). 
ZELENY, Jindrich. The Logic of Marx, (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1980). 
